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PRESENTACIÓN

Jonathan Pimentel Chacón
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En un estudio reciente titulado *Sovereignty and the Sacred*, Robert A. Yelle (2019) afirma que las nociones “religión” y “sagrado” designan una dinámica relación entre un orden normativo y el deseo de sobrepasar dicho orden, ya sea para escapar de él o legiti­marlo. La observación de Yelle es uno de los corolarios de la posición según la cual “las tempranas teorías de la secularización” (1) han sido insuficientes, porque estimaban el declive imparable de lo religioso en el “orden social”, para aproximarse a las prácticas religiosas. Según Yelle, el resurgimiento de la “religión” en la “esfera pública” hace obsoletas las posturas teóricas que suponen, contra una vasta evidencia, la desaparición de las prácticas religiosas dentro de “lo público”. Por el contrario, afirma el estudioso estadounidense, una visión comparativa, que toma en cuenta varios continentes, muestra que la “religión” ha devenido en un fundamento de valor político y en una fuente para la disputa acerca de derechos. Desde este punto de vista, entonces, es necesario no sólo ofrecer discusiones con respecto a las relaciones entre instituciones

religiosas, sociedades y Estados. El fracaso parcial o total de las teorías de la secularización hace necesario realizar variaciones teóricas para aproximarse a lo religioso. Yelle distingue dos matrices de análisis de “la religión”, a saber, una vinculada a la tesis del declive de lo religioso y otra, a la que él se adscribe, que se interesa por comprender cómo pueden prácticas antropológicas como las religiosas aportar al entendimiento y transformación del mundo actual. Pese a que su interés específico consiste en aportar a la comprensión de la categoría política de soberanía desde una perspectiva que procura desarrollar la tradición religiosa, en particular la noción de Jubileo, como alternativa a categorías “seculares”; la tesis general de Yelle consiste en afirmar que, contra teorías de la secularización y contemporáneas teorías de lo político, la consulta de las tradiciones religiosas puede ser un factor importante para cancelar los efectos negativos de sistemas éticos y económicos dominantes.

Ante la eclosión de actores y movimientos estricta o difusamente

religiosos, *Sovereignty and the Sacred* recomienda la profundización pública en el legado religioso (*history of religions*) desde una impronta que sobrepase los límites de la “crítica iluminista” y “utilitaria”, que, como efecto de su crítica, habría inmunizado contra la intervención política los ámbitos legal y económico. El estudio de Yelle concluye que es posible, e incluso necesario, releer “el archivo religioso” (187), toda vez que, por un efecto anamórfico, la perspectiva convencional mantenida con respecto a la religión distorsiona u oculta su “forma verdadera” y sus posibles alcances críticos. Dentro del “archivo” al que hace referencia Yelle se encuentran textos, nociones y prácticas “fundantes” que, asegura el autor, no pueden ser recibidas con adecuación desde ópticas teóricas dominadas por “el legalismo burocrático” y “el capitalismo burgués” (186), se refiere en particular a ciertas aproximaciones “positivistas de las ciencias sociales”. Así, el programa de trabajo propuesto en *Sovereignty and the Sacred* supone un retorno a “la religión” para ir más allá de su definición –delimitación– moderna y capitalista.

Desde una tradición teórica divergente, Abdennur Prado en su *Genealogía del monoteísmo* mantiene, a través de todo su estudio, una tesis precisa: “la religión ha sido uno de los más perversos legados de la colonización” (174). Según Prado el conjunto

de prácticas que constituyen las “ciencias de la religión” provienen de la necesidad colonial, cuyo núcleo sería el cristianismo, de catalogar y jerarquizar las múltiples y distintas “culturas” que forman la humanidad. De ahí que, para entender las teorías de la religión, dentro de las que debería estar, también, la *historia de las religiones* sea necesario un procedimiento “genealógico” (6) que muestre cómo ha surgido el concepto de religión en Occidente. A partir de este criterio, el objeto de estudio denominado “religión” o “religiones” no existiría fuera de su matriz colonial y occidental. Existen, eso sí, “cosmovisiones, modos de vida o sabidurías no occidentales” (357) cuya adecuada recepción requiere, desde la perspectiva adoptada por Prado, una tarea crítica que, además de demostrar la incapacidad heurística del concepto de religión para entender realidades “no occidentales”, asuma que la “disciplina académica de la historia de las religiones” está en “colapso interno”, asimismo, que la clasificación de las religiones y nociones asociadas a ella, por ejemplo, monoteísmo, ateísmo, mística y sagrado resultan ser “una cárcel de conceptos que actúa como un filtro que impide el acceso a la comprensión de las diferentes tradiciones, formas de vida, filosofías, cosmovisiones, etc., de los diferentes pueblos de la tierra” (8). De modo que, la *genealogía del monoteísmo* tiene como objetivo principal, previa ruptura –en parte hecha posible por

“una frase extraordinaria de Heidegger” (9)– con la onto-teo-logía que ha “dominado el pensamiento occidental durante siglos”, una recepción de las tradiciones de los pueblos de la tierra en la que, finalmente, hablen desde “sí mismas”. El diseño del libro de Prado pasa de “la crítica” o la “deconstrucción” –nociones que son usadas como equivalentes– cuyo núcleo es la genealogía hasta un *ensayo* en el que el islam es considerado fuera del “cuadro ideológico” que “vela” más que “muestra” al islam. Una vez realizado el procedimiento mediante el que es suspendida la fuerza “ocultadora” del “saber colonial” dentro del islam, entonces es posible escuchar las palabras del islam. Una vez rechazada, por analíticamente insuficiente, la tradición occidental de “los estudios religiosos”, Prado se dedica a la consideración del “lenguaje coránico” y procura mostrar que algunos términos claves del Corán han sido, mediante forzadas equiparaciones, desprovistos de su sentido auténtico.

Genealogía del monoteísmo ofrece una doble perspectiva que incluye, primero, la tesis del agotamiento de las “disciplinas occidentales” que crearon y posicionaron la “religión” como un objeto “transcultural” que podía ser comprendido con un conjunto fijo de conceptos y, también, a partir de procedimientos estándares. Tal “ciencia”, una vez explicitada su genealogía, pierde su capacidad de explicar “la

religión” y deviene, para Prado, en un campo de estudio específico, a saber, aquel dedicado a la explicación de las relaciones entre los procesos coloniales occidentales y la elaboración de saberes teóricos. En su límite, esta posición afirma que las “ciencias de la religión”, sus conceptos y procedimientos, carecen de toda capacidad para producir conocimiento efectivo acerca de “las cosmovisiones” de los pueblos. Por otra parte, y como resultado de lo anterior, tanto para los estudiosos como para los practicantes de aquellas “cosmovisiones”, se hace necesario reiniciar su relación con lo que hasta ahora ha sido considerado una “religión” sin serlo. Prado, entonces, considera que mediante otros procedimientos –los suyos son de carácter filológico y filológico– el lenguaje, las palabras y la sabiduría contenida en las “tradiciones” humanas pueden ser escuchados. Según esto, el colapso de la “religión” es el principio de una nueva vida para la mayor parte de las “sabidurías” de la tierra. Además de esto, que no es poco, las implicaciones políticas y económicas de la “escucha” no colonial de la “sabiduría” pueden ser, aunque en *Genealogía del monoteísmo* no se incluyen reflexiones explícitas al respecto, de fundamentales repercusiones.

Yelle y Prado comparten una común insatisfacción en relación con las herencias teóricas “burguesas” u “occidentales” que han servido como

aproximación convencional para entender “la religión”. También, asumen que, habida cuenta de la insuficiencia de algunas (Yelle) o todas (Prado) las tendencias teóricas que forman la tradición de estudios o ciencias de la religión es posible y además necesario retornar a las fuentes primordiales de las “cosmovisiones” (Prado) o las religiones (Yelle) para desde y con ellas procurar un mejor mundo. De modo que, una nueva relación con las religiones o cosmovisiones sería un momento importante en la crítica del capitalismo, el colonialismo y la violencia epistemológica. Este viraje, en el que el retorno a las “tradiciones de la humanidad” se encuentra en el centro de una “nueva crítica”, plantea que las críticas “burguesa” y “colonial” de las prácticas religiosas han empobrecido las capacidades humanas de imaginar y construir mejores formas de hacer mundo. Mientras que en la crítica previa “echar por el suelo” los postulados de “la religión” constituía un fundamento civilizatorio, la “nueva crítica” propone que “la religión” ha sido un objeto elaborado para satisfacer la necesidad de dejar sin efecto el carácter evocador y radical que provenía de una matriz de la especie, de ahí que acercarse nuevamente a “lo religioso” se convierta en una necesidad para detener nuestra cruel civilización.

En el contexto costarricense, J. Amando Robles propuso en *Repensar*

la religión (2001) que, con independencia del “rebrote” de la religión –contra lo expuesto por las teorías de la secularización–, asistimos a un cambio de paradigma cultural en el que el predominio de la “sociedad del conocimiento” hará que la religión basada en creencias esté en una crisis irreversible. Robles también presenta una “nueva mirada” de la religión y, más específicamente, de ella como creación (arte) humano. De tal transformación en la mirada dependía de que en “las nuevas condiciones culturales” en las que “ya no hay dogmas de ninguna especie” y en los que los valores deben ser “creados y establecidos de acuerdo con la ciencia” (137) en un contexto con múltiples o ningún centro (“red de redes”) que no admite filosofías ni teologías de la historia, la experiencia religiosa fuese auténticamente tal. La religión, pues, no puede ser “ética”, tampoco “dogma” ni, mucho menos, cimiento cultural. En “las sociedades del conocimiento”, el futuro de la religión, que correspondería con su carácter efectivo, sería propiciar el encuentro de los “sujetos” consigo mismos. Así entendida “la religión” no puede ser explicada más con “el concepto clásico de religión” (145), puesto que este remite a “creencias”. Por eso, dice Robles, el “mismo nombre religión ya no es adecuado para expresar lo que de verdad es la religión”. Debido al predominio de la ciencia, la técnica y el conocimiento en el “actual paradigma

cultural”, la “religión sin religión” es, según *Repensar la religión*, experiencias ofrecidas como caminos de exploración para quienes deseen practicarlas. La “religión”, según Robles, es una experiencia que “se hace o no se hace” (146). De este modo, qué es o pueda ser el mundo —qué es posible lograr a partir del arte humano y hacia dónde puede ir o debe ir la humanidad— son cuestiones que pertenecen al ámbito del conocimiento científico y, al intervenir en él, las “tradiciones religiosas” pierden su camino. A la “religión sin religión” corresponde explorar toda la realidad, pero desde “el silencio” en el que cada uno de nosotros se descubre “a sí mismo” y, sin resquicios, se adecua a la realidad (148). La propuesta de Robles, como las que anteriormente he mencionado, dice que es necesario, si es que se quiere conservar lo más valioso que contiene el clásico concepto de religión, ir más allá de las teorías tradicionales de la religión hasta alcanzar una religión sin religión capaz de existir en el cambio de época.

Repensar la religión, y la tradición analítica a la que se vinculaba, produjo una discusión en Costa Rica, cuya memoria se encuentra parcialmente recopilada en *Sociedades del conocimiento: crisis de la religión y retos a la teología en América Latina* (2005) y *América Latina: transformaciones en la religión y retos a la teología* (2008). En ambas memorias sobresale, entre múltiples

discrepancias, el acuerdo acerca de la incapacidad, parcial o total, del concepto de religión para explicar el complejo conjunto de prácticas que debe sintetizar. En efecto, la discusión con respecto al pasado y presente del concepto de religión, sus límites y posibilidades constituye un lugar de disputa. Sin embargo, ya sea que se piense en una “nueva crítica” o en el “conocimiento religioso” o que se estime necesario *desvanecer en el aire* las “ciencias de la religión” coloniales, el estudio de las “prácticas religiosas” experimentan una etapa de reformulación, clarificación, surgimiento y o acabamiento. El estudio de lo que, con equivocidad se ha denominado “religión”, está en busca de sí.

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Este número de *Siwö*, cuya primera sección se titula *Teoría e historia de la crítica de lo religioso*, se ofrece como una contribución a la discusión acerca de cuáles han sido y pueden ser las relaciones entre derechos humanos y religiosidades (Gallardo), la historia de las representaciones teóricas sobre religiones y el vínculo entre teología y economía política (Pimentel y Soto). En su conjunto, los artículos contribuyen a la comprensión y evaluación de aproximaciones a las prácticas religiosas que aún son influyentes. Clarifican, además, algunas de las relaciones entre teología cristiana y economía política que son usualmente soslayadas.

Además, ofrecen, en especial, el artículo de Gallardo, un aporte para la discusión actual acerca de cómo deben relacionarse las “religiosidades” y el ámbito civil.

En la sección *Estudios exegéticos* aparecen dos estudios de las escrituras cristianas que se concentran en la escatología del Evangelio de Lucas (Braun) y la relectura de un pasaje de Gálatas desde una perspectiva informada por la teoría *queer* (Yasuda). Ambos artículos contribuyen al necesario esfuerzo de relectura de la herencia escrita de las tradiciones cristianas.

Por último, en la sección *Estudios filosóficos*, se encuentra un artículo que ofrece posibles aportes para una filosofía de la mente (González). El artículo es un aporte a los estudios de filosofía de la mente en el contexto costarricense.

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TEORÍA E HISTORIA DE LA CRÍTICA DE LO RELIGIOSO

DERECHOS HUMANOS Y RELIGIOSIDADES

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOSITIES

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Resumen

El artículo expone una concepción sociohistórica de derechos humanos y muestra que el vínculo entre sociedad civil y religiosidades (y en especial sus formas institucionalizadas, o sea, plasmadas en iglesias, como es el caso del catolicismo) tiene un polo fuerte (la sociedad civil) y uno débil (las iglesias). En el campo de derechos humanos, las iglesias no pueden oponerse al Estado ni a la sociedad civil. Vale para todos los Estados que han firmado los protocolos y pactos de derechos humanos.

De esta manera una iglesia, por ejemplo, puede rechazar la práctica homosexual en su seno, pero no puede perseguir ni acosar de forma alguna esta práctica en la existencia social. No se está ante una situación ética, sino de juricidad ciudadana. Los ciudadanos pueden darse las prácticas sexuales que deseen mientras no constituyan delito. Los grupos religiosos pueden rechazar determinadas prácticas para sus miembros, pero no pueden hacer de su rechazo una cuestión política. Un subtema del artículo es que instituciones religiosas y derechos humanos no se articulan constructivamente de modo espontáneo, sino que pueden diferir y enfrentarse.

Palabras clave: derechos humanos, religiosidades, sociedad civil, iglesias, Estado.

Abstract

The article exposes a socio-historical conception of human rights and shows that the link between civil society and religiosities (and especially their institutionalized forms, that is, embodied in churches, as is the case of Catholicism) has a strong pole (civil society) and a weak one (the churches). In the field of human rights, churches cannot oppose either the State or civil society. It is valid for all the States that have signed the Protocols and Pacts of Human Rights.

In this way a church, for example, can reject homosexual practices in its midst, but cannot persecute or harass in any way these practices in social existence. It is not before an ethical situation but of citizen juridicity. Citizens can give themselves the sexual practices they wish while they do not constitute a crime. Religious groups can reject certain practices for their members but cannot make their rejection a political issue. A sub-theme of the article is that religious institutions and human rights are not constructively articulated spontaneously but can differ and be confronted.

Keywords: Human Rights, Religiosity, Civil Society, Churches, State.

Despejar un estereotipo acerca de derechos humanos

Uno de los estereotipos más difundidos (aunque no por ello de los más peligrosos) con respecto a derechos humanos consiste en atribuirlos a una *naturaleza* o *esencia* humana, de modo que cada individuo *nacería con ellos*. “Derechos Humanos” resultarían así un referente de la Humanidad. En realidad, en la expresión ‘derechos humanos’, el término ‘derechos’ remite a un factor o situación que puede *ser reclamado en circuitos judiciales*, nacionales o internacionales. Lo usual es que el violador de estos derechos sea un *Estado*, o sea, el Estado en cuyo territorio se ha cometido la violación sin que se repare el daño y se castigue a los culpables. Derechos humanos efectivos se diferencian de esta manera de *expectativas y demandas por derechos* (que pueden generarse en necesidades situacionales de individuos y sectores sociales) que, por no estar incorporados a la legislación o estarlo bajo la categoría de ‘derechos progresivos’, no pueden ser por completo reclamados jurídicamente. Por ejemplo, el *Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales* en su Parte 2, artículo 2.1, señala: “Cada uno de los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto se compromete a adoptar medidas, tanto por separado como mediante la asistencia y la cooperación internacionales, especialmente económicas y técnicas, *hasta el máximo de los recursos de que*

disponga, para lograr *progresivamente*, por todos los medios apropiados, inclusive en particular la adopción de medidas legislativas, la plena efectividad de los derechos aquí reconocidos” (las *itálicas* no están en el original). Como se advierte, estos derechos, entre los cuales se encuentran, por ejemplo, la *seguridad social* (art. 9) y una *educación* orientada “hacia el pleno desarrollo de la personalidad humana y del sentido de su dignidad” (art. 13), están limitados por los *recursos* económicos que posee un Estado y por su *progresividad* (que puede referirse a su cobertura educacional limitada aunque en expansión, o a la preparación de los profesionales responsables del proceso educativo, por ejemplo), de modo que un Estado determinado podría alegar que *se esfuerza por cumplir con estos derechos*, pero carece de los recursos materiales y humanos para llenar las demandas. Así, no los cumple, *pero tampoco los viola*. Los cumplirá *en algún futuro*. Esta posibilidad muestra que los derechos humanos, al menos los económicos sociales y culturales, no se siguen de una ‘natural dignidad humana’, sino que son enteramente socio-históricos. Un Estado los reconocerá *si posee los recursos para hacerlo*.

Se podría argumentar que lo anterior no vale para los *Derechos Civiles y Políticos* pactados, asimismo, internacionalmente en 1966 y vigentes desde la década siguiente. Entre ellos algunos pueden *suspenderse* justificando la

suspensión (la libertad de tránsito, por ejemplo) y otros se consideran *absolutos* (a no ser torturado, por ejemplo). Pero bastaría recordar que un Estado, EUA, no reconoce ni firma los acuerdos internacionales de derechos humanos, de modo que estos no pueden aplicárseles por tribunales que no sean estadounidenses a sus ciudadanos ni a sus políticos ni militares. Escribe un autor insospechable en este campo, Michael Ignatieff: “Desde que Eleanor Roosevelt presidió el Comité que redactó la Declaración Universal, Estados Unidos ha promovido normas basadas en los derechos humanos en todo el mundo, resistiéndose al mismo tiempo, a que esas normas se apliquen a los ciudadanos y a las instituciones estadounidenses” (40). Ignatieff estima que este *excepcionalismo* estadounidense se deriva de considerar su ciudadanía (incluye a sus políticos) que la legitimidad de derechos humanos se basa en las respectivas *soberanías populares nacionales*. No tiene importancia si el argumento de Ignatieff es o no correcto. Lo que interesa es que la noción de ‘soberanía popular, o sea, ciudadana nacional’ es enteramente sociohistórica, no ‘natural’. Y esto se da en el marco de los países considerados *occidentales*.

Si se remite uno a *otra cultura* como la hindú, el punto se torna todavía más patente. Escribe Ramchandra Pandeya:

Desde el comienzo debe señalarse que en sánscrito clásico no existe una palabra que signifique “derechos” en el sentido contemporáneo del término. En todos los contextos la idea de “exigencia justa” se expresa por medio de la palabra *adhikara*. Pero esta palabra difícilmente se utiliza aislada, sino más bien en el contexto, ya sea de la realización de un acto o de algún tipo de adquisición. La palabra *adhikaria*, que designa a una persona que tiene *adhikara* casi siempre sugiere que la persona ha llevado a cabo un *dharma* (obligación prescrita) o bien ha llegado a poseer algo, un valor o un status (...) Para el hindú todo derecho es adquirido, es decir que no es natural; en segundo lugar la adquisición de cualquier derecho es el resultado de una acción propia o del propio status (295-296).

En esta versión los derechos aparecen siempre *relacionales* y *situacionales*. Nadie nace con derecho alguno. Todos los derechos se determinan relacional y situacionalmente. Resultan enteramente *sociohistóricos*.

Un autor, Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004), que casi toda su existencia sostuvo una concepción derivada del *iusnaturalismo* con respecto a derechos humanos, reconoció finalmente que ellos se segúan de las *conflictividades objetivas* y *subjetivas inherentes a las sociedades modernas*:

La libertad religiosa es efecto de las guerras de religión, las libertades

civiles, de las luchas de los parlamentos contra los soberanos absolutos, la libertad política y las sociales, del nacimiento, crecimiento y madurez del movimiento de los trabajadores asalariados, de los campesinos con pocas posesiones o de los jornaleros, de los pobres que exigen a los poderes públicos no solo el reconocimiento de la libertad personal y de la libertad negativa, sino también la protección del trabajo frente al paro, y los instrumentos primarios de instrucción contra el analfabetismo, y sucesivamente la asistencia de la invalidez y la vejez, todas necesidades que los propietarios acomodados podían satisfacer por sí mismos (18).

Esta afirmación todavía podría contener una referencia a una común “dignidad humana” que subyacería a los distintos sectores e individuos que protagonizaron esas luchas, pero es también relacional y disipa otro estereotipo muy común incluso entre los activistas latinoamericanos de derechos humanos: los derechos humanos se *divorcian* de las *violencias*. Por el contrario, los grupos humanos que aspiran a que se les reconozcan ciertos derechos asumen que son socialmente *violentados* y que el reconocimiento jurídico de los que reclaman pueden *hacer violencia* a otros sectores de la población. Resulta muy sencillo ilustrar esto en las sociedades latinoamericanas actuales debido a las disputas y *movilizaciones encontradas* que

despiertan la legalización del aborto, el matrimonio entre homosexuales masculinos y lesbianas y, desde luego, la opción homosexual. Quienes adversan los reclamos de derechos en estos campos suelen señalar como argumento que se trata de “crímenes” (e irrespeto a la voluntad divina) y de opciones que van ‘contra natura’.

En todo caso, lo que interesa en relación con el estereotipo que se comenta es que los derechos humanos son todos *sociohistóricos* (los ya reconocidos en legislaciones y pactos internacionales y los que podrían serlo) y han sido generados por las *conflictividades* inherentes a las sociedades contemporáneas. Sus vínculos centrales se establecen con la *integración de la existencia social y personal*, pero solo por esta mediación pueden asociarse con una *pacificación* de la existencia social determinada por un *nuevo carácter de sus relacionalidades*.

Un estereotipo acerca de derechos humanos ligado al campo de las religiosidades e iglesias

El inicio del siglo XXI ha resultado especialmente preocupante para los derechos humanos. En el marco de una mundialización en la que los *Estados nacionales* resultan reconfigurados, aunque no desaparecen, por su inserción en *constelaciones de poder* internacionales y transnacionales (Organización Mundial de Comercio, Organización del

Tratado del Atlántico Norte [OTAN] con alcance planetario, Mercado Mundial, por ejemplo), cuya acción se torna débil o disfuncional (y muchas veces irritante), el desempeño de organismos como las Naciones Unidas o la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) generados por la geopolítica tras la Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939-1945), ciertos derechos a los que se creía ya firmemente establecidos, han sido puestos en duda. En el siglo y en el seno de la mundialización el planeta vio surgir, desde la destrucción de las Torres Gemelas (Nueva York, World Trade Center, 2001), una ideología de *guerra global preventiva contra el terrorismo* cuyos diversos frentes¹ contienen la *legitimidad de la tortura contra los terroristas y sus asociados*, la invasión y ocupación unilateral y no discutida de Estados y regiones con sus pobladores, el empleo de la violencia *unilateral extrema* contra Estados débiles o a los que se intenta debilitar, la conspiración económica, política e ideológica para ‘asegurar la libertad, la seguridad y la democracia’ (“primavera árabe”). La mundialización en curso complementa “éxitos” de algunos

grupos con la precariedad de la existencia de millares que *no encuentran empleo o seguridad en sus lugares de residencia* y emigran en condiciones usualmente inestables y en las que son vejados en sus lugares de tránsito o destino. Solo en la llamada “ruta del Mediterráneo” murieron, entre enero y octubre del 2016, 3.800 emigrantes que buscaban un lugar en los países de la Unión Europea (*El País*, 26-10-2016). La *Ruta del Mediterráneo* ha sido utilizada por más de un millón de emigrantes en los últimos ocho años. Estos emigrantes no son deseados en sus lugares de origen (Argelia, Libia, Egipto, por ejemplo), se les *acosa en su trayectoria* por bandas de delincuentes y pobladores que lucran con sus desplazamientos y *tampoco son bien recibidos* (cuando les dejan permanecer) en sus lugares de destino.

En términos más amplios, la mundialización genera tanto *pérdida de empleos* (“población sobrante”, determina Z. Bauman) como *provisoriedad de ellos*. Se trata de *tendencias sistémicas* que se fortalecerán en las próximas décadas al igual que la transformación de territorios y poblaciones desde Estados y naciones y *puntos de inversión privilegiada* determinados por los requerimientos del mercado mundial y provistos por las tecnologías de punta.

En este contexto de *precarización de derechos humanos* aparece el libro del profesor universitario inglés Stephen

1 La guerra global *preventiva* contra el terrorismo contiene, en su enunciación por Estados Unidos, cinco frentes: diplomático, militar, de espionaje, jurídico y financiero. Ninguno de estos frentes requiere concertación. El Estado que considere que tiene la fuerza para actuar, lo hace. Los terroristas son determinados por la acción de los poderosos. Los costos inmediatos son de seguridad, privacidad, libertad y vida para todas las poblaciones del planeta. Al menos Rusia y el Reino Unido se han plegado a esta doctrina planetaria.

Hopgood *The Endtimes of Human Rights* (“Los días finales de Derechos Humanos”). Su tesis es directa:

No vivimos en la época del triunfo, sino en la de los últimos días de los derechos humanos. En nuestro mundo multipolar de poder estatal y social dispersos, los límites inherentes del modelo global de derechos humanos impulsado por organizaciones como *Amnistía Internacional* y *Human Rights Watch* se están haciendo dolorosamente aparentes. Ambas organizaciones están intentando ajustarse (...) Pero para que el concepto de derechos humanos mundiales permanezca, tiene que surgir un movimiento nuevo, más político, transnacional, flexible y ágil, que sustituya al modelo de activismo actual, de liderazgo vertical y dirigido por Occidente” (*Derechos humanos: ya pasó su vida útil*).

La tesis de Hopgood contiene vacíos. En realidad, la propuesta de *Derechos Humanos universales*, hecha en 1948 en las tinieblas atroces del holocausto nazi y de las masacres atómicas de la población no combatiente en Hiroshima y Nagasaki, fue una declaración que la constitución interna de las sociedades capitalistas de avanzada (y el consiguiente mercado mundial) no podía cumplir. Las sociedades contemporáneas *inventaron derechos humanos* en los siglos XVII y XVIII en el mismo complejo movimiento en el

que crearon las figuras de las ‘no personas’² e iniciaron una *sacralización* de los fetiches mercantiles, del dinero y del mercado. La materialización de estos fetiches torna no factibles/cumplibles los derechos humanos tanto en Occidente como en un planeta en el que las mayorías de gentes pueden ser consideradas por sectores con poder como ‘malas razas’, ‘mujeres’, ‘fuerza de trabajo barata y dispensable’, ‘fundamentalistas’ o, llanamente y sin mayor explicación, ‘hostiles’. El otro ‘gran vencedor de la guerra’, la Unión Soviética (con su mundo acosado por la Guerra Fría y su teratologización interna), sostenía en 1948 otro concepto de derechos humanos (progresivo) y con ello la declaración, en su nacimiento, mostraba su *fragilidad*. Declaración importante como *referente de horizonte*, pero débil por razones sistémicas y geopolíticas en Occidente y también débil por razones ideológicas y también sistémicas en el campo socialista-comunista. En la situación general latinoamericana, con *Estados patrimoniales*, rentistas y clientelares y sociedades de *status* con poblaciones que

2 La no persona resulta admirablemente descrita por uno de los creadores de los derechos humanos, J. Locke: la no persona es alguien que al ‘intentar’ atentar contra la vida o la propiedad de otro se comporta como una bestia salvaje y debe ser liquidado (Locke capítulo III # 16). El corolario de esta tesis es que mientras existan individuos e instituciones con capacidad para aplastar o rebajar, física o culturalmente, a otros individuos humanos, y quedar impunes, siempre existirán no personas.

se declaran mayoritariamente católicas, la declaración del 48 y los pactos posteriores sirven para engolamientos, luchas y reclamos ocasionales y permanentes (de grupos indígenas o rurales, por ejemplo), pero *carecen de reconocimiento cultural* por parte de una muy desinformada población y ciudadanía.

En breve, *nunca ha existido una época de triunfo para los derechos humanos planetarios*. En el momento de nacer, los Derechos Humanos, con mayúscula, sus balbuceos iniciales contenían ya también sus momentos finales. Los Derechos Humanos sí han servido para salvar vidas, procurar reconocimientos y castigar responsables de violaciones, pero también han sido, y mayoritariamente, *bandera cínica* para atropellos y crímenes que permanecen impunes (la Guerra de Indochina y las Dictaduras de Seguridad Nacional en América Latina, por ejemplo, o la continuidad del imperio patriarcal y del hambre y la miseria, o los oídos sordos ante las movilizaciones ciudadanas por la destrucción de armamentos nucleares y el final del racismo), pero obviamente el *éxito/impunidad en el atropello*, relegaciones y *crímenes* no puede ser declarado universalmente como “triumfo”.

Sin embargo, con estas y otras deficiencias, Hopgood sostiene puntos de vista interesantes y valiosos en cuanto permiten discutir. Escogemos dos. Indica Hopgood: “Serán los *activistas*,

y no los Estados, los que cambien las cosas en el futuro. Pero, es posible que el *tiempo de las organizaciones occidentales de derechos humanos* también haya pasado” (*Derechos humanos: ya pasó su vida útil*). Las organizaciones a que se refiere Hopgood son *Amnistía Internacional* y *Human Rights Watch*. Una de las preocupaciones que llevan a Hopgood a pensar que se vive un final para los Derechos Humanos (las mayúsculas remiten a que se trata de como los entienden los Estados poderosos occidentales) es su escepticismo acerca de la capacidad que tengan *Amnistía Internacional* y *Human Rights Watch* para penetrar e influir tanto en el Sur (América Latina) como en los países no occidentales. Es desde esta prevención que postula un *nuevo carácter* para la *promoción de derechos humanos*: un *liderazgo no vertical* y no dirigido *unilateralmente* por Occidente. Lo valioso de la tesis es que se acerca a lo que ha sido la *historia efectiva* (no la pantomima) de los derechos humanos: han sido reclamados por *sectoressociales* desde los cuales emergen *personalidades* que representan a estos grupos sectores (Olympe de Gouges, mujeres, F. Babeuf, explotados, y M. Luther King Jr., afroamericanos, por ejemplo). Al señalar un *liderazgo no unilateralmente occidental* Hopgood está tocando un campo complejo y vasto que contiene tanto la *diversidad de culturas* y la necesidad de *mutuos reconocimientos por todos los sectores*, al igual que una *voluntad económica y geopolítica*

de acompañamientos sin subordinaciones, como también la existencia de *diversas racionalidades* (y religiosidades) que pueden expresarse en una misma cultura o en culturas diferentes. Se trata de cuestiones que no han sido adecuadamente planteadas y que se han “resuelto” mediante la imposición de la cultura y de la razón occidentales como si estas carecieran de versiones distantes y no siempre conciliables en su propio seno.

Una segunda preocupación de Hopgood toca directamente a América Latina. Escribe, hablando del activismo sobre Derechos Humanos en el Sur: “Para empezar, no hay razón alguna para pensar que los Estados del *sur global* se comportarán de manera distinta a los Estados del norte. Los Estados son Estados. Los BRICS (*Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica*), no son un nuevo comienzo, sino aspirantes al estatus global como miembros de la *hipocresía organizada de los Estados soberanos*”. La pregunta es:

¿Pueden las organizaciones occidentales de derechos humanos enfrentar esto si se *alían de forma exitosa con grupos de la sociedad civil del sur*? Hasta ahora, las ONG de occidente han fallado en la tarea de crear un vínculo con el público del sur, más allá del nivel de las élites. ¿Puede esto cambiar? Después de todo, muchas organizaciones y movimientos locales del sur *mantienen creencias que no ocupan un lugar importante en*

el pensamiento occidental sobre derechos humanos. Estas incluyen creencias sobre la *religión*, la justicia, la solidaridad étnica, los derechos laborales y la *importancia de la familia*. Estas creencias siguen siendo aspectos vitales de sus identidades (...) ¿Qué suerte correrán los *ideales de derechos humanos universales* (...) con este conjunto de actores diversos y muchas veces en conflicto, cuando muchos de ellos ven a los *derechos humanos como compatibles* con las *normas no liberales* o están *comprometidos con derechos sociales, económicos y culturales* determinados por Human RightsWatch como una base inadecuada para una campaña eficaz? (*Derechos humanos: ya pasó su vida útil*, las itálicas no están en el original).

Como se advierte, existiría un *Norte liberal* atinado y sólido en la determinación de Derechos Humanos y un *Sur* (Brasil y América Latina, en lo que aquí importa) en el que *solo las élites se conmueven*, aunque hipócritamente, con ellos. La razón, de acuerdo con Hopgood, es que este Sur contiene *no liberales religiosidades* (e iglesias), creencias sobre derechos laborales, racismos y etnocentrismos y *fijaciones sobre la familia*. Por no liberales el ‘sí mismo’ cultural de estas regiones deviene *incompatible con Derechos Humanos*. Curiosamente, Hopgood no menciona ‘nuestros’ ejércitos. Pero, en efecto, nuestros Estados no son liberales (ya que se comportan como

rentistas y clientelares), las poblaciones se adhieren en su mayoría a la Iglesia católica (un 65 o 70%) y el catolicismo es un factor *significativo*, aunque *difuso* de la cultura de esta población y de sus *identificaciones inerciales*. Los latinoamericanos hemos constituido sociedades de *fracturas* (separatidades) sólidas y *enfrentamientos brutales* que terminan deslizándose con facilidad hacia *aplastamientos*. Y los cristianismos en uso se materializan sobre todo en expresiones pías, ingenuas y falsas o sólidamente litúrgicas y no como una *forma de existencia* fuera de los templos (excepto en cuanto cultura difusa que justifica cualquier tipo de acciones en interés propio) que *reúna y convoque prójimos*.

Lo negativo del posicionamiento de Hopgood, aun cuando no sea este su propósito, es que su determinación de las poblaciones de este Sur Latinoamericano como no liberales, *facilita su inserción en el conjunto de gentes* que (por no consumir con opulencia y menos producir con eficiencia) *resultan prescindibles* en un planeta hoy *acosado en su capacidad para mantener la vida humana en él* tanto por su estilo de existencia (mundialización capitalista) como por el *número de sus habitantes* (su número superará los 10.000 millones en este siglo. “Sobra” mucho más de la mitad). De varias maneras esta población puede recibir la caracterización de no

personas. Resultan agresores silenciosos o gritones, pero agresores al fin.

En todo caso, lo que importa en este apartado no es una prolongación para las poblaciones latinoamericanas, africanas y asiáticas, de las reflexiones de Hopgood, sino el que ellas hayan suscitado una respuesta de Larry Cox, quien ha sido tanto Secretario General Adjunto de *Amnistía Internacional* como codirector de *Kairós* (Centro para Religiones, Derechos y Justicia Social de la institución neoyorquina *Union Theological Seminary*). La presentación de Cox ataca directamente uno de los puntos que hemos destacado de la opinión de Hopgood:

Muchos activistas de derechos humanos son laicos y ven a la religión como un problema, en vez de como una aliada (...). Los derechos humanos y la religión se necesitan mutuamente. Aunque es posible que la universalidad de los derechos humanos requiera una presentación laica, la verdadera potencia del movimiento de los derechos humanos proviene de sus dimensiones inherentes religiosas. //Cuando los activistas de derechos humanos de nuestros días reconocen y crean vínculos con esas dimensiones, obtienen fuerza, nuevas alianzas y el aumento de legitimidad a nivel mundial que tan urgentemente necesitan (Cox, *Los derechos humanos necesitan religión*).

Todos estos argumentos, centrales para la reflexión de Cox (*los derechos humanos y la religión se necesitan mutuamente*), descansan en la gruesa identificación entre *religiones* (y religiosidades) e *instituciones* religiosas o *iglesias*. Esta asociación, y con mayor razón su identificación, resulta falsa. *Se puede tener fe religiosa* (exaltada o tenue) y *no estar adscrito a iglesia alguna* o a muchas. Se puede adherir con fe religiosa a una institución religiosa determinada y carecer de la más elemental información sobre su doctrina. Y se puede tener hasta un *alto cargo* en una institución religiosa o *iglesia* y *carecer de esta fe religiosa*. No se discute para nada aquí si la fe religiosa surge desde el ánimo de los individuos o resulta de una gracia sobrenatural y si su materialización supone información doctrinal especializada. En un frente, resulta factible para individuos y grupos *fingir fe religiosa* y, en el otro, no debería resultar sorprendente *mostrar fe religiosa ardiente y no participar de iglesia alguna*. O asistir, incluso con regularidad, a las liturgias de muchas de ellas. Existe una distancia entre religiosidad y adscripción a una iglesia. Y quienes se adscriben a alguna pueden carecer de fe religiosa o carecer de información (y del deseo de informarse) acerca de la institución en que se inscriben.

Un estereotipo desde las religiosidades acerca de derechos humanos

Superado, al menos en esta argumentación, el elemento falso de una entera identificación entre religiosidades e instituciones eclesiales conviene presentar y dialogar con otros aspectos de lo que resulta finalmente también un *estereotipo*, pero esta vez respecto de los vínculos entre *derechos humanos* y *religiosidades* e *iglesias*. Señala Cox: "... Los derechos humanos y la religión se necesitan mutuamente" (*Los derechos humanos necesitan religión*). En realidad, en la *historia larga de la especie* no lo han hecho. En primer lugar, porque no han coincidido. La especie humana, desde sus pequeños grupos iniciales y en cuanto *comenzó a producir cultura*, ha mostrado y comunicado *sentimientos religiosos* básicamente orientados a *sostener sus tramas sociales* (o sea, su estabilidad y supervivencia) y lo ha hecho mediante la *narración de mitos* (naturalistas, politeístas, monoteístas o deístas) que ligan ese entramado (sociohistórico) y su orden/violencia con *espacios* y *seres sobrenaturales*. El sentimiento religioso, hemos señalado, no requiere de iglesias, aunque bajo ciertas condiciones, puede crearlas. La primera 'iglesia' y el primer 'templo' fueron al mismo tiempo *las primeras comunidades culturales*. Los templos y los cultos institucionalizados vendrán mucho después. La *narración literaria* de Abraham puede fijarse quizás en el siglo VI a. C.

Pero una eventual existencia de Abraham no puede datarse con los actuales instrumentos tecnológicos. *Se pierde en el tiempo*. Sin embargo, es también obvio que en el siglo VI a. C. no existían derechos humanos ni tampoco los había en vida de Pablo de Tarso (5 o 10 d. C.-58-67) y Mahoma (570-632). Estos derechos son producidos y propuestos desde imaginarios modernos y contemporáneos. Su carácter "mundial" es tan reciente como el inicio de la vigencia de los pactos sobre derechos humanos en marzo de 1976. ¡Menos de 50 años! Cuando los derechos humanos estatales y 'mundiales' aparecen, sentimientos y doctrinas religiosas tenían ya siglos. Y, de hecho, su *dependencia mutua* no es tal. El artículo 10 de la Declaración francesa sobre los derechos del hombre y el ciudadano (1789) señala: "Ningún hombre debe ser molestado por razón de sus opiniones, *ni aún por sus ideas religiosas*, siempre que al manifestarlas no se causen trastornos del orden público establecido por la ley" (las itálicas no están en el original). Está claro: todas y cada una de las opiniones o creencias religiosas (o el no tenerlas del todo) resultan legítimas. Solo se castigan como delitos si ellas son factor de violencia *contra el orden público*. Las personas en este orden público constituyen la llamada *sociedad civil*. La idea precisa es que una *Iglesia* (alguna, en ese momento, deseaba dominar en forma irrestricta las almas y las prácticas de sus cuerpos) *no puede obligar de*

ninguna manera a nadie, excepto que esa persona voluntariamente acepte la obligación y mientras ella no constituya delito. *La libertad de conciencia religiosa es un derecho humano y ciudadano*. Conciencia religiosa y derechos humanos pueden resultar compatibles, pero solo la primera puede llegar a ser punible (un referente jurídico, no religioso) en ciertas condiciones, derechos humanos no. Cumplir con la legislación es *vinculante* para un ciudadano. En cambio, *la salvación no resulta obligatoria para nadie*. Pero tampoco a nadie se le prohíbe buscarla. Es el *ethos* de las sociedades modernas occidentales. Luego, una afirmación como "...derechos humanos y religión se necesitan mutuamente" es *enteramente discutible y polemizable* en el marco de las sociedades contemporáneas. Si existe una doctrina religiosa o iglesia que desea tener *control total* sobre la *identidad y comportamientos* de todos los ciudadanos, esta pretensión resulta *ilícita*. Tener creencias religiosas es legítimo, pero *en el marco de una sociedad civil*. Se advertirá que existe aquí una *jerarquía* y que en ella las religiosidades quedan subordinadas. Si quien tiene fe religiosa viola esta jerarquía, deberá responder por su transgresión en los circuitos judiciales.

En este punto específico conviene retornar a la afirmación de Cox, pero variándola desde la observación crítica anterior. '*... derechos humanos y religiosidades se necesitan mutuamente*'. Pero

‘derechos humanos’ resultan *jurídicamente vinculantes* y por ello tienen un contenido preciso. Si no fuera así, no podría reclamarse su violación en los circuitos judiciales. Ningún ciudadano puede optar por *no tener derechos humanos*. Aunque los rechace, los porta. La fe religiosa en cambio es una *decisión privada*. Por eso se la puede vivir de distintas maneras e incluso abandonarla. Mientras esa fe religiosa no implique cometer delitos ninguna autoridad pública la objetará. Si esto es así, existe una clara *asimetría* entre derechos humanos y fe religiosa o religiosidades, ya sea que se los considere como prácticas o como conceptos. Los primeros resultan *irrenunciables* en sociedades que los reconozcan. La fe religiosa es *opcional* u *obligatoria* (para quienes la estiman concedida por Dios desde el inicio de los tiempos). A esta primera asimetría se añade otra: ‘derechos humanos’ dicen que uno se inscribe en una determinada *sociedad civil* (que es un cuerpo *básico* y *general* vinculante). ‘Fe religiosa’ indica que uno se inscribe en una *comunidad parcial* y *singular* no vinculante, excepto por decisión propia, *supeditada a la sociedad civil*. De esta manera, todas las personas de una asamblea religiosa resultan ciudadanos, pero no todos los ciudadanos deben pertenecer a una u otra asamblea de fieles religiosos. El extremo socialmente débil de la relación es la *comunidad de fieles religiosos*. Pero en esta comunidad pueden darse creyentes blandos y duros, creyentes

informados y desinformados, creyentes que hacen de su creencia una forma de vida y quienes solo la estiman liturgia en un templo, etcétera.

Cuando afirma que:

Después de todo, muchas organizaciones y movimientos locales del sur *mantienen creencias que no ocupan un lugar importante en el pensamiento occidental sobre derechos humanos*. Estas incluyen creencias sobre la *religión*, la justicia, la solidaridad étnica, los *derechos laborales* y la *importancia de la familia*. Estas creencias siguen siendo aspectos vitales de sus identidades, incluso mientras estos grupos sureños están siendo perseguidos por sus propias élites y Estados (*Derechos humanos: ya pasó su vida útil*, las itálicas no están en el texto).

Hopgood está pensando (en lo que respecta a América Latina) en específico en *sociedades de estatus* y no de rendimientos y en *sociedades mayoritariamente católicas* donde por definición el individuo *no resulta sujeto* (principio de agencia liberal) porque quien realiza su subjetividad (adherirse a Cristo Jesús) es el *Espíritu Santo*. Adherirse a derechos humanos en la institución católica supondría su efectiva *revolución interna*.

En este sentido, la argumentación alternativa de Cox resulta muy deficitaria por imprecisa. Su fórmula

“derechos humanos y religiosidades se necesitan mutuamente” pasa por alto que identidades e identificaciones religiosas pueden predicarse *dentro de un abanico muy amplio* que va desde quien no tiene fe religiosa y la aparenta por razones de *estatus*, credibilidad e inserción, hasta quien se experimenta con esa fe e intenta hacerla presente en todos los momentos de su existencia. Los primeros no se interesan en derechos humanos excepto que les sean violados a ellos o a sus cercanos. Los segundos, en específico los católicos, se interesan en ellos, pero regularmente desde un posicionamiento negativo: *no los admiten si le parecen no deseados por su iglesia* (es decir, por su Dios trinitario institucionalizado). Estiman que su no admisión y sólido rechazo los acerca a la *salvación*. Su negatividad con respecto a derechos humanos va desde la sexualidad (un homosexual es admisible solo si *no practica* su “depravación grave”) (*Catecismo*, # 2357 y siguientes), por ejemplo, hasta la liquidación de “comunistas” contra los cuales resulta legítima la violencia (*Populorum progressio*, # 30, 31). Dejamos de lado la hostilidad de la jerarquía católica hacia judíos, musulmanes y mujeres. Luego, un primer aspecto es que los *sentimientos propios de una fe religiosa* no son vividos por todos los fieles de una manera ya no idéntica, sino solo *parecida*. Y que la vivencia de una religiosidad puede contener, para algunos fieles religiosos, *enconos* en relación

con derechos humanos que una sociedad civil compleja por diversa reclama.

En este punto Cox argumenta que algunos creyentes religiosos han tenido, “una participación extremada en los movimientos en favor de los derechos y la justicia social. Lo hacen porque con frecuencia su fe es lo que les da la inspiración moral, la legitimidad popular y la fortaleza interna para soportar grandes sufrimientos. Consecuentemente, la acción con base en la fe ha sido, y sigue siendo, una de las principales fuerzas que socavan los sistemas políticos represivos en todo el mundo” (*Los derechos humanos necesitan religión*). Por desgracia en el párrafo anterior no menciona la participación de los pueblos cristianos o católicos, sino a *personalidades*: “Óscar Romero de El Salvador, Mahatma Gandhi de la India, Shirin Ebadi de Irán, Martin Luther King de los Estados Unidos (EE. UU.) y Aung San SuuKyi de Birmania/Myanmar”. Esta mención de personalidades resulta por completo unilateral. Olvida, por ejemplo, y desde la realidad latinoamericana, que Óscar Arnulfo Romero *fue aislado por la jerarquía de su iglesia* (salvadoreña y vaticana), contra el sentir mayoritario de su pueblo, incluso después de su martirio, y que, así como se le menciona positiva y justificadamente a él, *criminales* como los *generales* Jorge Rafael Videla (Argentina) y Augusto Pinochet (Chile), ambos católicos, nunca fueron aislados,

denunciados ni repudiados por estas mismas jerarquías locales y vaticanas. Y para no dejar en paz a los cristianos protestantes, así como se indica a Gandhi (para nada cristiano), *uno de los mayores genocidas de Guatemala* (se trata de un escalafón muy competitivo), Efraín Ríos Montt, tras dejar el catolicismo se transformó en ministro de la Iglesia Pentecostal de la Palabra.

Para no quedarnos en localismos, recordemos con tristeza que en el feroz *genocidio de Ruanda* (1994, 800.000 tutsis asesinados, casi todas las mujeres tutsis que sobrevivieron el genocidio fueron violadas y la mayoría de los 5.000 niños nacidos de esas violaciones resultaron liquidados) intervinieron siniestramente religiosos católicos, incluido el obispo de Gikongoro, Agustín Misago. Sobre la participación de creyentes católicos en el genocidio reproduzco un párrafo de un diario mexicano:

Entre los procesados por su participación genocida se encuentran dos monjas benedictinas: Consolata Mu-kangango (sor Gertrudis) y Julienne Mukabutera (sor María Kizito), acusadas de haber contribuido en la ejecución de 7 mil tutsis que buscaban refugio en el convento de Sovu. La participación de estas “religiosas” consistió en llamar “a las milicias para que echaran del lugar a los desesperados tutsis del perímetro del convento. Les dieron

gasolina a los milicianos para que quemaran a unos 500 tutsis que se habían refugiado en el estacionamiento del convento (*La Jornada*, 9 de junio del 2001).

No conviene olvidar que el Vaticano (Juan Pablo II) defendió y apoyó a estos genocidas. Por supuesto, no todos y cada uno de los cristianos y católicos es un criminal abyecto o un genocida. Lo que aquí se muestra es que una declarada religiosidad *no inmuniza contra la crueldad ni bloquea los odios* o lleva a *renunciar a la cobardía abyecta*. Luego, existen cristianos y católicos en lo personal generosos y bellos (y en parte deben estos caracteres a su fe religiosa), existe un buen número que *vive su religiosidad como si ella lo apartara de los demás* y además existe otro grupo que *no experimenta incompatible ser cristiano o católico y despreciar, acosar y matar* (cultural o físicamente a otros). A todos, “su fe es lo que les da la inspiración moral”, según nos refiere Cox. La afirmación resulta, como se advierte, por completo vacía. Entre los quizás 10.000 soldados estadounidenses que ocupan hoy Afganistán (ocupación que empezó en el 2001) liquidando “terroristas” y creando condiciones para violar mujeres afganas sin duda existen muchos que poseen creencias cristianas. Se puede conceder que la disciplina militar los hace relegar sus sentimientos religiosos. Las cifras de muertos y lisiados afganos en

el conflicto no pueden establecerse porque las autoridades políticas (entre las cuales ha de haber ‘cristianos’) y sus medios las ocultan. En abril del 2017 el presidente Trump se mostró orgulloso por haber ordenado el lanzamiento de la bomba no nuclear más grande del mundo contra el territorio y población afganos. Trump es cristiano presbiteriano. Estima que la suya es “... *una maravillosa religión*”.

Incluso grupos budistas, independientemente de si el budismo constituye o no una religión, no admiten ser agrupados mediante una *denominación abstracta* por general: budistas. Existen budistas interesados en lograr una *purificación* que los separe del sufrimiento y de la reencarnación y por ello tratan de evitar todo mal sentimiento o acción que hiera a otros y existen también budistas (Sri Lanka) que persiguen y odian a musulmanes y tamiles en nombre de una *pureza étnica-cultural originaria*. Tampoco gozan de la simpatía de estos budistas los cristianos occidentales (responsables de haber ingresado “forasteros” a Sri Lanka) y los politeístas (los hinduistas tamiles pueden ser budistas o politeístas, entre su alta variedad de opciones).

Desde su *inconveniente generalización* acerca de los creyentes religiosos, Cox estima que “Las religiones y los derechos suelen converger porque ambos creen en eso que la Declaración

Universal de Derechos Humanos llama “<la dignidad inherente>” de ‘todos los miembros de la familia humana’. Como la Declaración, la mayoría de las religiones predica el amor por todos los seres humanos y la necesidad de actuar cuando se está violando la dignidad humana”. Añade Cox: “Los derechos humanos y las religiones también coinciden en afirmar que esta dignidad, y los derechos que se requieren para protegerla, no es una invención de los seres humanos o los gobiernos, sino que está presente en todos y cada uno de nosotros desde el momento en que nacemos” (*Los derechos humanos necesitan religión*). Pero también admite que:

Algunas de las expresiones más espectaculares del fervor religioso provienen de grupos que promueven la violencia, la intolerancia, la misoginia y la homofobia. En los EE. UU., por ejemplo, el activismo religioso se asocia frecuentemente con ataques a los derechos de las mujeres y la población LGBTQ, la investigación científica y las críticas al capitalismo no regulado. Consecuentemente, los medios y muchos académicos suelen ignorar las expresiones progresistas de las religiones y ven la fe como una expresión de superstición, fanatismo o conservadurismo (*Los derechos humanos necesitan religión*).

Ambas consideraciones de Cox resultan al menos *imprudentes* al ignorar los hechos. El punto lo conduce a

conceptos mal formados. Una eventual 'dignidad humana' no consiste en un *carácter innato de los individuos* que pueda predicarse con *independencia de las relaciones sociales entre ellos*. No existía para sus asaltantes dignidad alguna en el judío herido en la parábola evangélica del samaritano (Lucas, 10). El desprecio que, por razones religiosas, los judíos expresaban por los samaritanos tampoco les concedía a estos últimos dignidad humana de ningún tipo ni los samaritanos exigían que los judíos les reconocieran ese *estatus*. Tampoco vieron (ni experimentaron) dignidad humana alguna en el herido, el sacerdote y el levita (ambos funcionarios del templo judío) que pasaron por su lado sin ayudarlo. La dignidad de los seres humanos *solo aparece* cuando el samaritano (despreciado racial, religiosa y culturalmente por los judíos, es decir sin ninguna dignidad humana) y el judío herido (un despreciador étnico y religioso) *se reconocen el uno al otro como humanos* y el primero socorre al segundo y el herido acepta la ayuda que proviene de alguien que hasta ese momento valía para él 'menos que un perro'. También hubiese surgido esta dignidad si el sacerdote y el levita hubieran atendido al herido. Quienes le robaron e hirieron no repararon en esa dignidad sino en su indefensión y sus bienes. La dignidad humana *se genera mediante relacionamientos*. No se puede predicar sin ellos (excepto para juegos intelectuales o discursos ideológicos)

porque *no existe fuera de ellos*. Eso es lo que dice la parábola. Y así lo presenta Jesús de Nazaret. La versión de Cox proviene de una ideología liberal (con antecedentes medievales) o religiosa para las cuales los seres humanos *nacen individuos* (dignos) y luego, por su deseo, establecen relaciones (Contrato Social). Se trata de una superchería. Los individuos humanos y sus atributos nacen de relaciones sociales, el vientre de la madre humana es social y el niño nace en una trama de relaciones sociales que lo antecede. Y es en tramas sociales que ese ser humano va a *individualizarse*.

Tampoco las religiosidades humanas expresan solo superstición, fanatismo, conservadurismo y criminalidad. Sin duda, y especialmente las *iglesias institucionalizadas*, pueden ejecutar estas prácticas. Pero el sentimiento religioso también resulta significativo para la *integración personal* de algunas o muchas personas y, con ello, estas personas pueden manifestar una *expresión cordial* (en los sentidos de amable y generosa) hacia los *otros*. No resulta adecuado negar esto. Tampoco conviene sugerir (o proclamar) que se requiera en algunos lugares del planeta una inclinación religiosa *para que la cordialidad* hacia otros exista. Muhammad Ali (1942-2016), el boxeador, no aceptó participar en la guerra de Vietnam porque 'esas gentes no le habían causado daño alguno ni a él

ni a los afroamericanos estadounidenses'. Sus conciudadanos blancos sí lo habían hecho y lo siguen haciendo. Ali, como se advierte, entendía que la dignidad humana tanto de individuos afroamericanos como de asiáticos y blancos pasa por sus *relacionamientos*, entre ellos, el que supone su *ciudadanía común*, no por caracteres innatos.

Podemos finalizar aquí este examen del estereotipo que liga necesariamente *religiosidad con derechos humanos*. No existe tal vínculo forzoso. Menos si la religiosidad se materializa en iglesias. Tampoco se tienen derechos humanos porque se pertenezca a una determinada civilización o grupo social. Objetiva y subjetivamente los derechos humanos dependen del *nivel de compromiso ciudadano humano* medido por su relación con los *logros o impedimentos de humanidad factibles* para los *ciudadanos más vulnerables* en las sociedades que comparten, o más allá de ellas. En este compromiso pueden o no jugar un papel importante los sentimientos religiosos. Por ejemplo, cuánto conmueve ciudadana y socialmente a un guatemalteco la siguiente información: 'Según estadísticas del Ministerio de Educación la tasa de analfabetismo nacional es 24.8% y la de las mujeres indígenas del 73.4%. En cuanto a la brecha étnica, en todos los niveles educativos desde la primaria hasta el diversificado, existe una cobertura menor conforme hay más

población indígena (...) el analfabetismo indígena es de 42.5% y el analfabetismo en la mujer indígena adulta llega a un 73.4%, con un promedio de escolaridad del 1.8 años, comparado a los 4.3 años que es el promedio de escolaridad nacional'³. En esta situación guatemalteca la *vulnerabilidad* más alta se sigue de un dominio político-cultural del *campo sobre las áreas rurales*, de la *blancura* y el *mestizaje* sobre lo *indígena*, de la *pareja mutuamente excluyente* entre *opulencia* (relativa) y *miseria-pobreza*, y de la *dominación patriarcal* de machos adultos sobre mujeres, niños y ancianos *vigente tanto en la sociedad guatemalteca en su conjunto* como en el *seno de las familias indígenas*. Sin embargo, aquí el punto, por ejemplo, se centra en *cuán conmovido* se experimenta un ciudadano guatemalteco blanco o mestizo urbano, creyente religioso o no, por esta conjunción de *violaciones sistemáticas de derechos humanos* a las *niñas (y ancianas) rurales indígenas* de su país y cuánto se comprometerá (con acciones específicas) para su superación, lo que implica tanto *iniciativas estatales* como *transformaciones culturales*, o sea de toda o la mayoría de la sociedad guatemalteca.

Un segundo aspecto es *qué papel jugará en su compromiso o descompromiso*

3 Referimos desde http://www.segeplan.gob.gt/downloads/clearinghouse/politicas_publicas/Grupos%20Vulnerables/Pol%C3%ADtica%20Ni%C3%B1ez%20y%20Adolescencia.pdf

su adhesión religiosa (y con ella su identidad radical) o su adscripción a alguna iglesia presente en Guatemala. Mal que bien, Guatemala se confiesa católica y protestante, es decir, cristiana. Pero las cifras de discriminación y postergación indígena muestran que se trata de un cristianismo *con escasa o nula irradiación social*. Lo que significa que una mayoría de guatemaltecos *no se comportan como lo que proclaman ser*. El ejemplo pudo de manera semejante darse con la *indiferencia casi generalizada* de los costarricenses por la *violación de derechos humanos en los recintos carcelarios del país*. Si estuviesen animados por una fe evangélica (un 71% se declara católico y un 21% protestante evangélico) radical (o sea, sólidamente identitaria) no les resultaría indiferente esta situación.

La cuestión de la identidad radical

En el apartado anterior y discutiendo la observación de Larry Cox acerca de una eventual coincidencia de criterios entre creyentes religiosos y activistas de derechos humanos, se ha hablado de los primeros relacionándolos con una *identidad radical*. Se trata de una apreciación conceptual aplicable en especial a religiosidades *teístas* como los cristianismos. Lo que está en juego en estas religiosidades (y por ello en las iglesias que los albergan) es la *salvación de los individuos*. Se trata de una *salvación trascendental* usualmente referida

como una existencia eterna en el Espíritu, que puede o no ser ligada por una resurrección del cuerpo *ahora trascendental* porque vive la experiencia de unirse al cuerpo místico de Cristo y con ello *acceder a la visión de Dios*. El Catecismo católico describe la situación así: “Los que mueren en la gracia y la amistad de Dios y están perfectamente purificados, viven para siempre con Cristo. Son para siempre semejantes a Dios porque lo ven “tal cual es”, cara a cara” (#1023). La referencia es del evangelista Juan: “... y aún no se ha manifestado lo que hemos de ser; pero sabemos que cuando él apareciere, seremos semejantes a él, porque le veremos como él es (...) Y el que guarda sus mandamientos, está en él, y él en él” (1 Juan, 3). Y añade el párrafo 1024 del Catecismo: “Esta vida perfecta con la Santísima Trinidad, esta comunión de vida y de amor con ella (...) se llama “el cielo”. El cielo es el fin último y la realización de las aspiraciones más profundas del hombre, el estado supremo y definitivo de dicha”. Una ‘realización de las aspiraciones más profundas del hombre, el estado supremo y definitivo de dicha’ no puede ser entendido sino la consumación de una *identidad radical*. ‘Radical’ en su sentido de fundamento/raíz, aquello que concede su ser efectivo al ente.

Vista así, la salvación para el cristiano católico (y en general para todos los cristianismos) no puede ser asumida superficial o epidérmicamente. O algo

que se desea mientras no se lo olvida. El ‘cielo’ se presenta como una *existencia eterna en el seno de Dios*, existencia donde *todo se comprende* y se disfruta.

Para el cristianismo de inspiración luterana el cielo es también la meta, aunque a ella se llega por la *sola fe* (Sola Fide): “Los sentimientos vienen y van. Los sentimientos son engañosos; mi seguridad es la Palabra de Dios. Nada más vale la pena creer. Aunque todo mi corazón se sienta condenado queriendo alguna muestra dulce, existe algo más grande que mi corazón Cuya Palabra no puede ser quebrantada. Confiaré en la Inmutable Palabra de Dios hasta que el alma y cuerpo sean separados porque, aunque todas las cosas pasen, Su Palabra permanecerá por siempre”⁴. Por la acción de Jesucristo en el Cielo el alma volverá a unirse al cuerpo (separados por la muerte individual) y se tendrá una *trascendente existencia eterna*. La diferencia con el catolicismo no está así tanto en el carácter de la salvación (Cielo) como en los medios para obtenerla: *la fe en la palabra de Dios*.

Tanto en el luteranismo como en el catolicismo encontramos que la fe religiosa en la salvación constituye un *referente radical* para esa fe. En este sentido es que hablamos de una *radicalidad*

de la identidad religiosa. No constituye apariencia. Es *fundamento y horizonte*.

Por supuesto, resulta factible tener una percepción *light* de las religiosidades. Para ello basta con relegar/olvidar su *referente trascendental* y observar sus *apariencias* (derivadas de una mirada puntual sobre los comportamientos/actitudes habituales entre los fieles). En Costa Rica, escribe, por ejemplo, Víctor Manuel Mora Mesén, un religioso, que las religiosidades en boga en el país pueden determinarse como doctrinales, rituales, emotivas, simbólicas, mediáticas y virtuales y sus combinaciones o mezclas. Elijamos al azar tres de las religiosidades que menciona para reparar en lo que tienen de común: la religiosidad *emotiva* “...pretende que la experiencia religiosa impacte siempre los afectos de las personas. No importa que se trate de un acto de culto o de una conferencia, de una devoción, de un rito o de una conversación con otra persona: el objetivo es alcanzar un cierto estado emocional”⁵. Por supuesto, “personas” es una abstracción, entre otras, que utiliza el articulista. En una liturgia pueden coincidir *adolescentes* que vienen saliendo de una fiesta de la que han salido novios, *madres* que han perdido

4 Tomado de <https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/coalicion/article/martin-lutero-y-la-seguridad-de-la-salvacion>

5 Todas las referencias han sido tomadas de “La variopinta religiosidad contemporánea”, *La Nación* (periódico), 29/10/2017. Existe versión en Internet, fechada el día anterior, en http://www.nacion.com/opinion/foros/variopinta-religiosidad-contemporanea_0_1667233274.html

recientemente un hijo y *padres* que no saben cómo pagar la próxima cuota del alquiler. Todos ellos quizás desean que esa liturgia les ayude a alcanzar o a sostener “cierto estado emocional”. Son seres humanos. En la religiosidad *mediática* se transmitirían “... contenidos religiosos a través de las redes sociales. Se diferencia de las otras religiosidades en que se vive solo en la interconexión mediática: no necesita de instituciones o de estructuras de culto, basta con la transmisión de experiencias, doctrinas, imágenes o prácticas rituales que no exijan una sumisión obligatoria a una autoridad determinada. Ellas se entienden a sí mismas como soluciones eficaces al anhelo espiritual, así pueden ser vividas individualmente y de manera anárquica”. Aquí el analista de ‘religiosidades’ olvida que “anárquico” en español remite a *ausencia de poder público* (las iglesias pueden realizar actos públicos, pero carecen de poder público ciudadano) o a ‘desconcierto’ e ‘incoherencia’. Al parecer echa de menos en esta religiosidad una autoridad *sagrada e incontestable*. La del padre o el cura, por ejemplo. Cuesta imaginar que las interconexiones mediáticas no estén mediadas por instituciones (ellas mismas son una), excepto que se considere ‘institución’ solo a las pétreas, como alguna iglesia. ‘Individual’, por supuesto, no es igual a anárquico. Materializarse como ‘individuo singular’ es propio de la especie humana (y no entra en conflicto con su carácter

social ni eventualmente comunitario). Una tercera ‘religiosidad’ mencionada por el autor es la *ritual*. Consistiría en privilegiar “... la celebración del culto y su parafernalia. Para los que entienden de esta manera la vivencia religiosa, lo importante es cumplir con aquellas prácticas que garantizan un acercamiento con lo sagrado”. ‘Parafernalia’ es un término pintoresco, por sus alcances inerciales (habitualidad) para asociarlo con culto religioso, y decididamente inconveniente si se trata de lo ‘sagrado’, según escribe el autor. Comportarse inercial con lo sagrado puede conducir al abismo, vía la idolatría. En todo caso, solo en esta religiosidad, aunque flanqueada por la parafernalia, se menciona lo sagrado. Ahora, toda religiosidad tiene que ver con lo trascendental/sagrado. Si no se establece esta relación, no se está hablando de religiosidad, sino de moda, entretenimiento, hábitos, inclinaciones, supersticiones, etcétera. En este sentido, reiteramos en su religiosidad se juega *el creyente religioso su identidad más profunda y también su salvación*. Es obvio que estamos tomando en cuenta centralmente los cristianismos imperantes en América Latina y otras partes del mundo.

Ahora, al menos una de estas religiosidades radicales entra en abierto conflicto con *derechos humanos*. Es la religiosidad católica. Un par de razones bastarán para comprenderlo. En la

tradición *judeocristiana* un Dios todopoderoso crea todo lo que existe (para ello combate con aguas agitadas, tinieblas, desorden y abismos) hoy como *cosmos*. Dentro de esta creación, modela a la mujer y al varón: “Y dijo Dios: Hagamos al hombre a nuestra imagen, conforme a nuestra semejanza; y tenga dominio sobre los peces del mar, y sobre las aves de los cielos, y sobre las bestias, y sobre toda la tierra y sobre todo animal que se arrastra sobre la tierra. Y creó Dios al hombre a su imagen, a imagen de Dios lo creó; varón y hembra los creó. Y los bendijo Dios y les dijo Dios: Fructificad y multiplicaos; y henchid la tierra y sojuzgadla; y tened dominio sobre los peces del mar, y sobre las aves de los cielos y sobre todas las bestias que se mueven sobre la tierra” (Génesis, 26-28). Dios crea seres humanos a su imagen y semejanza, *pero no iguales* a Él. Esto queda claro porque *les concede dominio* sobre tierras y animales y, además, porque *les ordena qué hacer*. Estos seres humanos resultan sus *creaturas* (especiales, sin duda) y en relación con Él son siempre-*criaturas* (menores). En este sentido no son Dios porque Éste no es creado sino Creador. Es Sujeto. En cambio, los seres humanos, en la lectura más optimista, se comportan como *sujetos*. Un Sujeto Absoluto no admite dependencias. Los sujetos relativos sí. Se puede imaginar a los seres humanos ‘libres’, o con libertad, pero no son Absolutos, sino *en situaciones*. Pueden optar *libremente*,

pero en condiciones que *ellos no determinan por completo*. Y en su relación con Dios no pueden cambiar esto.

A estos factores judeocristianos, que pueden entenderse como “Dios hace la historia aunque los seres humanos protagonicen sus designios”, el catolicismo añade un criterio doctrinal también específico. Si bien Dios se hace carne en su Hijo, Cristo-Jesús, lo que podría interpretarse como que los seres humanos devienen *parcialmente divinos*, *aunque mueran* (su ciclo sería gestación, muerte, resurrección) se añade que la *Iglesia católica* (su institucionalidad) expresa materialmente la Revelación de Dios y con ello se torna *universalmente vinculante*. Sus sacramentos, en los que se hace presente el Espíritu Santo, introducen a este Espíritu en el individuo humano consagrado o en el fiel laico y lo llevan a vivir la fe en Jesús o en Cristo. El vínculo entre Espíritu Santo y Cristo Jesús en la *existencia identitaria del fiel creyente* y el *carácter revelado* de la Iglesia que *administra los sacramentos* (el carácter sagrado de la existencia sociohistórica) confirman la propuesta del ser humano como una *creatura siempre-menor* a su Creador y Señor de la Historia. Es libre, pero por la *acción del pecado* que expresa y lleva a la separación de Dios y de los otros seres humanos y conduce al individuo a su *condena eterna*. En relación con las instituciones *queridas/creadas por Dios*, la

Iglesia con sus sacramentos y la familia (o la propiedad privada de medios de producción), por ejemplo, *el ser humano no es libre*. Esto es lo que en la liturgia se condensa en las expresiones: “Palabra de Dios”, “Así sea” o el más tradicional “Amén”. Toma, asimismo, cuerpo en el *culto mariano* (“He aquí tu sierva”) y se extiende en la *religiosidad popular* de inspiración católica en la forma de ‘fiestas patronales’ (los santos son referencias de culto y hacen milagros o interceden para que ellos se cumplan) o en las sentencias con que se *aceptan/asumen los dolores y tragedias* de la existencia cotidiana, en especial entre los sectores más humildes: “Dios lo ha querido así”. “Es la voluntad del Señor”. “Dios sabe por qué hace las cosas”. Incluso el nombre de un proyecto o proceso católico costarricense reproduce este imaginario: “Obras del Espíritu Santo” supone el aposentamiento de este Espíritu en los cuerpos y almas de quienes participan o colaboran generosamente en esta empresa. Las personas que la llevan a cabo *son y no son ellas* en cuanto están ahí con sus donaciones y trabajos, pero las anima o nutre el Espíritu Santo.

Nada hay de perverso en la anterior ideología, pero choca de frente con la sensibilidad político-cultural de derechos humanos. Estos descansan, aunque selectivamente en el criterio de *agencia humana*, de inspiración liberal. El principio de agencia humana

resulta compatible con fe y creencias religiosas, pero sobre todo enuncia que el ser humano, por *racional* y *empresario* (sujeto), es libre y capaz de *crear opciones* y de *elegir* entre ellas. ‘Libertad’ no quiere decir aquí reconocer la voluntad de Dios y cumplirla, sino crear opciones y tener la capacidad para discernir entre ellas y elegir. Como se las elige individual o colectivamente, se es *responsable* por ellas. Es en este sentido que el ciudadano tiene derechos y deberes. Ambos lo relacionan con el Estado. Las transgresiones a ese esquema no constituyen pecado sino *delitos* (contra las personas de la sociedad civil y el Estado). Desde un punto de vista conceptual, este criterio (que sostiene derechos humanos desde los siglos XVI y XVII) con respecto a la libertad humana no resulta incompatible con la *religiosidad católica* siempre y cuando esta última se mantenga como *opción privada* que coopera con la sociedad civil y la *organización pública* de la sociedad (Estado). Los problemas surgen, y los latinoamericanos lo tienen claro, para bien o para mal, cuando la *Iglesia revelada* “invade” el ámbito de la sociedad civil (e inevitablemente del Estado) en cuestiones que lesionan el *principio liberal de agencia humana*: aborto, familia lesbiana o gay, opción lesbiana o gay, fecundación in vitro, sexualidad genital sin matrimonio, técnicas anticonceptivas ‘no naturales’ (?), la proliferación de sectas, etcétera, o el *carácter no confesional* del

Estado (legislar en forma positiva [o sea, reconocer jurídicamente] sobre los temas anteriores, por ejemplo). El principio liberal de agencia humana no es sagrado, sino *civilmente debido*. Implica que puede cambiar de acuerdo con circunstancias. En la perspectiva católica más tradicional, que domina en la institución y el personal ordenado y en menor medida entre la feligresía, distintos alcances del principio de agencia pueden *ofender la voluntad de Dios* y contienen un *socavamiento de los fundamentos de la sociedad y la civilización*. Lo sagrado, por trascendental, suele resultar insensible a las circunstancias. Cualquiera que sea la circunstancia, el comportamiento homosexual y el aborto ofenden la voluntad de Dios y han de ser rechazados.

Para los protestantismos y sus iglesias y espiritualidades (entre un 17 y 20 por ciento de la población costarricense), no debería existir en los temas anteriores (homosexualidad, aborto) ni en relación con el principio liberal de agencia humana mayor problema. Aunque las expresiones del protestantismo son variadas, su *rechazo a sacralizar toda institución humana* (que les potencia para fundar una diversidad de iglesias y para potenciar al individuo o colectivo emprendedor), el énfasis en la *salvación por el constante vigor de la fe* (gracia de Dios) y el *estudio e interpretación bíblica* (que ha potenciado una teología vigorosa y disputante), su

sacerdocio universal y, en la situación latinoamericana, su penetración en los *sectores bajos y medios* de la ciudadanía (sin despreciar a los altos) le concede una mayor capacidad para *dialogar con la sociedad moderna* (racionalismo, hedonismo, polifonía) y contemporánea. Por lo demás, nació como respuesta de fe religiosa a esta sociedad. Si alguna de sus iglesias choca con determinadas exigencias de derechos humanos, los fieles de ella que las apoyen pueden crear *otra asamblea* sin lesionar su fe religiosa o espiritualidad. Martin Luther King Jr. fue bautista, partidario de la *acción directa* y de la *desobediencia civil* para conseguir derechos ciudadanos, pero también *crítico* negativo del *Black Power* y de la *insurrección revolucionaria* (Che Guevara). Valoraba que ese tipo de violencia resultaba ineficaz porque no alcanzaba sus metas. Algo semejante estimó Hélder Cámara, el obispo brasileño. Pero Cámara, sin que esto implique reproche alguno, nunca organizó una marcha semejante a la que, con otros dirigentes, impulsó Martin Luther King Jr. (*Marcha sobre Washington por el trabajo y la libertad*, 1963). Algunos aspectos del pensamiento de Cámara y Luther King Jr. tienden a coincidir. *La diferencia la marca su trabajo político*. Escribió el último:

La última debilidad de la violencia es que es una espiral descendente, que engendra lo mismo que busca destruir. En lugar de debilitar el

mal, lo multiplica. Utilizando la violencia, podéis matar al mentiroso, pero no podréis matar la mentira, ni restablecer la verdad. Utilizando la violencia, podréis asesinar al rencoroso, pero no podréis matar el odio. De hecho, la violencia hace simplemente crecer el odio. Y esto continúa. Devolver el odio por el odio multiplicado al odio, añadiendo una oscuridad todavía más profunda que una noche sin estrellas. La oscuridad no puede esconder la oscuridad: sola la luz puede hacer esto. El odio no puede esconder el odio: solo el amor puede hacer esto (*Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?*).

Sin embargo, King fue *revolucionario* en un marco de lucha por derechos civiles y humanos. No triunfó, porque esta victoria supone la conversión de los racistas y despreciadores de las diferencias, pero su combate continúa. Cámara optó por un diálogo y conciliación con los poderosos de este mundo para que consintieran en erradicar la producción de hambrientos y vulnerables extremos en América Latina. Obviamente no logró ese consentimiento. En América Latina no resulta incompatible ser cristiano e inmisericorde.

América Latina nunca se ha mostrado particularmente proclive hacia los *deísmos*, pero en ellos los derechos humanos encuentran una excelente articulación *con el carácter que asignan*

a la religiosidad. Como ella no puede contener nada irracional se revela a la razón humana en el orden/violencia o caos del mundo, sin referencia a Revelación ninguna. Dios existe como principio y sentido de lo que existe (Gran Diseño), *pero no interviene en la historia* y por ello la acción humana ha de orientarse a disminuir o eliminar el sufrimiento/dolor/injusticia (mal) y a potenciar la integración y la armonía mediante el conocimiento de nuestras condiciones de existencia. Si lo hacemos perseverantemente encontraremos recompensa en nuestra existencia misma o en alguna futura. Otra ventaja del deísmo es que facilita una asunción sociohistórica de Jesús de Nazaret sin remitirlo al Cristo-Jesús mítico. El deísmo contemporáneo surge del mismo *ethos* (seguridad, identidad) que generó la propuesta político-cultural de derechos humanos, es decir, en los procesos de gestación de las sociedades modernas y actuales. Entre sus principales méritos está el de no requerir materializarse en iglesias disgregadoras. Los deísmos claramente enfatizan su propuesta de consistir en una *actitud experiencial hacia el mundo* que desemboca en un estilo de *existencia personal y social*. Y sus propuestas, alejadas del prejuicio de tener la verdad en el bolsillo o en un libro, resultan *enteramente compatibles con derechos humanos histórico-sociales* y las luchas/esfuerzos progresivos e integradores (humanizadores) que ellos contienen.

Retornando a las religiosidades más tradicionales, aunque minoritarias en América Latina, la mayor capacidad de quienes profesan alguna de las versiones del cristianismo protestante, que *coinciden con la civilidad de lucha* contenida por el reclamo y observancia de derechos humanos, está expresada en forma adecuada en la obra de Rubem Alves (1933-2014), originalmente presbiteriano, a quien puede considerarse con *justicia generador de la corriente de pensamiento y acción* conocida como *Teología latinoamericana de la liberación*. En su pensamiento, un Dios que no sufriese porque su pueblo, que deposita su fe religiosa en Él, no lucha históricamente por sus derechos a una vida justa y emancipada (Alves), no amerita considerarse, ni el pueblo ni Dios, cristiano. En relación con Alves, Larry Cox tendría razón. Con él, con Martin Luther King y con Hélder Cámara se encuentran personalidades cristianas que lucharon por derechos humanos. Pero ninguno de ellos redujo sus deseos y esperanzas a los límites que aquejan a *Amnistía Internacional* o *Human Rights Watch*. El desafío político y cultural contenido en una demanda por derechos humanos y por su ejercicio planetario excede con mucho los márgenes políticos, geopolíticos e ideológicos de esas organizaciones. La fe religiosa, diría Alves, está para más. *Dios está para más*. Él no se decanta nunca totalmente en institución alguna, sino en los sentimientos que las animan. La pregunta

entonces sería: *¿qué sentimientos han nutrido hasta hoy el discurso y la práctica de derechos humanos?* Ya sabemos que no se trata de sentimientos religiosos, aunque no resulten incompatibles con algunas maneras de experimentarlos. Tal vez se podría mejorar la pregunta: *¿qué tipo de sentimientos animan a la sociedad que inventa Derechos Humanos? ¿Y cómo se expresan en ellas tanto las religiosidades trascendentales como las fetichizaciones idolátricas? ¿Y los deísmos?*

Según se avance en el estudio y debate de las respuestas se tendrá una más adecuada respuesta a la colaboración factible y constructiva entre religiosidades y derechos humanos en el mundo actual. *Ni unas ni otros pueden presumir de no levantar justificadas sospechas.*

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THE ECONOMY OF FLESH: A READING OF ADAM SMITH'S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS

ECONOMÍA DE LA CARNE: UNA LECTURA DE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS DE ADAM SMITH

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Resumen

El artículo presenta una lectura del libro de Adam Smith (1723-1790) intitulado *Teoría de los sentimientos morales* en la que se enfatiza su carácter teológico. Al enfocarse en cómo representa Smith al “salvaje”, los procedimientos que sigue para pensar la encarnación y los vínculos que establece entre teoría económica y economía teológica, se introduce un modelo para leer el pensamiento político de Smith.

Palabras clave: Adam Smith, economía teológica, teoría de los sentimientos morales, encarnación, teoría económica.

Abstract

This article presents a reading of Adam Smith's (1723-1790) *Theory of Moral Sentiments* that demonstrates its theological adscription. Focusing on how Smith represents the savage, the means by which he theorizes the question of incarnation and the ways he links economic theory and theological economics, I introduce an entire model for how to read Smith's political thinking.

Keywords: Adam Smith, Economic Theology, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Incarnation, Economic Theory.

Introduction

The achievement of happiness is the organizing principle of Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. By organizing principle, I mean that even the conflict or tension between selfishness and preoccupation with others is inscribed within the assumption that each human being procures its own happiness. The idea of happiness organizes Smith's philosophy as his proposal is based upon the idea of a fully developed humanity and not some sort of open justification of social domination. This article follows this hypothesis through a reading that emphasizes Smith's theological discussions. Throughout the article, I demonstrate that there is no contradiction between moral and economic theory. Furthermore, I show that the continuity of morality and economics is possible due to Smith's understanding of God. Smith's project effectively has as its center the assumption of God's immanent participation in history. From this assumption comes his proposal of an economy of the flesh. I argue that Smith's understanding of flesh presents a fundamental interpenetration of theology and economic theory. For him, flesh is a vicious and powerful element that must be incarnated, and not destroyed, within the human body and the social and political body.

One of Smith's basic ideas is that human beings naturally tend to surpass or overcome the limits of their nature. Although this can appear at first sight as a contradiction, for Smith nature is in permanent digression with itself. The eccentricity of human nature, its rebellion against itself, is what makes it possible even for the "greatest ruffian" to experience a discomfort within himself. This natural discomfort is the result of a "clash:" while trying to affirm and preserve its own life, human nature also at the same time manifests "sorrow from the sorrow of others." Human nature splits itself, tries to affirm its individuality but, at the same time, moves itself towards the other by attempting to carry itself beyond its "own person." Thus, this clash and division is experienced by the person as a manifestation of the tendencies of his or her nature. The person does not have control of these movements that modify his or her existence from its core.

Smith presents the person as a sensible *topos* in which nature encounters itself at an economic disjuncture: how to conserve the person's life at the same time that he or she moves herself to experience the life of others.¹ There is a second disjunctive, namely that nature does not have or cannot provide persons with the capacity to fully embrace

1 See Göçmen (2007) for further discussion.

the suffering, joy, or pain of the other person, for "our senses will never inform us of what he suffers" (Smith 9). The others remain unknowledgeable as sensible beings to a person's senses as they are entirely concentrated on themselves. Being a sensible being implies, for Smith, being closed off to others. A person is sensible or aware only of themselves and of the experiences of their existence. They recollect or capture experiences in order to preserve their own lives.

Smith thus distinguishes between senses and imagination. The senses, because they are attached to the immediacy of the person's self-experience, lack exteriority. It is only through imagination that a person can experience, or at least have a sense of, the intimate life of the other. The distinction Smith proposes seeks to connect sensibility and imagination; he states that it is from the data provided by the senses that our imagination enables us to "place ourselves" in the other person's situations. Smith's notion of self is of a capsule of sameness that can be accessed only by the power of imagination. The relationship with the other is always based on a procedure located within the person: as a result of sensitive stimulation the self can imagine the sensible experiences of another person. Imagining is, in its most basic meaning, an attempt to transmigrate—to relocate one's own

center amid what is suffered by other persons in their bodies. However, Smith also presents an inverse process, one in which it is not the intentionality of the person that makes intimacy possible, but their own damaged self:

Persons of delicate fibres and weak constitution of body complain that in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in their correspondent part of their own bodies. The horror which they conceive at the misery of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves more than any other; because that horror arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually affected in the same miserable manner (Smith 10).

Although the hierarchical relationship between sensible experience and imagination appears, this description introduces another dimension. What interrupts and irrupts within the realm of a person's self-closure is the uncontrollable damaged other. It is not the intentionality of the self that constitutes its field of experiences but the lacerated body of the "wretched." The self's secure dwelling in its world is taken into the deepness of terror by an anomalous body that resists the apprehension of the self's gaze. Damaged

bodies, as rebelling angels (Milton 3) pierce the “delicate” person's bubble of selfhood, rebelling against the “throne and monarchy” of the person, distancing itself from anything that surpasses its own satisfaction. Misery and pain concentrated in another person's body prompt this immediate corporeal response. Smith's ulcerated bodies rebel against the predominance of the spectator. It is not the spectator who arranges the surroundings but the unpredictable smells, texture, and voracity of the wounded other. It is not the spectator's interests and attentiveness that modify its sensibility and imagination but the unfathomable yet irruptive concreteness of the “beggars”-Smith's all-embracing designation to evoke the foreign and monstrous.

For Smith, nevertheless, the beggars are apparitions without context. Their wounds and fetidness are sudden irruptions that are thought to be unrelated to the landscapes of the “delicate person.” Smith describes the experience of the production of pure bodies and corporeal disgust. The beggar is pure battered physicality; it lacks, for Smith's spectator, the components of a full person. It is precisely the beggar's condition of putrid body, its unrecoverable otherness that produces repulsion: it is a *nudum hominem* (Tertullian, *The Flesh of Christ*, 8). This notion initially refers to a Christological dispute: was Jesus merely clothed

as a man or was he an angel with the appearance of a man? Smith's bare man is the one that is indistinguishable from its wounds, basically *terrenae carnis* (Tertullian, *The Flesh of Christ*, 7). The bare man enters, producing terror into the field of possible corporeal experiences of Smith's spectator because it is terrestrial flesh. The spectator is obligated to experience in its own body what is commonly not regarded or, more precisely, not experienced. Therefore, Smith's bare man (*nudum hominem*) or beggar causes in the “delicate person” an unintended variation in its sentimentality. The reverse of Smith's bare man is the body of the man of God or “uomo di Dio,” and refers to that which is perennially fragrant and clean.

There was fear and weakness, dizziness and guilt on the one hand, and on the other, the yearning for warmth, plenty, good health, and most for all for well-being and the body's safety. The delician paradise was a great votive casket full of dreams, desires and hidden fears [...] The nostalgia for the lost Eden kindled the desire for what was missing: above all for the body's permanence, the total efficiency of its working parts: eyes without their worldly spark, strong teeth, an abundance of years (Camporesi 265).

Camporesi's description, although not related to Smith's context or work, nonetheless expresses the atmosphere

of Smith's introduction to his *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* with its combination of gazes, odors, and unexpected presences. It points to the manifest tensions that permanently question Smith's project.² His project is fundamentally a daring and permanent series of anthropological speculations and an attenuated materialism.³ And these speculations and seeds of materialism have, as I argue here, a point of inflection in the emergence of what Smith considered to be its exterior, that which signals the limits of its own clean and united self,⁴ a strong and fundamental assumption about the deity's design of his world,⁵ and an explicit irrationalism that functions as ground for his economy of flesh and, as part of the same, to create a philosophical framework that enables the matching between satisfaction and punishment. Albeit ubiquitous throughout Smith's philosophical interventions, it is in Frankenstein where another and relevant sentimental texture of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* is most clearly expressed:

I had deprived myself of rest and health. I had desired it with an ardour that far exceeded moderation; but now that I had finished, the beauty of the dream vanished,

and breathless horror and disgust filled my heart. Unable to endure the aspect of the being I had created, I rushed out of the room, and continued a long time traversing my bed-chamber, unable to compose my mind to sleep. At length lassitude succeeded to the tumult I had before endured; and I threw myself on the bed on my clothes, endeavoring to seek a few moments of forgetfulness. But it was in vain: I slept indeed, but I was disturbed by the wildest dreams (Shelley 36).

Those are the words of Victor Frankenstein describing a "dreary night of November" when he managed to create life. With his "instruments of life," Frankenstein transforms a lifeless thing into a catastrophe that breathes. Smith's own attempt to create and administrate life has a tone of despair and wild dreams. He is witnessing the opening of millions of new eyes and the consumption of countless lives at the time that his deep ideals of masculinity and commerce appear to be in contradiction. When Smith proceeds to create life that intention underlies his continuing and elastic notion of nature, and every time he feels that he is achieving it, he realizes that his world is dusk, ruins, and miserable splendor. Here Smith appears not merely as the untamed proposer of markets and domination but as a dream of a dream. With *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* one can access an

2 See for similar reading about the atmosphere of Smith's reflection see Vincent Bissonette (2012) and David Marshall (1984).

3 See Ronald L. Meek (1976; 2000).

4 For the context of this process see Margaret Hunt (1993).

5 Kleer (1995); Clarke (2007).

unusual zone of social conflicts as they are expressed in the form of philosophical inquiries. Form, as important as it can be, cannot be distinguished from the combination of formation and dissolution of existential spheres that both embrace and reject individuals. Smith is capturing and communicating his wild dreams. He is forming plans and strategies to surpass their most dangerous implications and trying to prolong their most joyful possibilities. In order to do that he had had to expel the demons that haunt the divine character of his society. Although it does not do so immediately, the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* eventually reveals itself both as a lament and an affirmation whose center are theological procedures thought to be capable of recollecting and suppressing the abnormalities, excesses, and waste of life without destroying it completely. The economy of flesh points toward an incarnational mode of life that does not negate flesh but subsumes it within different bodies.

The Wretched

It is because of this interest in subsuming differences that the figure of the wretched plays a central role in Smith's philosophy. The wretched being, that laughs and sings, is closed, cloistered off, and lacks the language and strength that are necessary to refer (to give reason) to its situation.

The figure of the wretched one must be understood as a form to designate "the pure carnality" insensible to itself, lacking itself, hidden to its same presence as a productive unit. The wretched being is possessed by its despair and erring; it laughs and sings, according to Smith, because it has forgotten its own location. The wretched are infants that cannot access their roots: their pain and wounds block and cancel their condition as spectators. As the mother responds to the infant's crying, the wretched one, the closed carnality, depends on the other's gaze and requires its maternal warmth in order to survive. It is a stationary flesh, trapped in time and in its mute pain. The wretched is an exhausted physic. It does not have a future; it lacks humanity. Thus, because it does not feel fear or anxiety, in significant ways it is not in the world. The world, nature, its anatomy possessed it. It cannot even attain the condition of despair. It does not know about its mortality; it ignores its future and its extinction. Its laughs and songs are screams from the deep and an exposure of its broken body. It is an empty body, a deepness from which something familiar arrives; it is also part of the spectator. Because of that the wretched does not belong to death of life. The sun burns its skin, the light illuminates its face, but the wretched one cannot establish relationships. The spectator would say that the wretched one shares the condition of the dead,

as one who has been deprived of all its sensible experiences, of the company of others, of being recognized as life that lives. Hence, the wretched is like the cold of the tomb. The textures, cadence, and vital rhythms of life are closed to it; it makes noises while it is a prey of its not developed self. That flesh that screams in the middle of the streets will not be forgotten, because it irrupts into the spectator's gaze and introduces an anomaly.

The "wretched poor," in contrast to the dead, is not in repose. It is in permanent movement; it is intense noise, flesh that extends itself to touch all borders. No one remembers or suffers on behalf of the wretched, yet its proximity to the world of the spectators produces discomfort. Smith affirms: "The most important principles in human nature, the dread of death – the great poison of happiness, but the great restraint upon the injustice of mankind; while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society" (Smith 13).

The wretched one does not fear death; it cannot because it ignores it as it ignores itself. It is not happy; neither does it practice justice, because it is not an individual. Because of all this the wretched does not protect or guard society. Instead, lacking spirit, it returns all its weakness to society. Its apparition itself posits an economic

question: What must a society do with those who lack the condition of individuals? Smith does not respond to this question immediately, but neither does he forget about it.

The mutual sympathy excludes, from the start, the damaged one because it supposes the encounter of two individuals, two beings that recognize themselves as carriers of humanity. To be more precise, the mutual sympathy occurs within or through practices of friendship and intimacy demarcated by the social division of labor. Sympathy can be expressed within the limits of intimacy, kept away from the interruptions of the different. Therefore, sympathy creates links while it establishes separations: its equilibrium consists in an exchange of pain and joy that can be understood and returned. Sympathy belongs to the circuit of exchange; it always expects a return, a surplus. Smith's theory also supposes an abysmal zone in which sympathy cannot be expressed. There are certain pains, anguishes, and joy that even inside the sphere of one's intimate circles cannot be embraced because the other's sentiments escape the foundational capacities of the spectator.

This sorrow or joy that the spectator cannot experience as the other for Smith constitutes excess. To him they are expressions of passion that surpass the limits of propriety because they cannot

be assumed by the spectator's gaze. For him, even in the intimate sphere, the only sphere in which sympathy can be expressed, emotional expression must fulfill the principle of reciprocity. This principle is the one that makes the regulated exchange of emotions possible. It functions as a guarantee that emotional stock can be conserved.

When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic spectator they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper; and unsuitable to the causes that excite them (Smith 16).

The calculated exchange of sympathy has a social importance; for Smith the adequate regulation of individual sentiments makes the social continuum possible. The rupture of this delicate and primordial economic act holds within itself the possibility to create alterations in the spirit's movement. The propriety of affections is linked to the necessity and possibility of recognition and, along with this, to the production and reproduction of the social. The tense discernment about what is proper and what improper, as it is described by Smith, locates the life

of passions as an economic object. For Smith the expenditure of sentiments is the condition of possibility of any other economic operation or, more properly, of economics. The equilibrated disposition, that reaches its paroxysm in the attitudes of the martial spirit, is the state that makes sympathy possible. Everyone must take care of their passions, protect themselves from these passions, and take possession of them in order to be recognized as spectators. Despite all this, the spectator is not able to sympathize fully with the other that is within its intimate circle. This lack of sentimental formation is the cost of the economy of calculated exchange.

The spectator feels and suffers because he cannot be properly embraced in his emotionally limited situations, where he cannot retain his overflowing passionate heart. However, the spectator also wants to sing and laugh but he must do the impossible and overcome the sentimental torrent that damages the logic of return. Smith describes that vacuum in which the equilibrated sympathy cannot institute recognition. Because of that, we can best read his theory of sympathy as a meditation about loss, the lack expressed by the other that screams for "a more complete sympathy" (Smith 22). To this lack, imposed by the limits of propriety, Smith opposes the necessity to tamp down the discomfort that is generated by the spectator's gaze.

If there is not equivalence between compassion and original sorrow it is not because that is a feature of human nature. Smith does not describe a condition; rather he proposes a principle of political economy. The attempt to experience the other is blocked, according to his theory, because it incorporates an excess: it implies the interruption of the accelerated rhythm of self-satisfaction; it induces a break within the circuit of the market's production and expansion.

He explains: "In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the spectator" (Smith 22). With this, according to Smith, the wound produced by the impossibility of recognition is sutured. Every spectator must assume the inevitable incommensurability of its own sorrow and joy. This is one of the characteristics of Smith's spectator: to retire from the social life, putting above himself his despair and ecstasies, the sentimental excess that can surpass the social concord. The spectator is intrinsically broken; he recognizes his own condition of being human by trying to ignore that this sentimental economy hurts his life. In trying to suture the lack he has, the spectator cannot relate his own sentiments, those which are more significant, with his

social life. On the one hand he must depart from himself and on the other hand he must remain in silence with himself and listen, without feeling his sentiments. The presence of the other serves as a reminder to him that nothing must disturb the gray tone of the firm emotions. The "candid and impartial light," meanwhile, burns the mute intimacy of the spectator.

Being a master of oneself implies ignoring one's broken sentimentality every day. Within the ambit in which each spectator exercises sympathy, conversation about the surfaces of everyone's banalities is allowed. Because of that, the "poor wretched" one that screams, and the latent howl that dwells in each spectator, are beyond the limits of sympathy. Smith's spectator walks on the edges of his own catastrophe and believes that it is possible to survive within a society of radically lacking individuals. The spectator, in Smith's presentation, must choose sadness and concealment in order to produce wealth.

The spectator wants to be the master of an impossible silence. He wants to quiet what is more intimate through words; meanwhile his flesh is being devoured by a death that he does not know. This is a kind death that is not the secure one that produces just a modest fear. The tranquility of calculation makes the master a servant

of the silence and howls at those that are always interrupting the moderate conversations of friends. The words without intensity are the condensation and expression of “self-denial” and “self-government”: control of a fracture that must be cured by engrossment. From this perspective, the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* is a theory of the intensity of the voice. What unhinges Smith's theory of moral sentiments are the demands and laments of the “sufferer” because in them the power of the master is revoked. They transform the sentimental geography and make it impossible to ignore them. But it is not just the noise that produces discomfort and disgust in the spectator; so too does the public exposition of fluids and grimaces. The flesh that struggles to express what weighs it down, particularly the weight of the prospect of death, represents for Smith an affront to sociability. It is the duty of the spectator to make his most intense experiences appear as neutral as a cold wind. The other exists just in the measure that this other is a copy of the spectator. Then selfishness is not surpassed but rather is located within a calculation: if the other maintains its propriety, the spectator can take of her, but she will take care of him. This is the meaning of Smith's sentimental exchange and reciprocity.

Love

Smith does not want to negate Christianity. Moreover, his reflection on love has Christianity as a framework. His understanding of love is central for his project of an equilibrated society: “As to love our neighbor as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbor, or, what comes to the same thing, as our neighbor is capable of loving us (Smith 25)”. Smith starts here with a reference to Christianity, a reference in a strict sense: he does not attempt to think of love from its basis in Christianity but to depart from it. He locates his own concept of love as an initial instance that announces a non-contingent law of love. Nature's law subsumes Christianity's law and in subsuming it introduces a transformation. What is in question is not whether to love our neighbor but to love that neighbor as he or she can love us. Love, for Smith, must be contained until the last moment, until the other shows of what it is capable. Just at this moment the spectator loves. To love is to return, exchange, and exercise the power of a master. If Christianity, according to Smith, does not establish a limit to love, nature is a regulator of love's intensity. The spectator loves because it has been an initial gesture, an emotional expenditure that must be returned. Virtue is, paradoxically, to love without the expectation of return:

because of that Smith renounces loving the scream, the echoes, and the complaints of the corpses. Virtue contradicts calculation because it expects the magnanimous and this is, within Smith's system, the irrecoverable lost. Because of that, Smith maintains that this type of love is impossible for human nature. With this he introduces an understanding of love that is relived, at least formally, from failure and rout.

The Christian idea of love is a consideration about how to exist inside failure: love is announced when it has failed, it emphasizes that we have been loved first, and that there is occasion for retribution. Love is always a response to its own loss. It cannot sustain itself because it has fallen. This dirty and muddy love is, for Smith, indecent because it attempts the impossible. It tries to unlink itself from nature and society. It makes mediocrity tremble. A type of love that does not fear loss is furious passion that, as hunger, is voracious. Every passionate life is fundamentally carnal: "the true cause of the peculiar disgust which we conceive for the appetites of the body when we see them in other men, is, that we cannot enter into them" (Smith 28).

Body

The question of love has effects in Smith's conception of the body. At the core of his conception is the idea

of the body as uncontrollable thing that he cannot possess. The body is an insatiable assemblage of desires. It desires itself, to touch its texture, embrace other bodies, penetrate them and go out, and to wander looking for itself. The spectator cannot enter into the jumble of a body that shakes with joy. The spectator is a cold and distant gaze that does not boil. The body has appetites because it is alive, it does not consume objects but other bodies and the spectator's gaze. The body, while enjoying itself, is not productive. It remains, according to Smith, concentrated on its own sensible existence, forgetting about its social obligations, obligations such as the discipline of the factories and the marital bed. These bodily appetites are located outside the realm in which sympathy can operate.

The body is a heap of parts that demand to be satisfied. In this regard the body is, for Smith, the limited experience of being permanently affected by the world. However, the body cannot trespass itself. It makes circles, swings around itself, but it cannot recognize anything apart from its own existence. It is confined, as the poor wretched, to an existence without intimacy. Its insatiability, always increasing according to Smith, separates the body from what is more intimate and secret for others.

Imagination and Loss

The body does not know the monetary economy: "The person, who has lost his whole fortune, if he is in health, feels nothing in his body" (Smith 29). As an empty foundation, the body, therefore, does not belong to Smith's basic idea of sociability. The body's appetites obey a strict code: they do not require money to be satisfied. Imagination, on the other hand, says Smith, is attached to the monetary economy. For Smith what excites imagination is the absence or possession of money. The lack of money makes imagination construct states of radical solitude, shame, and misery. Money, to Smith, refers to the possession of human energy or life. It is money that provides identifications and that guarantees social recognition. Smith understands why the person who loses his or her fortune represents this loss as "the loss of his dignity." To possess money identifies those who have embraced the spirit of the time.

The content and activities of imagination he reduces to the accumulation and circulation of money. To him, an accumulation of money expresses dignity. In order to accumulate money, one must recollect and procure to extinguish one's corporeal appetites. From Smith's position there always will be an irreducible antagonism between money and body, between

dignity and wounds. Only the one who makes a docile body can accumulate the necessary money to ignore its own body. To forget the body is not a metaphor: the theory of moral sentiments is a theory for a delicate body that hides behind a modest smile. The monetary economy requires consuming, touching, and dissecting bodies. Hence, this economy asks: How can one fight against the body? Money itself is a body, hundreds of condensed and unsubstantial bodies. There is only one alternative to winning and that is bowing out without reserves of money. Money is, for Smith, that what erases memory.

Pain, Forgetfulness, and Economy

Money is not only an element of economic theory. It itself economizes the body's rage, its flesh. Nonetheless, imagination does not forget the separation and clash between body and money. It cannot erase from its profundities that money is bodies and that the ones carrying, taking, and dancing around money are also bodies. Imagination stalks the delicacy and propriety of the spectator, makes it return to its own blocked appetites. In so doing imagination opens economic theory to its social roots. It points to the fact that money accumulation is only possible from an exchange: the exchange of wounds for coins. Because these wounds are social, this means

that they are dispersed throughout the social body and concentrate its most terrifying effects there where the songs are more intense. If “a philosopher is company to a philosopher only; the member of a club to his own little knot of companions” (Smith 34), then the only thing universally recognizable, the only thing that links while breaking is money. This is so because the virtue of a philosopher, for Smith, consists in the creation of hermetic spheres that protect him from foreign screams. Money is what creates the territory of the virtuoso life: which consists in accumulating corpses concealed by prisons.

A prison is certainly more useful to the public than a palace; and the person who founds the one is generally directed by a much more just spirit of patriotism than he who builds the other. But the immediate effects of a prison, the confinement of the wretches shut up in it, are disagreeable; and the imagination either does not take time to trace out the remote ones or sees them at too great a distance to be much affected by them (Smith 35).

Prisons are patriotic creations because they, like surgical instruments, fulfill the function of extirpating the wretched from the public world. A prison's lugubrious appearance contradicts its vigor: the edification of a prison is the synthesis of public virtue.

The prison divides the social territory and so makes explicit the spiritual hierarchy of society. If prisons are horrible edifications it is because they take their shape from those who inhabit them. The goal of a man of virtue consists in being able to acknowledge the beauty amid the putrefaction of a prison, because the prison liberates society from its “germs” and stalkers. The walls of that edification are the encrypted book that the man of letters should read in the solitude of his room. There he can find the message that he must seal in his own sad body: the punishment and pain of the wretched are the cost of the security of his perpetual present. The question is not how to appreciate the monstrosity of the wretched but to consider one delimited subject: the institutions created to punish them, horrendous as they should be, are based upon a virtuoso judgment. If initially these institutions appear to be exterior to society, this is due to the agent's weakness.

Smith insists that society requires jail cells in which to throw its waste. For the philosopher, a prison is the most human of edifices. It condenses and expresses one of the nodal points of Smith's theory of moral sentiments: sympathy and compassion are limited, and its most ardent intentions, impossible. Protection by and empathy with intimate friends is also affected by this impossibility. Trying to conduct

oneself from an impossible horizon leads only to destruction and violence. With their iron and stone eating bones, prisons remind us that the world will never deserve a love beyond calculation. In a society surrounded by “wild beasts” such places of confinement are the luminous pleasures of a humanity that must love its executioners.

Ranks, Shame, and Punishment

After expressing his admiration for prisons and punishment, Smith develops a justification of the division of social ranks. He admits that there is a relation of necessity between poverty and pleasure—clearly not because he considered poverty to be beautiful. On the contrary: “we make parade of our riches and conceal our poverty (Smith 50)”. The man of rank is, above all, an exhibitionist, and expends himself without contention. In the act of exhibiting himself he believes that he is swallowing space, time, and souls. The primitive accumulation that permits this luxurious expenditure requires unrestricted punishment and moderation. Smith writes a nostalgic song to immortality: the great man should live forever. This sentiment, explains Smith, necessarily implies the rejection of anything that happens amongst the low ranks. Among them particularities disappear; they are the ones whose most profound desire is the long life of the great man.

The origin of the distinction of ranks and the order of society is the human propensity of loving the rich and powerful. In this point Smith's philosophy turns to be the lost voice of the “poor wretched”: the philosopher speaks for them in order to affirm that, despite everything, their loyalty will be always with the great man. Smith makes the low ranks pronounce a word, a promise: that they love hunger and punishment. The great man speaks for the condemned to corroborate the thesis that in an equilibrated society conflicts or disputes must not exist. Inside the healthy and pompous body of the triumphant man everyone should find a minuscule space to satisfy his or her own needs.

Reason, Philosophy, and Order

Smith continues his justification and exaltation of the class system by saying, “That Kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or punished, as the public convenience may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is not the doctrine of nature” (Smith 53). Once again, a tension appears. Smith introduces the public equilibrium as the criterion by which to judge authority and sovereignty, reason and philosophy, hunger and social and existential despair. Although limited, this criterion is political and therefore admits interpretations and applications. It is

possible to understand that the organization of society will be what prompts political relationships. Therefore, reason must reach the highest limit of social tensions in order to satisfy its own expectations. Rational are those practices that are put into radical debate and can be transformed. The rationality of an action follows if it is effective or has a plausible capacity of contributing to public wellbeing. It is known that, for Smith, the public ambit includes only men from the high ranks. Independently of this, Smith opposes the doctrine of philosophy to the doctrine of nature.

The latter assumes authority as constitutive and inalienable. Once Smith establishes the natural (not rational) preeminence of the great man, he advises the “man of inferior rank” of how to distinguish himself in the public sphere. All this advice comes from what Smith denominates as the doctrine of nature. Reason must surrender itself to the doctrine of nature, he insists, because this doctrine is the foundation of the differences of rank.⁶ This is Smith's critique of reason. He is not looking for the rational. The basic argument of the contradiction between reason and nature Smith develops as an apology of nature and divine favor: “By 1776 when he published *The Wealth of Nations*, he does

not appear to have moved far from the stance adopted in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* where he maintains that success in business, like aristocratic birth, should be regarded as a sign of divine favor” (Israel 238). This apology serves as a structure of his economic theory. As a social application of this apology he proposes to those of low rank strategies to achieve excellence: they have to improve their technical skills, stretch their physical capacities to the limit, and wait with patience for death. Moreover, and perhaps most important, the “low ranks” must always be prepared to give their lives for the great man. This new (low ranked) man, the public man par excellence, should be ready for the battle because it is battle that allows him to be recognized as an honorable man.

These men have only their bodies to give testimony of themselves. In the empty landscape or war, amid corpses and the halt, the men of “middle and low rank” build their bloody future. Not only that, but he insists it is crucial that they die with pride. Because of that he develops a theory of sympathy to the miserable. They are the ones that will die in the place of the men of letters and monarchs. It is from this assumption that come Smith's cautions about the “man of fashion” (Smith 64). Men of fashion lack the physical and spiritual conditions to defend society. Yet they are no less

⁶ For a more detailed discussion see Israel (2011) and Hénaff (2002).

for that; indeed, Smith insists that we (presumably meaning lowly men, cannon fodder) never forget that fashion, the refined language of the salons, and good conversations require the brave and obedient masculinity of the men without honor.

Many a poor a man places his glory in being thought rich, without considering that the duties (if one may call such follies by so very venerable a name) with what reputation imposes upon him, must soon reduce him to beggary, and render his situation still more unlike that of those whom he admires and imitates, that it had been originally (Smith 64).

To those non-recognizable men, no noble sin or excess is allowed. Their vocation, if they aspire to recognition, is to assume fully the rigorous discipline of the factory, the martial spirit, and the shadows of happiness. For Smith the requisite for recognition is the obedience to nature.

Economic Objects

Smith establishes in the first part of *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* the necessary conditions for a healthy and wealthy commonwealth. At the beginning of the second part there is a reflection about what Smith calls the "imaginary resentment of the slain" (69). His reflection assumes that death

destroys life without attenuations. The cold corpses cannot say anything to us; it marks the end of our responsibility to them and to all they could have desired and cared for. Phantoms do not exist; economy has only life as its object. And life is understood as the blood exchanged in the market by warm bodies. The dead, because they cannot reappear, must remain foreign to our hearts. An economy should not stop its march toward progress because of the unachieved dreams of those captive in graves. We must, Smith says, pay no attention to the vengeance of the offended, to sentiments that sway us in our daily tasks. Indeed, to resist death, or to conceive of its annihilation, belongs to the most important secrets of reason, he insists.

Smith proposes a theory of resentment that does not consider the complaints and blood of the dead. What underlies this theory is the doctrine of the just punishment, the necessity and usefulness of the punitive structure and its forms of social implementation. Without punishment, according to Smith, there can be no society and without accepting punishment as some sort of educative apparatus there can be no agents. Sympathy is not directed at individuals or specific events but fundamentally at what, for Smith, makes society possible. What is at stake in his theory of moral sentiments is the type of relationship that

must be established between law, punishment, and sentimentality. Every law must be inscribed on the body so that punishment can produce intimate satisfaction. Smith manages to cancel any possible rebellion against law and the doctrine of nature.

The Crypt and Writing

Smith does not propose a rational philosophy. Although he intuitively reasons, he prefers to escape from its conflictive character. Smith's writing pretends to seduce the future: honor is a possibility if one assumes it can protect the condition of being men and women. He speaks to the multitudes, asking them to be pure, and advising them that it is fundamental to avoid luxury and riches. As an alternative to palaces he offers a common place: the city, home, and the places of work. Gray and cold as they are, those are the spaces in and through which society grows and becomes interconnected and indispensable. Smith's reflections do not admit ambiguous interpretations: "The very existence of society requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice should be restrained by proper punishments; and, consequently, that to inflict those punishments should be regarded as a proper and laudable action" (77).

The theory of just punishment belongs to what Smith designates as "the

economy of nature." Within the context of his presentation "Of Merit and Demerit," Smith narrows the economy of nature to one goal: nature provides humanity with a basic tendency toward self-preservation and propagation. Smith understands that human beings want to persist in their existence, extend it through procreation (family), and even avoid thinking about their own extinction. The authentically human has an aversion to death that, according to Smith, lies at the frontiers of thinking. The authentic thinker is the one whose orientation is to preserve human life through planning and instruments. To think is to act according to the principle of the production and reproduction of the conditions that make life possible. The problem for Smith is that, once again, nature and reason do not coincide. The ends provided by nature reveal themselves as too immense for the means (reason) that humans have for reason's achievement. Though Smith's humans aspire in any way possible to continue their existence, they cannot do it by themselves. These men of weak reason and obscure futures cannot deal with themselves. The vulnerability of their reason transforms these beings into hungry animals. Smith knows that desire is not the result of lacking an object but that its dynamism precedes any specific object. Desire creates worlds and shadows. In throwing himself towards the satisfaction of his

desires and the enjoyment of its necessities, laments Smith, man forgets about the goals that "the great Director of nature intended to produce by them." (Smith 78).

Making Us Social

Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with its own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face (Smith 110).

Smith's concept of human is a part of his complementary economy. It implies a strong disposition to work over one's flesh to produce a natural self. Because of this the bare man, the madman that sings, cannot recognize himself and feel shame (for he lacks culture). Solitude is, for Smith, an open door through which to become absorbed in one's own passions, a space in and through which one seeks pleasure as an end. Communication and language are consequently a defeat, a scar, and a memory of an intimate life in which there were other channels by which one could have shown one's humanity and been with others, whether that were by a kiss, a scrawl, or by drunkenness. The inclination of

the head, the tactile playfulness, and the unexpected disasters are subjected to a primordial punishment: the mirror and the eyes of the other. Smith's agent is broken at his core and divides himself to conclude the procedure of examination. The constant divisions and the resultant multiplicity function as the production of capital.

When I endeavor to examine my own conduct, when I endeavor to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of (Smith 113).

Smith's I has the peculiar capacity to interrupt the appearance given by the mirror. The I that examines, and judges suspends the artifice that allows the agent to participate in the social transactions as united. This unity is partially destroyed to make possible the judgment over the persona. This is the physical apparition that moves, makes and fulfills contracts, kills in war and exerts effort in the factories, and appears and disappears as a shadow exposed to noises. A defeated body and sentiments constitute the person; she or he is a labor force, a weapon of war, and a reproductive machine. However, as in the case of the

of recognition. The first point of his reflection deals with the religion of the desperate as they cannot achieve recognition in Smith's understanding of society. He clearly acknowledges that religion plays a primordial role in the rebellion of the poor. Because Smith's notion of recognition is impossible, the masses of condemned bodies look to the solace of religion.

The persons in such unfortunate circumstances that humble philosophy which confines its views to this life, can afford, perhaps, but little consolation. Everything that could render either life or death respectable is taken from them. They are condemned to death and to everlasting infamy. Religion can alone afford them any effectual comfort. She alone can tell them that it is of little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-seeing Judge of the world approves of it. She alone can present to them the view of another world; a world of more candor, humanity and justice than the present (Smith 120-121).

For the condemned the constituted world is an irredeemable place. For Smith, the condemned ones scream of innocence and rebellion cannot be attended to. The organization of social relations does not have space for reparation and doubt. Verdicts, judges, and trials cannot be contested. Philosophy, or more precisely the philosophical

techniques, acts like the copyist of the judge: philosophy writes and proclaims in the salons and universities that the condemnation to death is more than rational; it is the revelation of the organizer of nature. Yet as Smith recognizes resistance to annihilation persists—in the form of religion. Religion offers another world, one in which the legal structure trembles. From those irruptions arise, like wild plants, images and noises of a justice that does not require division and subjugation.

The judge that sees everything does not condemn and incites the imagination of another world. Within Smith's theory, religion has an anomalous status, but at its core it is indecent because it introduces the impossible into what he likes to think of as his closed world.

The Forbidden Name

The introduction of the religious anomaly helps Smith to emphasize that in the real world the religious judge does not have any power. The ambit of the judge is the wounded heart of the condemned person who longs for individual consolation. That world does not have the potency to interfere with the world designed by "The All-wise Author of Nature" (Smith 128). The religious world is evanescent, unsubstantial, a product of weakness and despair. From this perspective

bare man, such a person lacks his or her self. In one of the corners of his or her room the person, whether exhausted or energized, is taken to trial without knowing exactly of what he or she is accused. However, this trial does not occur in a space that is time determined; rather it functions as the *apriori* category of space-time. The productivity of a person presupposes the recurrent and constant judgment. The trial is happening always, because the person cannot be absolved.

The charges against the person continue to grow even if that person is trying to obey the director of nature. Every trial is suspended if the accused promises eternal loyalty to the director of nature and to its purposes. The division of the I or self is a way to maintain a prerogative: there is a point at which the spectator is always united. This unity is what Smith proposes for the society divided into ranks and for the social division of labor. If he admits that the human essence is the complex combination of its social relationships, then it is necessary to say that this essence is an uncontestable judgment against which are leveled secret accusations. The divided society embodies its cuts, domination, and modes of production all the while stalking the internalized judge.

Agent and Spectator

The one taken to judgment is the agent, the public figure that everyday lives out the doctrine of the creator. The judge is the spectator (the original idea) that acts in the world through its copy. Their difference cannot be abridged to "one is cause and the other the effect" (Smith 113). The spectator is the perfect version that, because of its condition of perfection, cannot relate directly to the everyday affairs of the world. This also has to do with its constitution as it does not have a body and therefore does not suffer alterations. The agent, copy, or residuum of the spectator is fundamentally a body that just intuits the spiritual life. Their relationship is necessary because Smith knows that the new economy cannot produce and reproduce itself without bodies. In its most pathetic version, the relationship between idea and bodies there is not forgiveness for the body and its needs. This is possible because, for Smith, bodies want to be recognized and embraced by the idea.

Religion: A World to Come

After his apology on punishment and his elaboration of obedience, Smith offers a reflection about religion. His objective is to differentiate between true and false religion. This differentiation continues his discussion about the limits and possibilities

it is possible to argue that religion is not a complex of beliefs but a horizon that must be practically and partially reached. How then does one create a new world? The "Author of Nature" on the other hand makes social relationships the highest goal of human life. The author has left the world entirely to the disposition of men so they can judge themselves. Politically this means that it has sanctioned Smith's divisions as transcendental. First, men judge and condemn each other, and then they condemn themselves. The demigod never forgets. If the internal judge is afraid to condemn itself and this is one of the motivations of Smith's reflections, a demigod rises against it. Against this demigod struggles another root of human nature: a hope and expectation for a coming world. Smith writes from within an agonistic struggle. The effective and factual social relationships face the also real and unfathomable expectations of a non-calculated and novel space that come from the rebellion of the poor. From the ruins and scraps of desperate men appears an afflicted nature.

As a response to this, Smith proposes to keep loving life: "The poor man must neither defraud nor steal from the rich, though the acquisition might be much more beneficial to the one than the loss could be hurtful to the other" (Smith 138). If the thirsty and hungry poor person decides to

steal or, more precisely is obliged to do so in order to preserve his life, he must put the love of life above the love of self. Any individual necessity, not even the drive to self-preservation, can be considered as more valuable than the interest of the majority. The demigod is the one that gives a message: do not resist, be a man. To die Smith considers as divine virtue; it is what makes the poor be closer to God.

Deity and Spectator

Smith's philosophy of moral sentiments is a theological enterprise throughout. As a part of this enterprise he creates his own understanding of a true religion. Therefore, religion also has its double. For Smith there is another religion which is part of the sequence of law, punishment, love, and death. In this religion it is the deity itself that inscribes morality in every heart. Within the realm of this deity there is no other possible world. Smith's world finishes its cycle: it announces that it starts from facts and ends with an explicit theology. Nonetheless, from the beginning of his moral philosophy, Smith proposes a theology. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments'* form of exposition implies that there has since the beginning been an encounter between nature and deity. In contrast to his idea of human reason, Smith's divinity is all-comprehensive and self-founded. It is on this

basis that Smith writes his philosophy. Smith's deity is theological in one precise and concise sense: it is a presence whose apparition depends upon and is made possible by writing. It does not differ from the word that represents it. This religion and its deity are necessary to reinforce the sense of duty. The obligation is not to the divinity but to the happiness of the commonwealth. This deity does not require anything because it has deposited its entire being into justice and its "vicegerents." Smith equates the historical and contingent reality with the law of a God.

As a part of this equation Smith locates the vicegerents of God inside every person; he understands the social conflicts and struggles as if they were a battle against God. In this labyrinth of tensions that Smith is always touching upon and from which he wants to escape, his last play is to put God on his side. It is in the immanent heaven that everything can be remediated. Smith's false alternatives are either to cooperate with God to achieve happiness or to rebel against it: "By acting otherwise, on the contrary, we seem to obstruct, in some measure, the scheme which the Author of Nature has established for the happiness and perfection of the world, and to declare ourselves, if I may say so, in some measure the enemies of God" (Smith 166). And this God is always stalking, ready to punish, and eager for revenge. Its body

is the body of the philosopher. Smith returns to one of the most important questions of his moral philosophy as a result of his reflection about God. The question can be considered strictly soteriological.

Flesh and Savages

The question to which Smith returns is: what are the conditions, exercises, and economization that everyone must practice in order to fulfill God's plan? Smith's response is based upon an alleged "comparative anthropology." One of the categories that organizes this comparison is self-denial. Smith compares his own anthropological situation with what he denominates "savages and barbarians" (Smith 205). These are beings that close themselves to any risky passion because they are in permanent danger. Their primordial condition is that of the weak that hides from the other, and that attempts not to be perceived. Their being is always about to be destroyed. They are never satisfied with themselves. Their misery, that for Smith is congenital, does not allow them to develop a personality and societies. In the strictest sense the savages, as the wretched, cannot develop such things because of their constitutive weakness. The savage is a solitarian without a possible salvation; it is completely turned towards its broken self.

Such savages cannot have encounters with others because their own life is ungraspable to them. Among the savages sympathy has not been developed; they have, therefore, another nature. The savage, says Smith, falls into its solitary silence and does not get out of it. If for Smith noise is a mark of damaged humanity, silence is its scar of inferiority. If one is fully human, that humanity, the philosopher emphasizes, must be expressed through moderate talking. This means permanently exposing oneself, constantly revealing oneself to others. The spoken word is the place in which the person is solidified. Through speaking a person exposes him or herself to the judgment of others. The spoken word serves as evidence of the state of one's secret places. Smith introduces an analysis of language as juridical device: the act of speaking weakens the security artifices within the speaker that introduce a conflict with duty and God. In speaking, the agent shows everything to its accusers. Talk is always the economic norm that Smith misses in the savages. Among themselves, explains Smith, they are indifferent.

To silence, savages add distance from every stimulus. Smith, who writes from a colonial imaginary, creates what can be called sensible blocking of the conqueror: since when they are being tortured the savages do not express the natural emotions of a

person, the conqueror cannot demonstrate his or her own sensibility. For Smith, conquest and torture do not affect the sphere of human sensibility because the conquered other, given its alleged insensibility, shows its empty heart. Smith understands conquest as a pre-sentimental activity in which what are being hurt are merely objects, raw material. Savages are thus another modality of the bare man. Here a question of political importance that has been discussed, among others, by Achille Mbembe, must be introduced:

I do not intend to go back over such problematic of continent as "invention", since the history of that imaginary has been firmly established and its wellsprings laid bare. I am, rather, concerned with two issues, two sides of a coin. One is the burden of the arbitrariness involved in seizing from the world and putting to death what has previously decreed to be nothing, an empty figure. The other is the way the negated subject deprived of power, pushed even farther away, to the other side, behind the existing world, our of the world, takes on himself or herself the act of his or her own destruction and prolongs his/her own crucifixion (Mbembe 173-174).

Smith's colonial and fantastic take on others is sustained by a ferocious inventiveness. However, Mbembe's double issue is an attempt

to understand why the conqueror and his philosophers try to destroy what is not even supposed to exist. This is a question about the motivations of a philosophy that declares both the inhumanity of savages and at the same time expresses certain nostalgia about its alleged primitive and original characteristics. It is more appropriate to refer to the instances rather than motivations through which a philosopher pretends both to negate the existence and capture a savage or barbarian. In the case of Smith, it is, as I shall explain in what follows, some of those fixations and fantasies that populate the philosophical delirium.

The Sound and Fury

For Smith the basic theological and economic contradiction is between the savage and God: "every savage is said to prepare himself, from his dreadful end: he composes for this purpose what they call the song of death, a song which he is to sing when he has fallen into the hands of his enemies, and is expiring under the tortures which they inflict upon him" (Smith 206). Smith's savages compose songs. Their intimacy and interior appear not to be accessible. Their voices remain distant, open to a future that does not belong to the torturer. The savage murmurs a melody that guards its life from the fire and makes present the multitude of lives that make its

songs possible. All music speaks; it says multiple things that are not always immediately understandable. The torturer, whose voice the philosopher pretends to be, gets frustrated because the burning body is not his property, and because the bloody lips of the savage conceal what is most important. Torture has as its purpose to make the condemned live enough to declare that they surrender. To surrender to the torturer has a direct relationship with the imperative to obey the spectator. In each case what is at stake is accepting the infinite power of God. The songs that the savage sing are suspires against death, the songs introduce a battle with God. Smith's dream is that all the impoverished, accused, and tortured learn how to defeat their weaknesses for them to remain firm when the fire consumes them.

For Smith, conquest and colonization are hazardous turns of fortune that demonstrate, amid cruelty, the noble character of the savage. To the question of the uniformity of human nature Smith adds this apparent tension: the braveness of the savage. Smith laments that it is a feature that has been weakened in and through civilized societies. The philosopher keeps the hope that it will be possible to combine the love of God and the availability for death. The economic theory and anthropological speculations are linked in order to ask even more of the condemned:

“The hardness demanded of savages diminishes their humanity, and, perhaps, the delicate sensibility required in civilized nations sometimes destroys the masculine firmness of the character” (Smith 209). The previous declaration is awkward. The savages are from the outset not considered as humans. The relationship between the civilized and the savage, inside Smith's work, is organized from the assumption of a radical difference that is never called into question. The angle that interests Smith is not the “loss of humanity” but the question of the destruction of masculinity.

The Gentleman's Nostalgia

The savage, a rhetorical figure, provides the place in which the human is a combination of laconic heroism and monetary accumulation. The rupture between matrix and body, origin and present marks Smith's anthropological genealogy. As in the case of the division of labor, in which he recognizes its deadly effects on the workers, Smith makes the “original masculinity” of the savage an object of philosophical remembrance.⁷

This is the reason why Smith's theory of moral sentiments is an artifact that creates differences and encrypts them.⁸ The production of

differences, in this case concentrated on the savage, is cryptic. The savage, as a rhetorical place, is the intentional oblivion of what exceeds the gaze of the spectator. But Smith does not stop there. He estimates that it is even necessary to cancel the nostalgia. Smith turns against himself and his fantasies about beings that have the war inscribed in their skin. The philosopher creates an itinerary that serves as a philosophy of history: the origin of the human, conserved still by the savage, is found in the inclination towards action and care of silence. When history, that subsumes savages as ashes, reaches its highest productivity the roots of humanity are put at risk.

Thus, Smith writes a requiem for the savage whom he cannot but condemn to perpetual servitude.⁹ At the core of this condemnation is the project to include these men by ignoring who they are, and seeing them solely as a labor force: “One who, in flying from an enemy whom it was impossible to resist, should throw down his infant because it retarded his flight, would surely be excusable; since, by attempting to save it, he could only hope for the consolation of dying with it” (Smith 210). Smith interprets the abandonment of children, in the context of persecutions and killings, as the expression of an ancient tradition. With this he negates

7 See(Sebastiani 6-9).

8 For this procedure see Tinland(2003).

9 For a more developed discussion of this see Forman-Barzilai (2010).

the tension and radical loss that are implied by deciding to let a child die. The gentleman reader of so-called historical documents cannot admit that while reading about far away tropical people he is also provoking escapes and death: "Thus, there is no violence in a colony without a sense of contiguity [...] Furthermore colonial violence is linked to the exercise of language, to a series of acts, gestures, noises" (Mbembe 175). Reading and writing are also those gestures in and through which Smith belongs to the imperial and colonial enterprise.

Take care of yourself: Distance and Obedience

Smith concludes that everyone must take care of himself. This maxim meshes with Smith's idea about the constitutive sentimental narrowness of the human. To face this condition, which for Smith is natural, it is necessary to create small units of care. These unities have as their norm to reduce distance and to intensify sentimental exchanges. Besides that they preserve social peace: "The distinction of ranks, the peace and order of society, are in great measure founded upon the respect which we naturally conceive for the former [...] The peace and order of society is of more importance than even the relief of the miserable" (Smith 226). This principle is extensively developed in the section

entitled "Of Universal Benevolence" and "Self-Command." As a whole these two sections conclude Smith's theological economy by offering the meta-theoretical conditions for *An Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations*.¹⁰

Throughout the development of his theory, Smith does not conceal a deep sense of unsettledness. He is aware that the solid can and, effectively is, vanishing into the air. He can grasp and even show some of the conflicts of a world that is being fractured by conquest, impoverishment, and commercial trade. The spectacular mobility of the world that Smith is trying to contain makes him create a mega-economic criterion: it is imperative for everyone to surrender to the Universe. Smith's model is, once again, that of the soldier who is willing to give his life. This imperative of cheerful sacrifice must be read as a total politics of life.

The Invisible Hand

The following passage announces and explains in advance Smith's invisible hand in *The Wealth of Nations*:

He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public, nor knows how much he is promoting

¹⁰ John Millar, a student of Smith at the University of Glasgow, was the first to point to this transition. See Millar (2006 [1771]), 264-265.

it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention [...] By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it (Adam Smith, *An Inquiry Into the Wealth of Nations*, 477-78).

Men's sole responsibility is to take care of themselves and their sentimental circles or units. The passage of *The Wealth of Nations* accents the individual's actions within the market. As he establishes certain relationships and makes choices, he is creating the conditions of possibility for the invisible hand to lead him to promote the security of his society. This invisible hand is none other than the God from the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. The God that oversees the universe introduces its hand in human society in order to promote unexpected implications out of self-interest. The message is the same although presented in different contexts and languages. The role of God and the invisible hand is that of conducting irrationality. There is in Smith, a form of soteriological longing. But in Smith's case the economic relationships and economic theories are not what directly offer salvation.

Smith proposes a continuum that could be arranged in such a way that the authentic human beings, organized as a society, could achieve happiness not because of social practices intended to produce it for everyone. There are irrational and insensible beings that remain far from God's hand. Because there is no rupture between Smith's moral and economic theories, Smith develops a theory of the incorporation of bodies within society.

Becoming a Body

Individuals must become a body, transform themselves into bodies, and accept their bodies. To be incorporated, as flesh, into social dynamics and institutions requires everyone to be a unitary body that works, speaks, judges, and loves its country but fundamentally its own self-interest, which Smith identifies as God's own providence. Now it is possible to see that in Smith's narrative the poor are precisely those that are not possessed by corporality.

In Smith's system there is no separation but the presence of a body, which is a transparent ensemble that permits the production, distribution, and accumulation of life. For Smith, life is the flesh that in Tertullian appears as be provided of inclinations and temperatures that make difficult for its capture and control. Because of that Tertullian creates a flesh without

action, density, and passion. This explains Tertullian's interest in the question of Mary's virginity. In assigning a passive flesh to Jesus (*genere non vitio*) or more precisely in creating a theory of a damaged flesh, Tertullian creates the soteriological body, which is flesh controlled by the divine substance. He creates a body that consumes flesh while he locates it as an accessible and sensible present object. Incarnation, the process in and through which flesh is taken by a body, is an agonistic struggle against the carnal *actus*: what Smith does is attempt to go to the densest and deepest part of the person in order to subsume its potency.

A body is not something that one carries or brings with oneself; to assume a body, as Smith demonstrates, supposes a trajectory. The body that Smith refers to is not simply the body of an animal *oeconomy*. Smith's is a reflection about the body that pretends to transform or to take the place of the organic body. The pilgrim walks, advances, but because his body hurts, he has a hope inside him. To produce and achieve his hope he must struggle against his basic productive tool: his corporality.

Smith's bodies are thought to be reduced to the performance of basic tasks whose projection they cannot decide. Family, friends, and the country are also micro-productive bodies. Inside these bodies circulate and

produce the words and gestures that make the market possible and excited. The market ultimately belongs to and is protected by God, says Smith. Its quotidian life is composed of the different body-performances, all of them separated by degrees of magnanimity and honor.

The rest of the spheres of action that Smith assigns to the "weak man" must be understood as derivations of self-interest. The limits of the care for others Smith has established in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* as resignation and honorable masculinity. As a wound that spreads itself over the skin the world of Gods, demi-gods, and vice-regents that Smith instituted as ground for his philosophy reiterates a message: you must be a man until the end.

Economy of Flesh: Dawn and Vice

Even when they adequately interpret Smith's project, some readers still miss some of its most important theoretical moves.

Far from theorizing a self-regulating market that would work best with a minimalist state or with no state at all, *The Wealth of Nations*, no less than the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and the unpublished *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, presupposed the existence of a strong state that would create and reproduce the

conditions for the existence of the market, that would use the market as an effective instrument of government; that would regulate its operation; and that would actively intervene to correct or counter its socially or politically undesirable outcomes (Arrighi, 42-43).

The description inserts Smith's philosophy into the scheme of the relationships between state and market. It is accurate as it highlights the effective tendency at the surface of Smith's political economy. What it lacks is that it does not consider the foundational and theological area that in fact prompts Smith's narrative. What is theorized first by Smith is the transition from bare life (plural and moveable flesh) to bodies. Smith proposes an economy of minimal flesh that transforms flesh into strong and healthy bodies. These bodies are not all given by nature. What nature provides is an anatomical structure and a complex system of affections that must be transformed into agents and vigilant spectators. Incarnation becomes in this lineage a decisive security and health device to suppress the latent rebellion of impassible flesh: "More than an expulsion of flesh, this concerns its incorporation into an organism that is capable of domesticating flesh's centrifugal and anarchic impulses." (Esposito 164). Although accurate, this assertion does not go to what is the precise ambit in which the economy

of flesh originates and extends itself: the assumption that there is in flesh a component, ubiquitous and intrinsically vicious, that must be identified and economized. This assumption allows the development of a series of techniques, therapeutic practices, philosophical interventions, and social and political sanctions whose intention is, at least in the case of Smith, to accumulate that territory called man. Smith reminds us that there is no man without a God. Without a God there will just be flesh. Therein laid the problematic relationship between the economy of flesh and incarnation.

Economy of Flesh and Incarnation

Esposito's argument will serve as an introduction to the question that I shall develop in another discussion: "With regard to the distinction (and also opposition) vis-à-vis the logic of incorporation: while the incorporation tends to unify a plurality, or at least duality, incarnation, on the contrary, separates and multiples in two what was originally one." (Esposito 167). The fundamental problem of this argument is that it does not understand that the flesh of incarnation is not "identical to ours;" (Esposito 168), it is indeed a material flesh, but it does not carry the predisposition for contamination that ours still contains. It must be sub-jetivized, reduced to the condition of being one with God. In this sense the

operations of incarnation and Smith's economy of flesh remain within the same space as both claim to be dealing with an object-subject that requires being, intensively economized. The semantic and theological field in which Smith's economy of flesh exists ranges from questions related to the loss of masculinity to the tone of the voice. Thus, flesh is the antipode of the human being, although it cannot be destroyed entirely. In this sense, Smith's project reveals the flesh's return to God.

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DIOS Y ESTRÉS: ENMIENDAS A LA CREACIÓN. RELIGIÓN EN JOHN STUART MILL¹ GOD AND STRESS: AMENDMENTS TO CREATION. RELIGION IN JOHN STUART MILL

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Resumen

En este trabajo se analiza el concepto de religión en John Stuart Mill como parte de sus *Principios de Política Económica*. De acuerdo con Mill, no es la muerte de Dios aquello que debe esperarse o propiciarse en una sociedad liberal, pues la religión no está fundada en el miedo. En cambio, el mito fundamental del liberalismo sería el surgimiento de una *comunidad del estrés*, pues la religión está fundada en el deseo de enmendar la creación y la erradicación del mal. Esta perspectiva será analizada en relación con la tradición de la teología económica cristiana, en la cual, los dones dados por Dios a la humanidad deben ser proliferados, así como una prefiguración del lugar que ocuparía la religión en el mundo moderno según lo imaginaron los textos de Mill.

Palabras clave: religión, liberalismo, energía, rendimiento, mill.

Abstract

This paper analyses the concept of religion in John Stuart Mill as part of his *Principles of Political Economy*. According to Mill, it is not the death of God what is to be expected or propitiated in a liberal society, for religion is not anchored in fear. Instead, the fundamental myth of liberalism would be the rise of a *fellowship of stress*, where God requires the partnership of humans, for religion is anchored in desire to amend the creation and the eradication of evil. This perspective will be analyzed in relation with the tradition of Christian theological economy, in which, God's gifts to mankind must be proliferated, and as prefiguration of the role of religion in the modern world imagined by Mill's texts.

Keywords: Religion. Liberalism. Energy. Performance. Mill.

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Introducción

Este artículo estudia el concepto de religión al interior de la economía política de John Stuart Mill. Lo religioso, en la perspectiva del filósofo inglés, no se advirtió como residuo incómodo de la infancia humana, un cadáver sagrado, destinado al rincón más privado de su existencia. Mill prefiguró que lo religioso tendría continuidad al interior del liberalismo, no como herramienta de control moral, sino como expresión de la disposición económica del ser humano, por la cual se le requiere enmendar su estado. La tesis básica de este artículo será mostrar cómo en Mill, el mito fundamental del liberalismo no es la muerte de dios, sino la alianza del estrés, donde el problema básico de la existencia es el aumento del rendimiento de lo creado.

En la obra de J. S. Mill resulta evidente que el imperativo económico, según el cual, cada uno debe realizar una apropiada administración de su vitalidad-energía, no remite exclusivamente a un criterio técnico de productividad. En una discusión mucho más amplia, el filósofo inglés lo ubica como la forma en la cual cada ser humano responde a la exigencia antropológica que nos define como especie. Según su perspectiva, la creación y sus criaturas no deben solo conservarse en su integridad, sino que, tal como se predica de la parábola de los talentos, lo creado

debe ser enmendado y ensanchado, debe llevarse hasta su grado más pleno, a tal punto que finalmente el bien se imponga sobre el mal. El problema industrial de captura eficiente de vitalidad se inscribe dentro de una consideración de mayor amplitud en torno a la naturaleza, la divinidad y sus propósitos, donde cada elemento en el universo porta el requerimiento de alcanzar un estado de mayor perfección.

Los ensayos sobre la religión de J. S. Mill se ocupan de esta cuestión. En el trasfondo de la discusión liberal sobre el progreso yace una consideración acerca de la *naturaleza* y el ser humano, donde el filósofo inglés aborda con detenimiento los problemas legados por siglos de tradición teológica cristiana, no como un recurso didáctico o meramente histórico, sino como una forma de ahondar el problema básico de la economía teológica con respecto al tipo de administración de sí que logra captar (en su amplia acepción de producir y encauzar) el máximo potencial de lo creado. En su consideración sobre la religión, Mill no solo se separa de muchas de las posturas clásicas (muy enraizadas aún) sobre el utilitarismo de la religión para la sociedad liberal, sino que muestra cómo el problema de la captura de energía-vital debe ser abordado desde su profundidad antropológica.

Finalmente, el propósito de estas consideraciones será mostrar cómo una preocupación básica de la economía política liberal, a saber, la captura de vitalidad-energía, no se desplegó contra el acervo teológico de la tradición cristiana europea, como se predica de un discurso sobre la mayoría de edad secularizada de la modernidad. Tampoco el liberalismo se limitó a citar la tradición teológica como recurso para mediar o asegurar la aceptación popular de la nueva corriente cultural. Las discusiones en torno a la captura de vitalidad-energía se dieron a partir del influjo cultural de la tradición de la economía teológica, cuyo material gramatical permitió articular y ahondar los modos de comprensión sobre la producción de excesos y su vínculo con el desarrollo de la maximización de la labor industrial.

Establecer que la tradición de *teología económica* ofrece los trasfondos culturales que permitieron pensar los aparatos de captura de vitalidad para la economía política liberal supone evitar simplificaciones. En primer lugar, sugerir que las formas teológico-religiosas de un momento histórico deben ser analizadas en sus asociaciones con la economía política, no implica determinar las primeras, en un nivel ideológico, como aquella supraestructura que despliega una distorsión farmacológica de la realidad. Asimismo, a partir de un espíritu funcionalista, delimitar

los servicios morales que instituciones religiosas brindan en un momento particular al tipo de emprendimientos requeridos por el liberalismo, no agota los traslapes entre la economía política y la tradición teológica cristiana. En cada uno de los casos aludidos, se reduce el aparato de captura teológico a modos, aunque diversos, de aprisionamiento, sin ocuparse de una locación más estructural de lo teológico con respecto a la economía política, donde podemos advertir su vínculo con la formación de excedentes, y su incorporación, como procesos constitutivos de la empresa liberal.

En adelante, procuraré mostrar cómo la economía política liberal, al menos, según la presentación de uno de sus pensadores más representativos del siglo XIX, no establece una ruptura definitiva con la tradición de teología económica cristiana, ni tampoco se limita a usufructuar beneficios particulares de instituciones religiosas. El propósito consiste en ubicar los vestigios de un alcance mucho más constitutivo de la tradición teológica al interior de la formulación de los ejes fundamentales del liberalismo decimonónico, a saber, ofrecer las coordenadas básicas que enmarcaron la captura de la vida. De ahí que nuestra fuente de discusión central proviene, en este apartado, no de textos cristianos o tratados teológicos, sino de autores que abordaron problemáticas básicas vinculadas a la

industria decimonónica. Los textos de J. S. Mill serán analizados en esta clave, con el propósito de considerar los trasfondos teológicos a partir de los cuales pensó una economía política de tipo liberal con base en una consideración sobre la naturaleza.

Energía industrial: deseo y productividad nacional en John Stuart Mill

Al interior de las distintas discusiones presentes en su *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), texto básico en la formación del pensamiento económico de su época, John Stuart Mill dedica un apartado al análisis de las causas de la superioridad productiva de algunas naciones, particularmente, en lo que se refiere a la *energía* laboral: ¿por qué algunas naciones, se preguntó Mill, cuentan con un mayor acervo de energía laboral para su aprovechamiento y empleo? (Mill 102-106).

Para explicar las diferencias de capacidad *energética laboral* entre las naciones, Mill hace referencia a un principio etnográfico de su tiempo: en lugares «*in which mere existence is a pleasure*» la energía corporal, si bien abundante, es gobernada por las pasiones y se desvía de toda actividad disciplinada. Son más bien las dificultades del medio hostil «*that nourish bodily and mental energy*», razón por la cual, ha sido en la premura de las adversidades del entorno, «*Up*

North», donde la empresa conquistadora, el vigor militar, el pensamiento especulativo y la energía industrial se han desarrollado y consumado con mayor alcance, efectividad y propiedad.² Mill no concibe esta particularidad etnográfica, asociada con las circunstancias climatológicas y geográficas, como una constante natural de la condición humana, la cual vincularía, por algún capricho ontológico, raza y energía corporal. Mill asume esta diferencia como una variable antropológica, por lo tanto, susceptible de transformación.

El despliegue de la *energía laboral* requiere de formas específicas de

² Se trata de una concepción que compartía, siglos antes, un autor como Jean Jacques Rousseau, cuando intenta explicar las bases antropológicas que explican las diferencias entre las lenguas de países cálidos y septentrionales: “En aquellos horribles climas donde todo está muerto durante nueve meses del año, donde el sol solo calienta el aire algunas semanas para enseñarles mejor a los habitantes de qué bienes están privados y prolongar así su miseria, en esos lugares donde la tierra no da nada si no es a fuerza de trabajo, y donde la fuente de la vida parece estar más en los brazos que en el corazón, los hombres, atareados sin cesar buscando provisiones para su subsistencia, se preocupan apenas por lazos más dulces [...] La ociosidad que nutre las pasiones cedió el lugar al trabajo que las reprime: antes de preocuparse por vivir feliz, era preciso preocuparse por vivir [...] Los de los países cálidos tienen pasiones voluptuosas, relacionadas con el amor y la suavidad: la naturaleza hace tanto por los habitantes que estos casi no tienen nada que hacer; si un asiático tiene mujeres y reposo, está contento. Pero en el Norte, cuyos hombres consumen mucho sobre un suelo ingrato, los hombres sometidos a tantas necesidades son fácilmente irritables; les inquieta todo lo que se hace a su alrededor” (Rousseau 55-56).

trabajo: «*Labour which relates to human beings*». Seres humanos, aun aquellos que Mill considera salvajes y, por lo tanto, acostumbrados a las condiciones más favorables (Mill refiere a «the negroes of Jamaica and Demerara»), pueden ser *educados* de modo que puedan reapropiarse de su energía industrial: “To civilize a savage, he must be inspired with new wants and desires, event if not of a very elevated kind, provided that their gratification can be a motive to steady and regular bodily and mental exertion” (Mill 104). El salvaje, cuya energía corporal es abundante pero distribuida de manera amorfa, puede ser civilizado, lo que quiere decir, enseñado a concentrar y canalizar su «*industrial energy*» (aquella que constantemente está al servicio del trabajo). Para esto se requiere de una pedagogía que pivota sobre la maleabilidad del deseo humano. Por efectos de sublimación del deseo, la energía corporal puede ser reencauzada, de modo que sirva a los propósitos de una disciplina laboral, sobre la cual descansa toda posibilidad de maximización de la producción.

Mill tiene claro que la energía corporal fluye, y que los deseos participan de la captación y canalización de este flujo. El aprovechamiento industrial de la energía corporal, incluso en *lossalvajes* de las regiones cálidas, no pasa por una proscripción del placer. El deseo funciona, según Mill, como un

vector energético, susceptible de modificación en su variable direccional. Nuevos deseos pueden provocarse, «*event if not of a very elevated kind*» (una referencia a David Hume, quien señaló la necesidad y beneficios de desarrollar *the delicacy of taste* sobre la delicadeza de las pasiones) (Hume 3-8). De esto se sigue que, con el debido trabajo, es posible variar la orientación de flujo energético, así como su intensidad. La captación, como redefinición del curso del deseo, permite su inscripción, por coincidencia o correlato de destinos gratificantes, con las metas de emprendimientos industriales. La energía corporal, que no cesa de fluir en condiciones óptimas (saludables), no debe ser reprimida, restringida, menos aún sometida y obligada. La tesis que sostiene Mill es que una política económica debe atender a los destinos del deseo, de modo que se puedan identificar, promover e intensificar aquellos que potencian, o al menos soportan el despliegue de la energía *industrial*.

Con mucha antelación a Freud, una variable básica de la economía política liberal era el lugar de la sublimación del deseo y sus vínculos con la economía política. Alrededor de ochenta años más tarde, en su texto *El malestar de la cultura* (1930), el vienés se refirió al vínculo constitutivo entre economía política y economía libidinal (Freud 109-110). El padre del psicoanálisis puso en tela de juicio aquella

tesis «comunista», según la cual, de la anulación de la propiedad privada se sigue la redención del mal. Si bien Freud se excusó de abordar la teoría económica que sustenta esta tesis («*No es de mi incumbencia la crítica económica al sistema comunista*» –dijo–), criticó la fragilidad de sus premisas psicológicas.

Según el psicoanalista la propiedad privada, pilar fundamental de la economía política liberal, se articula y extiende en la economía libidinal de los sujetos, donde encuentra soportes y apoyos. No se debe a que la propiedad privada sea un dato psicológico o una condición ontogenética, pues ninguna pulsión «*ha sido creada por la institución de la propiedad*». La tesis de fondo postula la profunda interdependencia entre economía política y *economía libidinal*, en términos de coincidencia de sus destinos pulsionales. No es posible desplegar un proyecto económico sin un trabajo sobre la economía libidinal que cimiente las bases psicológicas del modelo productivo requerido. La «ilusión» de fondo, según Freud, es que de la eliminación de la propiedad privada se siga la cancelación de la economía libidinal a la que está vinculada, lo que es un absurdo debido a su profunda imbricación histórica. Según la discusión anterior, J. S. Mill (y toda una larga tradición británica) tenía muy claro este principio, muchas décadas antes de su formulación en el lenguaje psicoanalítico.

Un principio básico en la *economía política* de John Stuart Mill es la necesidad de *administrar* el deseo humano como factor de la productividad nacional. Esto se sigue del vínculo que advertía entre la maleabilidad del deseo y el acervo de la energía corporal dispuesta para la industria. El tesoro nacional se cuenta también por la calidad de las fibras internas de los cuerpos individuales, pero, principalmente, por un meticuloso trabajo sobre esos cuerpos, capaz de movilizar (no reprimir) deseos y gratificaciones según las coordenadas y magnitudes requeridas por la maximización productiva.

El Estado debe tener presente que la administración apropiada de los nervios, músculos y deseos es un componente básico del desarrollo de la productividad nacional, en tanto asegura la eficiencia energética requerida por la industria. La *economía política* del siglo XIX señaló la necesidad de ocuparse de la moral de la población como garantía del acervo de *energía laboral* requerido para la producción: “The moral qualities of the labourers are fully as important to the efficiency and worth of their labour, as the intellectual” (Mill 109). La deficiencia moral,³

³ Previamente, Adam Smith ha señalado: “That the tendency of virtue to promote, and of vice to disturb the order of society, when considered coolly and philosophically, reflects a very great beauty upon the one, and a very great deformity upon the other, cannot, as I have observed upon a former occasion, be called in question” (Smith,

como en el salvaje, hace que la energía corporal se disperse de modo amorfo, pero, por otro lado, el rigorismo moral puede producir cuerpos enervados, incapaces de movilizar sus deseos y gustos según el proyecto requerido por la productividad nacional.

De esta forma, no es la represión del cuerpo individual, inicialmente tampoco el disciplinamiento de los miembros por parte de una institución, lo que interesa a la economía política en la formulación de John Stuart Mill. El núcleo básico no es el cuerpo como una unidad sólida de falanges, móviles pero invariables, susceptibles de adiestramiento no de transformación. Existe una preocupación económica previa al disciplinamiento molar de los miembros. Hay un flujo en la corporalidad misma, que Mill denomina *energía corporal*, una *vitalidad* orgánica que debe ser captada, no solo para usufructuar de su dinamismo a nivel industrial, sino para enriquecerla. La captura de esta vitalidad, según estos *principios de economía política*, no se despliega mediante mecanismos de confinamiento que la recluyen y, por lo mismo, la exteriorizan. No es una forma de agente patógeno que debe ser apresado o incluso descartado y desechado, aunque

ciertamente hay peligros asociados a su indebida administración que competen a la producción y a la *salud* del cuerpo social. La captura que interesa a Mill sobre esta vitalidad se comprende en términos de afluencias que reconfiguran corrientes de flujo en intensidad, cauce, caudal y alcance.

Asimismo, las lógicas de captación que piensa John Stuart Mill no se definen como una actividad *centralizada* en el Estado, el cual desplegaría, desde arriba, mediante instituciones o aparatos gubernamentales, esquemas uniformes que aseguren el correcto devenir del flujo corporal. Por el contrario, para Mill, cada individuo, luego de una serie de trabajos que posibilita y desarrolla la vida social (principalmente mediante la educación), debe potenciar las cualidades que le permitan administrar en forma eficiente su propia *vitalidad*, desarrollar sus capacidades individuales, y mediante esta práctica de sí mismo, contribuir al común de su «*raza*», y al beneficio del producto nacional:

It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interest of others, that the human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process

316). Para Smith el cultivo de la virtud, y la correlativa erradicación del vicio, permiten que la gran máquina que es la sociedad humana funcione de manera perfecta y bella.

human life become rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them (Mill, "On Liberty", 266).

La belleza del ser humano se propicia ahí donde es capaz de administrar apropiadamente su vitalidad («*human life*») para fortalecerla, mejorarla, diversificarla (no uniformizarla): "Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, mental and spiritual" (Mill, "On Liberty", 226). Un trabajo apropiado de administración de la propia vitalidad está lejos de ser una actividad egoísta, pues, cada individuo que se ocupa de fortalecer su propia vida contribuye positivamente al fortalecimiento del conjunto: «*when there is more life in the units there is more in them as which is composed of them*». Fortalecer la vitalidad individual, ocuparse de sí mismo, es la mayor contribución que cada ser humano brinda a la *raza*, al cuerpo social, al embellecimiento de la nación.

La administración de la vitalidad ocupa, según la economía liberal, un

lugar fundamental al interior del proyecto nacional. Las actividades sobre las cuales descansa la industria y producción nacional pasan por la capacidad de los individuos de desplegar una apropiada administración de sí mismos. Por ejemplo, aspectos tan sensibles para la economía nacional, tales como la adecuada regulación del «*desire of accumulation*», dependen del desarrollo de una propicia gestión que los individuos hacen de sí mismos. Este factor contribuye a explicar, según Mill, la razón por la cual una sociedad como la China, si bien superior a nivel asiático, es inferior con respecto a la europea en términos de *incremento del capital*: "From various circumstances in their personal habits and social conditions, it might be anticipated that they [the Chinese] would possess a degree of prudence and self-control greater than other Asiatics, but inferior to most European nations" (Mill, "Principles of Political Economy", 167). El *self-control*, o bien, la administración de sí, es una variable importante de la economía política liberal, en tanto afecta aspectos tan sensibles como la productividad, así como la acumulación e incremento del capital.

De esto se sigue que, según la economía política del siglo XIX, las deficiencias en la productividad no dependen exclusivamente de aspectos técnicos (como la tecnificación de los procesos de producción), sino también

de la eficiente *educación* que un gobierno pueda implementar al interior de una nación en lo que respecta al *self-control*. Por ejemplo, en naciones donde la variable tecnológica es similar, un pobre desarrollo de la capacidad individual-social de *providencia* (que Mill vincula «*with intellectual as well as moral causes*») impacta negativamente la productividad nacional: “That it is a defect of providence, not defect of industry, that limits production among the Chinese, is still more obvious than in the case of the semi-agriculturized Indians” (Mill, “Principles of Political Economy”, 168). Esta capacidad de *autocontrol*, o *administración de sí*, es lo que permite formas de captación de vitalidad adecuadas a prácticas eficientes de incremento productivo de capital. El lugar que ocupa esta variable en la explicación de Mill resulta tan central, que le permite al autor utilizarla como parámetro para comparar y explicar diferencias en la capacidad productiva entre diferentes naciones.

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John Stuart Mill ha ofrecido una respuesta que explica las variaciones encontradas en los índices de productividad entre naciones. Aparece un aspecto central, anterior a criterios vinculados a la *industria* (capacidad tecnológica, por ejemplo): no todas las naciones disponen del mismo acervo energético para sostener la industria.

El problema no está determinado por las circunstancias etnológicas que distinguen a «las razas», tampoco por las condiciones climatológicas que caracterizan a las diversas regiones geográficas. Ni siquiera es una condición ontológica la que determina a una raza como superior a otra en términos de capacidad física, intelectual, industrial, artística o militar. Al interior de una misma raza se pueden advertir diferencias importantes en términos de capacidad productiva. La diferencia radica en otro aspecto, mucho más central para la economía política liberal que piensa Mill.

La disposición de *energía corporal* para la actividad industrial determina el índice productivo de una nación. El problema principal no tiene que ver con su incremento, pues, incluso aquellas naciones cuyas gentes poseen abundante energía corporal, sobre todo en los climas cálidos, demuestran ser incapaces de apropiarse de sus beneficios industriales. La preocupación central con respecto al flujo energético no tiene que ver inicialmente con su caudal, sino con su cauce: ¿de qué modo es posible reorientar el curso de flujo energético de manera que propicie la dinamización de la producción industrial? ¿Qué formas de *trabajo aplicado a los seres humanos* son necesarias para que sea posible reorientar el curso de su *energía corporal* según el vector de optimización industrial?

La clave antropológica de Mill viene dada por el deseo: las vías del goce marcan la pauta del devenir de la energía corporal. De este modo, el debido encauzamiento del flujo no se logra a través de la represión, la cual, imposibilitaría el despliegue energético e implicaría el estancamiento corporal, sino que resulta de una readecuación de los objetos hacia los cuales se dirige el goce. No se trata de una actividad centralizada del Estado, que vendría a imponer un modelo uniforme de deseo. Cada individuo debe llevar a cabo, a partir de las herramientas que la vida social pone a su disposición (educación), una apropiada administración de sí mismo, que le permita apropiarse de aquello más íntimo: su vitalidad, no solo para controlarla, sino para expandirla en forma de energía corporal. Los seres humanos, al ocuparse de sí mismos, realizan una importante contribución, no solo a sus propias vidas, sino a la vida de la raza, de la nación. Se trata de una moral que la economía política liberal ubica en la base de su proyecto de incremento en la productividad.

Deus ex machina: religión, estrés y enmienda en John Stuart Mill

Lo religioso, en Mill, participa de aquellos trabajos destinados a la *captura* de la energía vital de los seres humanos, con lo cual contribuye al proyecto productivo nacional. El propósito de esta breve consideración es identificar

en Mill los modos de participación de lo religioso del ensanchamiento de la fuerza productiva nacional, así como valorar la continuidad de la propuesta de Mill con aquello que hemos caracterizado como *teología económica*.

Hemos establecido que la producción de *energía industrial* es el resultado de una serie de trabajos sobre los cuerpos de seres humanos, en procura de que cada individuo llegue a ser un *administrador de su propia* existencia. Así, uno de los principios de la economía política liberal, viene a participar de la tradición de teología económica cristiana, donde se solicitaba al cristiano ser un *administrador* de sí, como principio fundamental para mantener la salud del cuerpo místico. No obstante, resultaría inapropiado en este punto establecer que el proyecto liberal de Mill es un recipiente pasivo de los predicados de la tradición teológica, pues, tal como veremos, el filósofo inglés se distancia de algunos de sus principales predicados, en particular, aquello que vincula *divina providencia* y el uso del mal. De esta forma, pensar la naturaleza de la religión, un arcano problema al cual se aproxima Mill, solo tiene sentido para considerar los rastros de economía teológica al interior de su economía política liberal.

En este apartado me ocuparé de establecer cómo el abordaje de J. S. Mill sobre la naturaleza, la religión y la

tradición cristiana ofrece una consideración sobre elementos centrales de la teología económica desarrollada por el cristianismo. La discusión sobre una divinidad que tiene una relación con su creación y criaturas, no solo de producción, sino, además, de gestión, donde incluso el mal (según lo determina la tradición de la *divina providencia*) debe ser dispuesto al objetivo de vigorizar y mejorar la vitalidad creada, es asumida por Mill y reintroducida dentro de los *principios de economía política* liberal. Nos interesa analizar cómo se resuelve el problema de la esencia religiosa, el vínculo del ser humano con respecto a su creador, el papel de la creencia, y de aquello que Mill denomina *Religion of Humanity* en relación con la sociedad liberal.

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En sus ensayos sobre religión,⁴ John Stuart Mill (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 369-489) nos sugiere que el encuentro entre creador y criatura no muestra una divinidad cargada de gloria, mucho menos de una disposición docente, donde toma de la mano al ser humano, aún infante, y lo conduce entre una creación incólume. Según Mill, el primer aviso que el ser humano tiene de dios no viene de lo más alto, su voz no cae del cielo poderosa

como un trueno. No hay parusía donde veamos al Señor de los cielos descender desde lo alto de una colina con su buena nueva.

A rastras, exhausto y abatido, un dios maltrecho apenas alcanza llamar la atención de su criatura. Extenuada, la deidad clama auxilio, según relata Mill en contra de toda una tradición apologética. Tras de sí, arrojado en el suelo, yace una divinidad rendida ante una empresa que le demostró impotente: erradicar el mal de su propia creación. Al lidiar con un material imbuido de decadencia, dios mismo ha sido infectado y ha caído fatigado. Su obra está incompleta y se sabe incapaz de llevarla a buen término. Dios no dona al ser humano su creación a modo de obsequio, sino por necesidad. Rendido, se ve en la obligación de ofrecer su proyecto a una criatura finita, imperfecta, portadora de la misma decadencia por subsanar: el mal debe ser desterrado, es la consigna principal.⁵

El primer ensayo sobre la religión de John Stuart Mill antecede, por más de tres décadas, a la *Gaya Ciencia*, cuyo *Requiem aeternam Deo* (acápíte ciento veinticinco) anunciaría la descomposición del cadáver divino (Nietzsche

4 Los dos primeros ensayos, *Nature y Utility of Religion*, fueron escritos entre 1850 y 1858, el tercero, *El Teísmo*, entre 1868 y 1870. La publicación de estos manuscritos aconteció de modo póstumo.

5 Con esta postura, Mill se separa del núcleo central de la tradición apologética. Que la creación es obra de una divinidad potente y no un mero mecánico que trabaja con material ya dado, fue una discusión importante para los padres de la Iglesia, ver Athanasius (57).

120). No resulta viable, sin embargo, asimilar ambos textos, al menos en sus conclusiones. Su tesis con respecto a la divinidad no admite la misma lectura, pues no se comunica la muerte de dios, ni el aviso, indispensable y festivo, de su exilio perpetuo. Tampoco se condena, como en Nietzsche, la hipocresía humana como un crimen mayor al deicidio, toda vez que se convive con significados ultramundanos por los cuales la divinidad sobrevive, incluso luego de fenecer, en la moral, la naturaleza, también la razón (Eagleton 151-173). Esta lectura no resulta posible en los ensayos del filósofo inglés, donde la deidad sigue presente junto a su creación.

Dios yace fatigado, no muerto. El proyecto de la creación ha llevado sus fuerzas al punto de fallo, pero no al fallecimiento. En los ensayos sobre religión, Mill no postula una vacante dejada por la divinidad, en torno a la cual el ser humano asume, jactancioso, el rol de amo del universo. El ensayo, *La Naturaleza* (1850), por ejemplo, no afirma que la deidad deja su proyecto a la deriva. Ciertamente le faltan fuerzas para llevar a buen puerto su empresa, pero no intención, pues anhela el triunfo del bien. Dios desea continuar, pero flaquea. De este modo, los templos no son mausoleos donde se deposita lamento o escarnio, ni están tibias sus paredes por el laudable sangrado, como llegará a anunciar el *loco*. A lo

sumo hematidrosis. Procede explicarse la humedad por efecto del sudor divino: el creador está exhausto, fatigado. Ya el relato de la creación había advertido sobre la necesidad de descanso de la deidad al finalizar su obra.

Asimismo, dios no ofrece su proyecto a la criatura para desatender su creación. El filósofo inglés deja entrever una divinidad que, a pesar de sus buenas intenciones, experimenta un *no poder más* (Han, 2012), un rendimiento, en su acepción de falta de fuerzas que imposibilita concluir, producir o extraer utilidad. No se declara ni conmemora intención de abandono, de exilio.

Dios está rendido, ¿qué lo doblega? Su opresión no viene de una tiranía externa que le ha impuesto la carga de la creación, pues su soberanía es suprema. La deidad en Mill está obligada por su propio empeño, es decir, por una incapacidad de negar la obligación de su propio proyecto. La rendición divina proviene de un emprendimiento que llevó su fuerza al fallo, a la fatiga. En esta formulación, dios padece estrés (Sloterdijk, 2017) y requiere una asociación que le permita liberar la carga. La criatura será en adelante un asociado que viene a ensanchar la capacidad, el rendimiento divino. En un giro con respecto a los Padres de la Iglesia, la fatiga de dios suscita la asociación primera entre creador y criatura, que

acontece para alivianar el estrés divino de una tarea altamente demandante: extirpar el mal.

El mito de la modernidad, según Mill, no narra la muerte de la deidad, en cuya vacante se posiciona el ser humano, quien sublimará lo celestial en instituciones y valores que, aunque secularizados, beben de predicados religiosos. El mito moderno anuncia, según el filósofo inglés, la primera comunidad del estrés. El núcleo mitológico de la modernidad comunica un emprendimiento conjunto, una asociación primordial entre divinidad y criatura que permite alivianar el estrés de las fibras que movilizan la empresa creacionista. La divinidad experimenta un *no poder* más, por lo que su criatura ofrece su aporte para inyectar capacidad. Se trata de una asociación primigenia que viene determinada por la tarea de enmendar lo creado, hasta que el bien se imponga a plenitud.

El liberalismo promete felicidad, toda vez que la carga de los emprendimientos esté distribuida en el cuerpo social, de tal forma que no se lleve al punto de fatiga alguna de sus fibras (al menos, aquellas que asuman con seriedad el contrato ciudadano), comenzando por las fibras del cuerpo glorioso de dios. En Mill tenemos una aproximación a la religión que la piensa a partir de niveles de estrés del cuerpo social. En su tratado sobre

la naturaleza, el filósofo inglés no nos presenta una divinidad que agoniza o que deja la creación a su suerte. Tampoco el ser humano se presenta como el revelo triunfal, que asume la vacante en el trono universal. Se trata de una consideración de la primera asociación de emprendimiento, como una colaboración que procura inyectar capacidad al rendimiento divino y, a su vez, subsanar el estrés padecido por el emprendimiento creacionista. La escena primigenia de una sociedad del estrés se propone en la base de la sociedad liberal del siglo XIX.

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¿Qué ha llevado a la divinidad a este punto de fatiga? Lo hemos dicho, la imbatibilidad del mal. Esta perspectiva se comprende y desarrolla a partir de un principio que articula los ensayos sobre religión de Mill, según el cual, el bien y el mal comparten una misma cualidad: se (re)generan a partir de sí mismos. Esta autogeneración es, por su mismo juego, negativa, en tanto la reproducción de uno significa la contracción de su opuesto. Del bien no se predica el mal y, correlativamente, el ensanchamiento del bien implica el repliegue del mal. Mill lee la parábola de los talentos (Mt 25:29) en esta clave, como una formulación antigua de este principio: el bien, también el mal, tiende a fructificar su propia clase en detrimento de su antítesis. Solo

esta consideración permite demostrar, según el filósofo inglés, que la pobreza sea madre de tantos otros vicios. Del vicio, por el contrario, no predica ninguna virtud.

Resultaría contradictorio con este primer principio postular el uso providente del mal. J. S. Mill aborda el problema de la *naturaleza*, ese nombre colectivo para todas las cosas, actuales y posibles, a partir de su hipótesis de trabajo: “The only admisible moral Theory of Creationist is that the Principle of Good *cannot* at once and altogether subdue the power of evil”.⁶ El mal no puede ser tenido por mecanismo correctivo del vicio. Esto implica una ruptura con aquel criterio teológico (de estirpe estoica⁷) que explica el mal como estrategia en la concreción del mayor bien posible. De ser así, dios no solo permitiría la existencia del mal, lo querría, entonces, goza someter al ser humano al tortuoso e interminable camino a la virtud. Es una conclusión que Mill se niega a adoptar como principio de la *naturaleza*. Dios no desata el sufrimiento, lo padece. El carácter ortopédico del mal al interior del gobierno providente resulta falso y, como yerro, no debe ser adoptado o

imitado por las costumbres y gobierno de los seres humanos.

Según el filósofo inglés, la creación exuda esta doctrina: el bien y el mal se derivan y multiplican a partir de sí mismos. Nunca uno sirve como agente del otro. De ahí que la naturaleza no debe ser tenida como norma del quehacer humano, pues de su acción se deriva también muerte, tortura y decadencia. En una tradición que Mill rastrea hasta Platón, la creación, si se la acepta como obra de un ser de bondad infinita, es el resultado de una divinidad que aportó todo cuanto tenía de bueno para ofrecer, pero tuvo que lidiar con un material intratable, constituido por una decadencia interna inextirpable:

One only form of belief in the supernatural—one only theory respecting the origin and government of the universe—stands wholly clear both of intellectual and moral obliquity. It is that which, resining irrevocably the idea of an omnipotent creator, regards Nature and Life not as the expression throughout of the moral character and purpose of the Deity, but as the product of a struggle between contriving goodness and an intractable material, as was believed by Plato, or a Principle of Evil, as was the doctrine of the Manicheans (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 425).

Si se renuncia a la omnipotencia, la divinidad no puede querer el mal,

6 (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion,” 389). Esta perspectiva vuelve a aparecer en el segundo ensayo, “La utilidad de la religión”, casi en términos idénticos (425).

7 Para ver los influjos entre la doctrina estoica y el cristianismo temprano ver Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Ismo Dunderberg (2010).

ni siquiera como un recurso ortopédico, indeseado pero requerido. Dios se propone el bien, según se indica en los diálogos platónicos: “dios no es causa de todas las causas, sino sólo de las buenas” (Platón 140-141) Dios no es causa del mal. Para sus criaturas dispone el placer no el dolor: “the Creator desired the pleasure of his creatures” (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 457-458), nos dice Mill en su ensayo *El Teísmo*, pero, a pesar de su deseo, la divinidad no logra la plenitud del bienestar de lo creado. Desde esta perspectiva hay que renunciar a la omnipotencia divina, toda vez que el mal no se admite como intermedio del bien, es decir, dios mismo enfrenta limitaciones de rendimiento. La creación es un proyecto pendiente.

Luego, cualquier prosélito, independientemente de su credo, si este debe admitirse como verdadero, debería estar de acuerdo en un punto mínimo: “if Nature and Man are both the Works of a Being of perfect goodness, that Being intended Nature as a scheme to be amended, not imitated, by Man” (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 391). Dios no entregó la creación como espejo, donde el ser humano encontraría las vías de la perfección, por el contrario, ofrece un proyecto inacabado, una obra por finalizar. La única religión verdadera, en Mill, es aquella que alienta al ser humano a asumir su papel de colaborador de una divinidad que no *puede más*: la

creación debe ser redimida, enmendada por la criatura.

*

El desarrollo de una teoría de la religión según la partenogénesis del bien (mal) establecida por J. S. Mill aporta una distinción con respecto a las corrientes de estudio de lo religioso del siglo XIX, principalmente las que estaban en boga en el medio académico británico de su época.

La naciente *ciencia de la religión*, principalmente aquella vinculada al clero a finales del siglo XVIII e inicios del XIX, adoptó una primera taxonomía cuaternaria, previo al gran giro que aportaría la gran ciencia del lenguaje al estudio de lo religioso, menos de un siglo después. El criterio divisorio asumía al cristianismo como la religión verdadera, y derivaba de ella una noción de religión que establecía el parámetro analítico: *religión es la apropiada adoración de Dios, creador del cielo y de la Tierra*. Las otras formas de religión que se admitían en los diccionarios de las religiones que circulaban en Gran Bretaña a inicios del siglo XIX, a saber, judía, islámica y pagana (esta última incluía un cúmulo diverso de “sectas”, según el lenguaje de la época), se comprendían como formas más o menos alejadas de la adoración

verdadera.⁸ No obstante, para Mill, la religión que se precia de verdadera no puede agotarse, ni caracterizarse principalmente, por la adoración de un dios vencido, que nos ha heredado una creación inacabada. No solo porque Mill, naturalista, evita un principio ultramundano, sino que, aún a pesar suyo, no sería la adoración el principio agente de lo religioso.

Previo al *Illuminismo*, los teólogos cristianos hicieron algo más que clasificar sectas en términos de una falsa o sucedánea adoración. Ahí donde encontraron el error idolátrico, se dieron a la tarea de explicitar las causas humanas que propiciaban la proliferación de esos rituales idolátricos *meramente humanos*.⁹ Estos estudios marcaron la base de lo que más tarde, durante la ilustración europea, y fuera de toda perspectiva proselitista, fue denominado el paradigma naturalista, que explicó lo religioso, no a partir de principios o referentes sobrenaturales, sino en términos de sus orígenes mundanos. Para el naturalista, la religión debía ser explicada a partir de sus causas naturales: humanas, sociales y ambientales.¹⁰

El *iluminismo británico* desarrolló ampliamente la aproximación naturalista a lo religioso. A partir de una larga tradición filosófica, se vinculó el origen de lo religioso con un sentimiento en particular, el miedo: *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor*. David Hume lo expresó en breve: “The primary religion of mankind arises chiefly from an anxious fear of future events”.¹¹ Según este principio, el miedo es un sentimiento potente del cual ha emergido, entre otras creaciones humanas, lo religioso. A finales del siglo XIX, el célebre trabajo de Edward Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (1871), particularmente en lo que respecta a sus análisis del animismo, ritos y ceremonias de “los salvajes”, expresiones del estadio infantil de la humanidad, consolidó la idea de que toda forma religiosa (que Tylor explica como sistemas de creencias) se vincula, en la temprana humanidad, con los distintos miedos¹² que los seres humanos tienen con respecto a la vida y al porvenir.

No obstante su afinidad con la perspectiva naturalista, J. S. Mill advierte como falso el principio que explica lo religioso como resultado del

8 Masuzwa (2005).

9 Es ejemplar de este modelo de explicación el texto de Josef de Acosta (2008 [1590]). Por varios siglos, el intento de Acosta de explicar las prácticas rituales y de adoración de los habitantes de las Nuevas Indias se adelantó en mucho a las teorías naturalistas que intentarían explicar lo religioso.

10 Para un estudio que se aproxima al paradigma naturalista desde uno de los autores más emblemáticos del siglo XIX, en lo que respecta al estudio de

lo religioso, ver Andrew C. Dole, *Schleiermacher on Religion and the Natural Order* (2010).

11 David Hume, *The Natural History of Religion* (1889 [1757]).

12 Este principio de inteligibilidad se desarrolla ante todo en el segundo volumen del estudio de Edward Tylor, *Primitive Culture. Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art and Costume* (1920).

miedo,¹³ a pesar de considerarlo un sentimiento *tan poderoso y universal*, apropiado para el disciplinamiento. Para Mill, el origen de los dioses no tiene como base el temor a lo desconocido, con lo cual, no es de la ignorancia, propiamente, que se deriva lo religioso. De ahí la pregunta central en el Segundo ensayo de Mill: *what it is in human nature which causes it to require a religion; what wants of the human mind religion supplies, and what qualities it develops?* (“Three Essays on Religion”, 418).

Para el filósofo inglés, la base antropológica de lo religioso, al igual que la poesía, tiene su anclaje en la imaginación humana en tanto se proyecta hacia un mismo anhelo: la posibilidad de acceder a una vida más hermosa y bondadosa. La religión se vincula al anhelo de felicidad: “So long as human life is insufficient to satisfy human aspirations, so long there be a craving for higher things, which finds its most obvious satisfaction in religion” (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 419).

Religión dice, en primer lugar, del reconocimiento del carácter incompleto y decadente de ambos, creación y criatura. En segundo lugar, la religión aparece como un saber imaginativo que, en la forma de un anhelo, propone a la criatura el horizonte de una vida más bella, bondadosa y feliz.

Sin lugar a dudas, del principio que ancla lo religioso al miedo se deriva una conclusión similar, con un alcance distinto, según la cual, la religión viene a ofrecer una realidad alternativa, más bella y placentera, donde nuestros miedos y angustias finalmente serán subsanados. En este sentido, lo religioso no se propone cancelar el mundo o mejorarlo, ni siquiera aceptarlo como bueno, sino soportarlo como pasajero. Luego, la afirmación de la religión como un anhelo de bondad y belleza se puede predicar de la religión como nacida del miedo y la angustia, al modo de un fármaco¹⁴ que calma nuestra ansiedad ante la existencia, de modo que sea llevadera, sin implicar un compromiso con el mundo.

Empero, J. S. Mill se separa de esta última consideración, como explicación del alcance *genuino* de la religión. La religión verdadera no consuela al

13 También la crítica a asumir el miedo como fuente de lo religioso tiene una larga tradición y tuvo una importante recepción después de los trabajos de J. S. Mill. El famoso estudio sobre la religión semita, que tanto inspiró a Sigmund Freud, establece una crítica a esta forma de comprender lo religioso como derivado del miedo: “It is not with a vague fear of unknown powers, but with a loving reverence for known gods who are knit to their worshippers by strong bonds of kinship, that religion in the only true sense of the word begins. Religion in this sense is not the child of terror” (Smith 54-55).

14 Fármaco, en el uso que se asigna a lo religioso según esta perspectiva, tendría que entenderse en el doble sentido que Derrida advierte en el texto platónico, como remedio y veneno (Derrida 140-175).

ser humano, ni lo resigna a soportar las penas mundanas. La religión verdadera en Mill no es indistinta al mundo y su decadencia. Por el contrario, lo religioso expresa el ánimo para enmendar lo creado. Esto constituye, en Mill, la esencia de todo sentimiento religioso, aunque pueda ser vulgarizado.

Una religión coherente con las aspiraciones morales e intelectuales más altas, no ofrece su anhelo de felicidad al modo de un analgésico o calmante que nos consuela frente a la miseria, sino como mediante el requisito de tomar partido en un proyecto inconcluso. El filósofo inglés indica: “A virtuous human being assumes in this theory the exalted character of a fellow-labourer with the Highest, a fellow-combatant in the great strife; contributing his little, which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much, towards that progressive ascendancy, and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil” (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 425).¹⁵ El ser humano, desde esta perspectiva, deviene un *colaborador* con el Altísimo en la lucha que pretende el triunfo

último del bien sobre el mal. Dios no desaparece, empero, cansado, rendido, precisa de un socio que contribuya a su empresa: una religión es coherente cuando presenta al ser humano como el socio de una divinidad que no ha podido más.

El anhelo religioso no consuela, pues no está anclado en el miedo, por el contrario, induce a responder afirmativamente a la solicitud de una divinidad que no ha podido llevar a buen término su creación, y se dirige a su criatura en procura de asistencia. Luego, desde la vía religiosa, el ser humano es conducido a mejorar lo creado y aquello que tiene frente a sí mismo. La verdadera religión, en Mill, aporta las formas de imaginación y anhelo requeridas por la empresa que constituye la esencia misma de su *economía política*: enmendar la creación desde sus cimientos, llevarla al máximo de sus posibilidades.

Al arribar a este punto, se podría argumentar que la postura de J. S. Mill con respecto a la religión no avanza en lo que sería una consideración sobre la *utilidad* de la religión según ha sido formulada en torno al liberalismo. Resulta conocida la fórmula: la religión aporta al control moral de la población obrera, de modo que la conducta de los trabajadores se ajuste a los requerimientos disciplinarios de la productividad industrial. El aporte de la

15 Se trata de una idea que Mill ya había desarrollado en su ensayo anterior, *La Naturaleza*, referida a la divina Providencia: “if as is the more religious theory, Providence intends not all which happens, but only what is good, then indeed man has it in his power, by his voluntary actions, to aid the intentions of Providence; but he can only learn those intentions by considering what tends to promote the general good” (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 397).

religión, si bien no se limita a resignar a las personas al sufrimiento de su existencia so pena de una ulterior compensación, ofrece seres humanos dóciles a la autoridad civil como representante terrenal de la soberanía divina.

Adam Smith, por ejemplo, en su consideración *De los gastos de las instituciones para la instrucción de las gentes de todas las edades*, se ocupa del financiamiento de instituciones eclesiásticas, ¿se deben o no financiar instituciones religiosas? Siguiendo a D. Hume, Smith indica que las Iglesias pueden ofrecer ventajas a los Estados: “ecclesiastic establishment, though commonly they arose at first from religious views, prove in the end advantageous to the political interest of society” (Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 796). La gran ventaja de la religión en esta materia, según Smith, se basa en la autoridad que impone mediante el miedo porque “the fears which it suggests conquer all other fears” (Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 796). Se trata del carácter útil de la religión, en particular de instituciones eclesiásticas, donde lo religioso sirve al Estado y a la industria debido al control moral de las clases obreras (claramente, esta posición de Adam Smith sobre las instituciones eclesiásticas no representa toda su comprensión sobre el peso de la teología cristiana en la conformación misma de una economía

política,¹⁶ sin embargo, es común que literatura secundaria lo proponga como el total del lugar de lo religioso-teológico en el liberalismo).

J. S. Mill no asume que el aporte de la religión se limite o concentre en el control moral de las conductas (particularmente, de las clases trabajadoras). Esta consideración se deriva de las tesis que su maestro, Jeremy Bentham, habría formulado con respecto a la religión natural (Bentham, 1822). Bentham abordó las limitaciones de la religión para influir en el comportamiento de la población, en comparación con otros ámbitos de la cultura. Esto se explica a raíz de los mecanismos religiosos que procuran asegurar la sumisión, los cuales, por estar basados en el dolor y la represión, desatan una serie de daños colaterales a los feligreses: “The force, which thus casts into the already over poised scale of misery, may be best appreciated by stating, that it frequently drives the sufferer into insanity” (Bentham 72). La crítica de Bentham está dirigida a toda comprensión de lo religioso en términos de tácticas de poder estrictamente negativas. Si la influencia de lo religioso estuviera determinada solo por la represión y el dolor que procura la docilidad de temperamento, el daño sería mucho mayor que el beneficio, toda vez que de lo religioso se derivarían padecimientos psicológicos, según Bentham.

¹⁶ (Pimentel, 2014).

El padecimiento *religious anxiety* se le antojaba como una prueba fehaciente de esta condición.

Mill retoma el marco analítico más amplio de Bentham, y desarrolla una crítica del componente moralizador/represivo de lo religioso, toda vez que es tenido como el aporte fundamental de lo religioso a la sociedad liberal:

Belief, then, in the supernatural, great as are the services which it rendered in the early stages of human development, cannot be considered to be any longer required, either for enabling us to know what is right and wrong in social morality or for supplying us with motives to do right and to abstain from wrong. Such belief, therefore, is not necessary for social purposes at least in the coarse way in which these can be considered apart from the character of the individual human being [...] If supernatural beliefs are indeed necessary to the perfection of the individual character, they are necessary also to the highest excellence in social conduct: necessary in a far higher sense than the vulgar one, which constitutes it the great support of morality in common eyes (Mill, "Three Essays on Religion", 417).

En este sentido, John Stuart Mill procura apartarse de lo que considera una valoración vulgar del papel religioso cuando se le reduce a ser un bastión del Estado, en la forma de un

mecanismo de control moral de la población. El mayor aporte de lo religioso a la sociedad liberal no se agota, solo en un nivel superficial, aunque más evidente, en el despliegue de formas de represión de las pasiones y la conducta de las clases obreras. La esencia de la religión no dice represión, ni siquiera en términos de la mayor utilidad que puede ofrecer a la sociedad liberal.

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Volvamos a la pregunta de Mill: *¿what it is in human nature which causes it to require a religion; what wants of the human mind religion supplies, and what qualities it develops?* ("Three Essays on Religion", 418). La respuesta viene dada por aquello que el filósofo inglés denomina la esencia de la religión: "The best persons have always held it to be the essence of religion, that the paramount duty of man upon earth is to amend himself: but all except monkish quietists have annexed to this in their inmost minds [...] the additional religious duty of amending the world, and not solely the human part of it, but the material; the order of physical nature" (Mill, "Three Essays on Religion", 383). Lo religioso, en la explicación naturalista de Mill, responde a un deseo del ser humano: enmendarse a sí mismo, superarse, mejorarse. Por lo tanto, se vincula con el desarrollo de todas las cualidades que contribuyan a satisfacer este deseo con respecto a

sí mismo y que se proyecta al resto de la creación. Luego, la productividad de una nación, según los *principios de economía política*, encuentran su raíz antropológica en esta misma esencia religiosa, a saber, el deseo de enmendarse a sí mismo.

Mill utiliza el verbo *to amend* (enmendar), toda vez que se refiere a la esencia de la religión, a la raíz antropológica de todo fenómeno religioso. A pesar de que el filósofo inglés es lo suficientemente cuidadoso como para emplear conjugaciones de este verbo cuando se refiere a la esencia de lo religioso, la traducción al español emplea constantemente el término *corregir*,¹⁷ como si fuera un sinónimo apropiado. Sin embargo, leído desde el contexto de los tres ensayos sobre religión, este cambio desplaza gran parte del sentido que nos propone Mill con *enmendar*.

Enmendar, tanto en inglés como en español, se deriva del latín, que combina el prefijo privativo *ex*, fuera, y el término *mendum*, falta, error, defecto. Este concepto se deriva de la idea de extraer el defecto en algo, aplicar una acción que anule o subsane el error. Enmendar, según su etimología,

no presupone un estado previo perfecto, puro, inmaculado que requiere retomarse, sino, propiciar el bienestar toda vez que resulta eclipsado. De ahí que *corregir*, como un enderezar la dirección, no recoge el contexto en el cual se nos propone esta idea. No se enmienda para volver o retomar un rumbo perdido, sino para propiciar algo no (necesariamente) acontecido.¹⁸ Cobra sentido el uso del término en Mill, a partir del contexto de enunciación: no se enmienda una creación/criatura cuya bondad primigenia debe ser restituida, *enmendar* comunica la posibilidad de lo no acaecido, el triunfo definitivo del bien, que la divinidad, en el principio, no fue capaz de instituir. *Enmendar* dice de una tarea proyectiva, no retroactiva, y aún pendiente. No es un retorno, sino un arribo a lo insólito.

La religión, en la perspectiva de J. S. Mill, se vincula con esta necesidad antropológica por la cual el ser humano desea introducir en la historia aquello no acaecido: el triunfo definitivo del bien. Lo religioso se deriva de un deseo/aspiración de enmendar lo creado, no para devolverlo a la bondad perdida, que nunca tuvo, sino para

17 En una de las citas que hemos empleado más arriba se torna evidente el cambio del “to be amended” de Mill: “si la Naturaleza y el Hombre son ambos la obra de un Ser de bondad perfecta, ese Ser concibió la Naturaleza como un plan para ser corregido por el Hombre, no imitado” (John Stuart Mill, *Tres ensayos sobre religión*, 78).

18 Debemos pensar *enmendar* en el sentido que Heidegger presenta “el estado de caída” del “ser ahí”: “tampoco debe tomarse, por ende, como caída desde un “estado primitivo” más alto y puro. De esto no solo no tenemos ópticamente experiencia alguna, sino tampoco ontológicamente posibilidades ni hilos conductores de exégesis” (Heidegger 195).

conquistarla finalmente. De esto se desprende la *imaginación religiosa*, no por la necesidad de consuelo, sino del impulso de la criatura por hacer algo mejor de sí mismo. El deber inventivo, más que ortopédico, que el ser humano tiene respecto de sí, se proyecta hacia todo lo creado, de modo que toda la creación sea enmendada de la decadencia y el mal que padece.

El compromiso hondo con esta tarea permitiría que cualquier credo, comprometido con esta consigna, coincida con aquello que Mill designa *Religion of Humanity*, una religión que no descansa en ninguna creencia: “a religion may exist without belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an instructive profitable object of contemplation” (John Stuart Mill, “Auguste Comte and Positivism”, 332). Más allá de posicionarse sobre la creencia, esta forma ideal de religión la piensa Mill en relación con una práctica de sí por la cual todo debe ser enmendado, llevado hasta sus máximas posibilidades. De esta forma, no solo las religiones particulares pueden brindar utilidad al proyecto liberal, sino que un desarrollo adecuado de la economía política, permite que las religiones mismas se eleven sobre sus formas «vulgarizadas». Es un beneficio en dos vías que se da cuando el ser humano, por las vías de una industrialización civilizada, hace de sí mismo un objeto digno de contemplación.

Debido a que el ser humano no puede, por imitación de la naturaleza, enmendarse a sí mismo y a la creación, debe propiciar aquello que no ha tenido lugar en la historia. Lo artificial ingresa en la consideración sobre lo religioso. Dios confía su proyecto a la criatura, de modo que lleve a buen término aquello que no pudo concretarse. La criatura, heredera de este proyecto, requiere de un *suplemento* que permita el triunfo definitivo del bien: “It is only in a highly artificialized condition of human nature that the notion grew up, or, I believe, ever could have grown up, that goodness was natural: because only after a long course of artificial education did good sentiments become so habitual, and so predominant over bad, as to arise unprompted when occasion called for them” (Mill, “Three Essays on Religion”, 417). Mill refiere a un ejemplo: la limpieza. Nada más artificial que la *limpieza* y, sin embargo, el ser humano puede adquirir un amor por ella, ya que se inscribe dentro de su anhelo de bondad y bienestar.

Enmendar la obra de la divinidad requiere de lo artificial en sí mismo, nunca acaecido: *Deus ex machina*, algo debe ser introducido desde un *afuera* de la narrativa natural para enmendar la trama de la creación. No se puede confiar la expulsión del mal al instinto como reflejo de la naturaleza. En los ensayos de John Stuart Mill sobre la religión, la imaginación religiosa es

una manifestación del principio antropológico básico, según el cual, el ser humano debe, por la vía del artificio, hacer de sí y de lo que lo rodea, algo mejor, que permita redimir la materia de toda decadencia.

Con esta última alusión a la necesidad de lo artificial como mecanismo para *enmendar* lo creado, que Mill introduce en sus consideraciones sobre la naturaleza y la religión, se enmarca el universo de acción básico de la economía política liberal: enmendar lo creado, primeramente, mediante la apropiada administración de sí, por medio de la cual, la criatura deviene una obra digna de contemplación, que, al ensanchar su vida, embellece y engranda la vida del cuerpo social, la nación. Pero, más aún, es la creación en su conjunto la que se enmienda por este mismo impulso. De ahí que la religión verdadera, según Mill, aquella que se expresa como el emprendimiento conjunto entre creador y criatura para enmendar el inconcluso proyecto creacionista, muestra el trasfondo *natural* que expresa o promete cumplir la *economía política* con respecto al progreso industrial de una nación. Incluso el recurso a lo artificial, por lo cual, la criatura se enmienda a sí misma, indica en qué medida todo recurso de factura humana, por ejemplo, los empeños de J. P. Joule en relación con el *motor*, participa de la honda expresión humana por enmendar lo creado hasta

el punto donde el bien se imponga plenamente sobre el mal.

Conclusión

La presencia (incómoda) del fundamentalismo religioso,¹⁹ en sus distintas manifestaciones, alcances y solicitudes, ha obligado a reconsiderar el lugar de lo religioso en el escenario político mundial. Un énfasis sobre el carácter secularizado del mundo moderno auguró, prematuramente, la muerte de toda forma religiosa, o bien, su transformación en modelos no heterónomos de experiencia humana, siempre y cuando se limiten a la esfera privada. La presencia pública de lo religioso solo sería explicada (permitida) en términos utilitarios, como policía moral, por ejemplo, so pena de acatar con silencio los dictados del mundo moderno. Esta versión no aportó un panorama equívoco del mundo moderno, pero, sin duda, se trata de una visión incompleta, pues, lejos de morir, o replegarse en el ámbito privado, solicitudes ancladas en creencias religiosas son inscritas en el ámbito público, en ocasiones, con recurso a la violencia.

Si bien un aviso sensato nos llama a leer esta primavera religiosa en el ámbito público como un efecto de contragolpe del modelo socioeconómico regente, no debemos caer en la

¹⁹ Armstrong (2001).

tentación de leer estos acontecimientos con las premisas analíticas derivadas del augurado exilio de lo religioso al ámbito de la vida privada, etapa previa a su final desaparición. Antes que una lectura sobre los usos que el neoliberalismo hace de los fundamentalismos religiosos, conviene sin duda repasar los fundamentos teológicos que soportaron el despliegue de la economía política de tipo liberal, por medio del cual, la tradición cristiana no fue abandonada por la modernidad, por el contrario, se le asumió en profundidad.

Según hemos considerado atrás, en la obra de John Stuart Mill, retorna una pregunta de raigambre teológica: ¿cuáles son las condiciones, los ejercicios y la *economización* (disposición, *uso*, orden) que cada uno debe cumplir de modo que se complete el plan (inconcluso) de Dios? O bien, ¿a partir de cuáles prácticas corporales individuales se asegura la inmunización y vigorización de la nación? La respuesta que ofrece el filósofo londinense consiste en ahondar la economía política de la carne por la cual, a partir del uso adecuado que cada quien haga de sí, se logra la salud del cuerpo social, y así, la promesa del crecimiento de todo bien. De esta forma, el proyecto liberal no se presenta como el corte entre una edad moderna secularizada frente a un antiguo régimen tributario de lo religioso, en su lugar, se ahonda una cuestión central

en la teología económica, referida a las prácticas económicas de sí que aseguran la salud del cuerpo mayor.

El núcleo básico del *Political Economy* de Mill profundiza, en este particular, el legado teológico que el cristiano ofrece al mundo moderno: el ser humano debe enmendarse, y junto a él, debe enmendar todo lo creado. El derrotero viene dado por una apropiada administración de sí. El progreso se mide por nuestra aproximación a un estado no acaecido: el triunfo perpetuo del bien sobre el mal, donde cada uno, y el conjunto al cual pertenecemos, seremos capaces de ofrecer el mayor rendimiento como respuesta al don que hemos recibido del cuerpo social. En Mill, el contrato que establecemos con el creador participa de una teología de la gracia.

La utilidad de la religión, por parte del liberalismo, admite una lectura distinta a la policía moral. En el mito moderno, donde J. S. Mill habla de la primera sociedad contractual entre divinidad y criatura, para alivianar el estrés de una empresa altamente demandante, lo religioso se muestra, simultáneamente, como repliegue y expansión del nudo antropológico básico que define a la humanidad: lo creado debe ser enmendado. Solo desde esta perspectiva, lo religioso ofrece su más profundo y verdadero aporte a una sociedad liberal, en tanto ayuda al

ensanchamiento de la energía e imaginación que requiere el nuevo orden: que cada uno haga de sí algo mejor de lo que es. La captura de vitalidad por parte de la economía política liberal implica que la vida, amenazada desde el interior, requiere ser enmendada, esto es, nutrida, extendida, ensanchada, mejorada, solo entonces el progreso industrial resulta empíricamente factible. Se trata de una tarea que debe ser realizada desde varios frentes, entre ellos, desde la vía religiosa.

De esta forma, la teoría de la religión natural se encuentra con una teología económica cristiana, según la hemos desarrollado en otro lugar. En otro registro lingüístico, el trabajo de J. S. Mill sobre la religión se inscribe dentro de la tradición teológica cristiana, cuando deriva del encuentro creador-criatura una solicitud básica: que el ser humano devenga un *ecónomo*, un eficiente administrador de sí que vela por el ensanchamiento del bienestar. Encarado a su creador, el ser humano descubre la tarea que recae sobre sus hombros: mejorar su condición, no solo a nivel espiritual, sino material.

Cuando nos preguntamos al inicio, a partir de los *Principles* de John Stuart Mill, ¿cuáles son los antecedentes históricos que han permitido a la economía política liberal pensar, en términos de una administración individual de la propia *vitalidad*, los problemas básicos

con respecto al gobierno de los seres humanos requeridos por su proyecto, ante todo, aquella parte que se delega a los individuos mismo? La herencia de la teología cristiana es profunda. Resulta oportuno indicar que, incluso la categoría central de la economía política moderna, *vida*, más que remitir a un concepto enteramente biológico o médico, corresponde al ahondamiento de una teología de la carne, del exceso de vitalidad (que reúne ambos, vulnerabilidad y potencia/energía), a partir del cual el pensamiento económico de la modernidad *capturó* el nuevo horizonte abierto por la biología y el desarrollo de las ciencias médicas y del *hombre*.

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ESTUDIOS EXEGÉTICOS

“ONE IN CHRIST”: WHERE THE GENDER BINARY IS TRANSCENDED QUEERING THE GENDER BINARY IN GALATIANS 3:28C “NO MALE AND FEMALE”

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Resumen

Este artículo desestabiliza la relación binaria entre sexo y género que aparece en Gálatas 3:28 a partir del uso de la crítica *queer*. Algunos investigadores que utilizan la crítica *queer* afirman que la unidad propuesta en Gálatas 3:28 supone reemplazar dos sexos con masculinidad (“en Cristo, un cuerpo masculino”), por lo que el texto no sería un manifiesto de equidad de género como algunas interpretaciones igualitaristas sugieren. Con base en la lectura crítica de Gálatas propuesta por Davina C. López, se argumenta que la unidad hace referencia al Cristo crucificado, que está distante de la masculinidad perfecta, una de las cosas más deseables en la ideología imperial romana. En consecuencia, la unidad se consigue mediante el movimiento hacia lo débil, considerado inferior y crucificado. Esta es la solidaridad conseguida “en Cristo”: un espacio *queer* y liminal en el que las personas buscan diferentes dinámicas de poder, jerarquías y estructuras genéricas de aquellas que predominaban en el Imperio Romano.

Palabras clave: Gálatas, crítica *queer*, género, espacio liminal, solidaridad.

Abstract

This paper aims to destabilize the sex/gender binary in Galatians 3:28 using queer criticisms. Some of the scholars using queer criticisms maintain that the oneness in Gal. 3:28 indicates replacing two sexes with masculinity (“in Christ,” a male body), and it is not a manifesto for gender equality as egalitarian readings suggest. Following Davina Lopez’s empire- and gender-critical reading of Galatians, this paper argues that the oneness is in crucified Christ, who is far from the perfect masculinity, one of the most desirable things in Roman imperial ideology. Thus, this oneness is attained by downward mobility toward the unmanly, inferiorized, crucified figure. It is the solidarity realized “in Christ,” which is queer and liminal space where people seek different power dynamics and the (gender) hierarchy/structure than those of the Roman Empire and constantly struggle to create solidarity among the oppressed.

Keywords: Galatians, Queer criticism, Gender, Liminal space, Solidarity.

Introduction

Gal 3:28c

οὐκ ἐνἄρσεν καὶ θήλῃ·
 ἅπαντες γὰρ ὁμοῦ εἰς ἓστε ἐν Χριστῷ¹ Ἰησοῦ.
*There is no male and female; for you all
 are one in Christ Jesus.*

There are a few manuscripts, including Codex Sinaiticus and Alexandrinus, which read *ἅπαντες*. It does not make a significant difference, and I choose to follow NA 28.

There are three other readings: *ἔν εστε ἐν Χριστῷ, εστε Χριστοῦ, εστε ἔν (or ἐν) Χριστοῦ*. The first variant reads *ἔν* (neuter singular) instead of *εἰς* (masculine singular). All three manuscripts that support this reading are from the 9th century and not strong witnesses. The second one has neither masculine or neuter forms of “one” and simply reads “of Christ.” It can be translated as “(for you all) belong to Christ.” This variant is also supported by only a few manuscripts, but they are strong ones such as papyrus 46 and Alexandrinus. The third reading has *ἔν* (neuter singular) and lacks the preposition *ἐν*.¹ The translation would be “(for you all) are one belong to Christ.” It is only supported by the original reading of the Codex Sinaiticus and one Vulgate manuscript

1 NA 28 suggests to read *ἐν* not *ἔν*: “*ἐν* (vel *ἔν*?).” However, I consider that *ἔν* is more plausible since the preposition is not used with genitive.

(with slight differences). Even though the witnesses for all three variants are not strong enough to choose any of them over the NA28’s text, what is relevant to this paper is that there is only one reading which uses *εἰς* in masculine form. It does not necessarily mean that those variants are the outcome of struggles for gender equality (especially when we notice that the similar saying in 3:26 says “*ἅπαντες γὰρ υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστε*” with no textual variant and *εἰς* in v. 28 may be merely an alternative to *υἱοὶ* in v. 26). However, with those witnesses of gender-neutral readings, we are allowed to imagine that there were certain people who read “you all are one (neutral) in Christ” as the scriptural text and how it sounded differently from “you all are one (masculine) in Christ.” In those variants, I see a possibility for more liberating and justice-oriented interpretations.

Aim(s) and Methodology

“No male and female.” (Gal 3:28). This phrase from Paul’s letter to Galatians has been proudly held up by readers of Scripture, including scholars, non-scholars, Christian liberationists, activists, and others, who sought equality and emancipation, especially for women. It has been, and probably still is, a positive, empowering, liberating statement. However, the challenge(s) are, and will continue to be, brought by those who find the gender binary problematic. “No male

and female." Does it mean there is no gender distinction and anyone who identified with any gender identity, including bigender, pangender, genderqueer, etc. is to be treated equally? "No male and female." Does it mean every one of Christ's followers comes to embrace *both* genders in their full spectrums and become "masculifeminine or feminimascupersons"? (Dale B Martin, "The Queer History of Galatians 3:28 'No Male and Female'", 89). Simply put, it is a question about the power that defines who is male, what is maleness, and the boundary and liminality between male and female: No male and female; but *what* is male and *what* is female? and how can we imagine the world beyond the binary?

In this paper, I, as a queer scholar who takes queer approaches to the text, will attempt to destabilize the gender binary in the verse and seek a more liberating and more justice-contributing reading of the verse especially for anyone who struggles with the gender binary. First, after I briefly review queer interpretations of the text, which are not many but diverse, I will pick and take a closer look at two different approaches, one represented by Dale Martin and Jeremy Punt, the other by Davina Lopez. By doing so, I hope to shed light on the significance of queer interpretations and possibilities they present. Second, I attempt to develop Lopez's idea of

Gal 3:28 as a mandate for international solidarity. In the end, as an expansion of Lopez' argument, I will supplement two things overlooked among other queer interpretations.

My primary aim is not to present *the* interpretation or *the* reading, but to name the problem the text and its interpretations have, to destabilize them, to challenge the things taken for granted among them, and find room for further discussion, in which we might find a way to create a better space for the oppressed and the marginalized. Thus, this paper will, intentionally and boldly, be as queer as it can be.

Setting of the Issue

Though Gal 3:28 has drawn so much attention in the history of interpretation, especially after the rise of the feminist movement in the NT scholarship, not so many works are done from queer perspectives.² Among queer interpretations of the verse, some of them directly deal with the third category, i.e., sex/gender (v.28c), while other works focus more on the first (v.28a) to show the possibility of inclusivity for LGBTQ people by paralleling circumcision with

² For brief reviews on the history of interpretations, see Martin 1(88-213) especially pp. 209ff for liberationist and feminist interpretations.

heterosexuality.³ I find it more crucial to wrestle with the gender binary, for it is the norm that dehumanizes certain people, and is the oversimplified category that suppresses the complexity of human beings’ realities.

Out of those, only a few scholars who made significant contributions to queer the binary are well-known and highly active in this field/methodology such as Lopez, Martin, and Punt. Among these three, the latter two point out similar or overlapping issues with the verse, especially about the centrality of masculinity, while Lopez sees the verse (and the entire letter of Galatians) in rather a unique way by analyzing the power structure of the Roman Empire surrounding and embedded in Paul using Empire- and gender-critical lenses. In next section, I first summarize the arguments of Punt and Martin, and then that of Lopez, which is helpful to find a solution to the issue pointed out by Punt and Martin. I will respond to and critique their argument and attempt to develop Lopez’s idea further.

Queer Readings on Gal 3:28: Destabilizing the Gender Binary (Jeremy Punt, Dale Martin)

The most crucial and obvious problem with Gal 3:28c from a queer perspective appears to be the gender binary; “male and female.” Scholars who use queer criticisms see this binary problematic and attempt to pave the way for destabilizing the binary. To question the binary, there seem to be multiple possible ways. One of the frequently asked questions, asked not only by queer scholars but also by feminist scholars seeking liberation and equality for women in this text, is whether Gal 3:28c means to abolish gender distinctions or simply gender inequality.

Abolition of Gender Distinction or of Gender Inequality?

While some scholars argue the verse is to be read as simply (or drastically, so to speak) abolishing the distinction between male and female, more scholars are concerned about its inequality and see the importance of maintaining the distinctness of one’s own sex/gender for the sake of identity.⁴ According to the

3 For example, Bohache (2000) and Patrick S. Cheng (2006). Though their contributions to LGBTQ inclusive readings are significant, I do not take their works up in this paper in order to focus on queer readings which challenge the gender binary directly and due to lack of space.

4 Bohache and Hogan read the verse as simply abolishing the distinction: Bohache (233); Pauline Nigh Hogan, (21, 202). Daniel Boyarin takes Gal 3:28-29 as “the baptismal declaration of the new humanity of no difference.” 5, italics by Yasuda). His interpretation is the following “In Christ, that is, in baptism, all the differences that mark off one body from another as Jew or

scholars who take the latter position, e.g., Meeks and Schüssler Fiorenza, what is abolished is, then, the privilege that only those who belong to one side of this gender binary had (and disappointingly still has).⁵ Some scholars take it one step further beyond the issue of privilege, by showing concern about human identity. For example, Uzukwu states: "The fact of being one in Christ nullifies every sense of privilege *without at the same time overcoming our specific identities as men or women*. Unity rejects the use of religious, ethnic, social, or sexual differences to exclude some people from the community of the believers" (209, *Italics by Yasuda*). While those scholars read the phrase in an egalitarian way by interpreting the verse either as the eradication of gender distinctions or of privileges, some queer scholars argue the opposite.

Androcentric Equality: Critiques from Queer Interpretations

Stephen Moore, in his footnote in a chapter about Romans 1:18-32 and homosexuality, shares his "suspicion" about Gal 3:28: "...what Gal. 3:28 implicitly proclaims is the replacement

of two sexes with one gender—masculinity in the theological trapping of 'righteousness,' which every believer, regardless of anatomical makeup, is required to put on" (265, note 94). Even though this is not a citation from his scholarly work on Gal 3:28 but merely from a footnote, his "suspicion" seems to get to the of the arguments by other queer scholars. This elimination of male and female appears to be imagined in androcentric (not humankind-centered but male-centered) ways in the ancient world.

Jeremy Punt, for instance, writes: "rather than extinguishing sex and gender distinctions, Gal 3:28 maintained and even radicalized maleness, indicated by the baptism of also the female into a divine image which was seen as perfect maleness" (154). Likewise, Dale Martin says: "I have argued, for instance, that the historically constructed meaning would be that there is 'no male and *female*' because, in ancient understandings, there was in Christ only male. The inferior female has been swallowed up into the eschatologically perfected male form" (89). What underlies these views is the idea of human androgyny in ancient world. The meaning of androgyny in the ancient world is, as Martin points out, different from today's, and it is understood not in equality of male and female, but in a clear hierarchy of male-top and female-bottom (Martin 83).

Greek (circumcision considered a 'natural' mark of the Jew!—Romans 2:27), male or female, slave or free, are effaced, for in the Spirit such marks do not exist" (23). However, he is also aware that this abolition of difference can be a "threat:" "The call to human Oneness, while it is a stirring call to equality, constitutes a clear threat as well to Jewish (or any other) difference" (32).

5 See Meeks (203); Schüssler Fiorenza (218).

According to Punt, there are three main “scenarios” which interpret Gal 3:28 based on the idea of androgyny: a single sex model, the so-called androgynous Adam, and the “androgynous image” of “the ideal human” in “Jewish apocalypse” (151-152). Even though they (deceivably) seem to be useful to understand Gal 3:28 in an egalitarian way, all of them are androcentric and hierarchal (male top). The first, a single sex model in the ancient world, explains human sex not in male/female binary but in the model of one male body. There was only one male sex and female were defined as an inferior version of the male. Therefore, “male and female were differences of degree and not of kind, permutations of a single sex” (Punt 151). The androgenous Adam is an idea that the original human being (אָדָם before אָדָם, cf., Gen1:26) was an androgyne, and only after the Creator made the other human being, the one who is later defined as female and called Eve, this original human being became the male Adam.⁶ This idea of androgynous Adam cannot be missed since (1) the paired Greek terms in Gal 3:28, ἄρσεν καὶ θήλυ, are also used as a pair in LXX Gen 1:27,⁷ and (2) Genesis

is the book which Paul cites and refers to many times in his letter to Galatians, especially in chapters 3 and 4 (the stories of Abraham, Sara, and Hagar), which is the direct literal context of the verse of our focus. Here, even though the original human being is considered as neither male nor female, or both male and female (Boyarin 20), androgynous Adam is still androcentric as the male Adam appears to be the core of the original androgyny. The third scenario, the androgynous image of the ideal human being in Jewish apocalypse, shows that there was an eschatological expectation that “human being will be androgynous, since the male/female distinction will have been overcome” (Punt 152). But this unification also occurs only in an androcentric way, by female merging into male.

Especially the third one, the androgynous image of the ideal human being, is crucially relevant to our text, which ends with a line “for you all are one in Christ Jesus.” Here, Christ Jesus is the model of the ideal human being. By being baptized in him, a person can be clothed with him as if Christ Jesus is the robe to cover any humane imperfection.⁸ What is covered by this robe is probably not only imperfection, but also any social distinctions; ethnicity, class, and sex/gender. The problem is, however, that this Christ Jesus is a man with

6 Boyarin names the androgynous Adam as “a male-and-female creature.” He says “the peculiar configuration of the biblical story which first describes a male-and-female creature, then gives it the name “man,” and then reinscribes that very ‘man’ as male, when combined with two peculiarly Greek cultural themes, the devaluation of the belated and the obsession with unity, produced the universal male “(20).

7 I will discuss more about this in later section.

8 As is generally admitted, underlying this is a baptismal formula. See J. Louis Martyn (378-379). See also Meeks (180-183).

a male body. Therefore, despite of many defenses to read Gal 3:28 in egalitarian ways, Pauline image of salvific equality between male and female appears to be androcentric and kyriarchal, as Moore suspected.⁹ "[I]n order to be 'saved' the woman actually is said to become male, implying the continued inferiority of femaleness in relation to maleness" (Martin 83). But we are to ask if this is the only image that we can find in Gals 3:28 since we certainly want and expect a more liberating reading of the verse. This is where Lopez comes in.

Gender Binary and/within Roman Empire (Lopez): Roman Empire and Paul through Gender-Critical Lens

Among interpreters who take queer approaches, Lopez presents a unique way to read Gal 3:28 within the context of Roman Empire. She suggests we should re-imagine¹⁰ Paul in the power dynamics of the Empire through empire- and

gender-critical lenses. Before we see her argument on Gal 3:28, I will summarize her view on Paul, Roman Empire, and gender in *Apostle to the Conquered*.

When Lopez uses her gender-critical lens, she does so in order to reveal or analyze the ideology, metanarrative, and power dynamics/structure in which maleness/masculinity is at center and femaleness/femininity is at margins. It is, needless to say, because discourses on gender binary are about power.¹¹ As Lopez shows in her book, there were various visual images used by the Roman Empire to propagate its firm and glorious dominion over the world.¹² In some of those images, the Roman Empire is personified as a man and the conquered nations as women.¹³ The male body symbolizes the oppressor/penetrator who is with the power, dominance, superiority, and so on, while the female body symbolizes the oppressed and penetrated figure who is powerless, submissive, and inferior to the male.

Paul is also analyzed in this masculinity-centered power structure. According to his self-reflection in the

9 It is truly kyriarchal if the equality in baptism and justification/vindication happens only by the inferiors become the superiors (the Gentiles to Jews, the slaves to the free, and female to male) through the liberating faith.

10 Lopez defines imagination as follows: "Imagination serves as a powerful tool, when coming from the marginalized, not only to confront the imaginary [abused for propaganda] as deceptive, dominant, and harmful, but also to identify voices that have been repressed and articulate new discourses and ways of being that overcome its power;" "Imagination arises from a position of hope among the disenfranchised; it is the ability to envision a different world when that task seems overwhelming, implausible, and forbidden" (18).

11 "[...] the binaries are about power, a form of doing politics through language. Binaries create the smallest possible hierarchy of one thing over another. They are not really about two things, but only one" (Riki Wilchins, 43).

12 See for further discussion Lopez (27-49).

13 For example, the Aphrodisias sebasteion relief of Claudius subduing Britannia, which is used as a cover picture for Lopez's monograph.

letter to Galatians (1:13), he used to be a conqueror (i.e., a persecutor of Christ-believing Jews), a powerful and even violent figure, who reflects the ideal image of “manly Roman soldier” or even of the emperor (Lopez 133). He internalized the Roman way of relationship with others and took it for granted to use violence freely to oppress and annihilate (ἐπόρθουν, Gal 1:13) others and even justified his acts with the traditions of his fathers (Gal 1:14) (Lopez 130). When he is “called” (Gal 1:13-17), however, he is “called to consciousness” (Lopez 124) to ally and identify himself with the conquered nations, which are in a weak, feminine, and lower status. Thus, “he models a different kind of consciousness toward and relationship to others” (Lopez 133) and he transforms from the conqueror to “the apostle to the conquered.” Furthermore, this transformation from conquering Roman-type male to defeated male goes further to let Paul see himself as a mother in birth pains (4:19) Lopez boldly uses she/her/hers pronoun for Paul, with quotation marks (i.e., “she,” “her”) or with slash (i.e., s/he, his/her), when she discusses about “her” maternal self-image (142-143).

Gal 3:28 as a Mandate to Live in Solidarity

Just as Lopez’s re-imagination of Paul is unique, her perspective on Gal 3:28 seen through empire-critical and

gender-critical lenses is also new. According to her, Gal 3:26-28 “is not a neutralizer of identity constructs or a call for equality, nor is it necessarily modeling nostalgia for primordial oneness; is a *mandate* for dominated groups to work together across their differences in the face of larger structural dynamics of oppression” (238, note 104, *Italics by Yasuda*). This view becomes clear when we see the verse with gender-critical lens, and here I show how it makes sense.

As I summarized above, the hierarchical dichotomy of the empire/nations, i.e., the dichotomy of masculinity/femininity, is fundamental in Lopez’ argument. It is also the case in her interpretation of Gal 3:28.

What if we were to begin to see Gal 3:28 as part of Paul’s broader argument for a transformed consciousness and solidarity among the defeated? In a Roman imperial ideology concerning the fate of all the nations, conquest and enslavement of all those presumed naturally inferior to the Romans includes, and even creates and manages to some extent, the categories Paul mentions here. Jew and Greek, slave and free, male and female—all are one under the banner of the emperor, through his violent peacemaking process (150).

Therefore, despite the reality that nations clash with one another,

people are to realize that true conflict is between the Roman Empire and the nations. Conflicts among nations are generated by the Roman imperial system and ideology (metanarrative), which makes the nations opposed to and compete with one another so that the empire rules over them easily; *divide et impera*.¹⁴ Nations were urged to take "upward mobility"¹⁵ which means to be ahead of other nations, be like the Romans (assimilation). However, the conquered are called to live out a new way of relationship with others, just as Paul became a model for them by taking downward mobility and identifying himself with feminized/conquered others. The nations build solidarity among themselves as children of the God of Israel and co-heirs of the promise, and this solidarity makes them a new creation (6:15).

This new way of relationship, which is named as "inter-national solidarity" by Lopez (146), constructs an alternative structure. It is alternative to the Roman structure since, even though the nations in solidarity still holds the lower/feminine position in the Roman structure from the Roman point of view, there is no hierarchical structure centering oppressive

masculinity inside the realm of international solidarity. This new reality transcends the Roman metanarrative and, unexpectedly and undesirably for the Romans, the nations confront the conqueror all together in unity. It is transcendence of the existing ideology since it would never happen if the nations were captured and blinded by it. Lopez calls it "gender transgression":

The care the Romans take to represent real men as stable, virile, and free, and the nations as penetrated women enslaved to their conquerors, is challenged by this statement [Gal 3:28]. Oneness in Christ and the one God of Israel is a unification of defeated nations from below in defiance of Roman imperial ideology consolidating the whole world, composed of all the nations, as one under Roman law and hierarchy. Paul presents this oneness as gender transgression and solidarity that destabilizes racial, gender, and cosmic order (152).

Since she does not give us further argument on how the oneness is gender transgression, that is, "queer" in a sense, I will investigate how this idea is queer later.

As we saw, the gender-critical lens shows us that the conquered nations are to realize that the true conflict is against the Roman Empire and that they have to unite in opposition to the harmful structures of the superior,

14 See for more discussion on this Lopez's chapter 3 "The Fate of the Nations and the Naturalization of Conquest," pp. 56-118.

15 A phrase which means "moving ahead of and above his [Paul's] contemporaries" (Lopez 129).

masculine, and violent dominator subjugating the inferior, feminine, and powerless dominated people. In order to achieve solidarity, they must overcome the conflicts generated from the social differences such as ethnicity, class, and gender. In other words, they have to be one in Christ, instead of one under the emperor, regardless of their difference. Thus, Gal 3:28 functions as mandate to live in solidarity.

Oneness Not in Masculinity

Lopez’s concept of international solidarity ordered in Gal 3:26-28 can be used to solve the dilemma pointed out by other queer interpretations that the oneness/equality of male and female only can happen when female merges into male or becomes male. As Lopez argues, the oneness is not achieved by “upward mobility,” i.e., attaining the masculinity by assimilation to Romans (manly men). Another example of oneness through upward mobility is found in upholding alternative (and superior) masculinity in competition with hegemonic masculinity.¹⁶

16 For example, in the Greco-Roman world, masculinity was involved with virtues such as self-control and it was supposed to be reflected on male bodies, including genitalia. As circumcised male genitalia were not regarded as ideal, if not shameful, in Roman values, it was important for Jews to build an argument for how circumcised male genitalia also reflect virtues and masculinity. See Karin Neutel and Matthew Anderson (2014). On hegemonic masculinity, see R. W. Connell and James W. Messerschmidt (2005).

On the contrary, it is achieved only by remaining at the bottom. She clearly says that the model Paul showed to the defeated nations to live in solidarity is “not the story of upward mobility characterized by becoming real men in Christ,” (141), but rather a way achieved only by downward mobility, even to the extent of identifying oneself as female. If the image of Christ was as a glorious masculine conqueror like a Roman soldier, the alternative structure was merely following the Roman ideology by replacing Caesar with Christ only to maintain the oppressive structure. However, the image of Christ in Galatians is far from glory, masculinity, and conquest. Rather, Christ is portrayed as a crucified, defeated, unmanly figure. I will argue in the following section how this crucified Christ is crucial to our queer interpretation of “in Christ” in Gal 3:28.

Queer and Liminal Space; “In Christ”

Lopez’s concept of international solidarity can be developed further. I suggest we understand the idea as a queer and liminal space; “in Christ” (read as if it is a name of a place) First, I discuss what kind of power dynamics/gender structure is revealed through the image of a crucified Christ, which seems to be the only image Paul portrays in Galatians (Gal 3:1; 6:14), and which Lopez does not fully analyze in

her book. Then I discuss about the queerness and liminality of the space.

Power Dynamics Revealed in Crucified Christ

The crucified Christ is, as I pointed out above, the image farthest from the picture of the Roman ideal man. Needless to say, that the crucified man has a male body does not simply define whether he is male or masculine; because what discourses on gender question is less about our biological sex or "essential" traits of each sex/gender but more about power structure and the (ab)use of gender in power dynamics.¹⁷ Hence, this man on the cross has nothing masculine in terms of power. However, this figure needs closer attention and inspection since he gained not a few followers and Paul uses him as a banner for the nations to gather around despite the fact that the crucified man was meant to be unmanly, and thus, undesirable.

First, Christ having a male body has a certain impact on power dynamics, though it has nothing to do with oppressive masculinity. Because it is a male body that was defeated by the forces of empire, it could be more shameful than a female body being defeated and therefore it disrupts the

"natural" order of gender. Thus, we could say that what is crucified on the cross was the oppressive maleness symbolized by the male body, by paraphrasing Gal 5:24 "those who are of Christ have crucified the flesh with the passions and the desires."

Second, the crucifixion itself symbolizes the oppressive structure of the empire. It is about who has power (who is masculine dominator) and who does not. It "was an institution of humiliation, torture, and execution designed to deal with the people considered most threatening to the establishment and its interests [... and] to strike fear into the hearts of any who would dare pose a threat to status quo" (Hanson and Oakman, *Palestine in the Time of Jesus*, 86). Roman citizens were not crucified as much as non-Romans were since it was too shameful (Hanson and Oakman, 87), and thus, it was "also a core image of divinely ordained Roman domination over all the nations" (Lopez, 135). Thus, it is a performance to let people know who has *divine* power. Nevertheless, the crucified Christ turns out to be where different kinds of power lie or come from. It is a power which is from below, resists and subverts the oppressive structure, connects people with one another, and empowers those who were trampled down. This non-masculine power, which itself is a contradictory concept, destabilizes

17 Wilchins describes that the knowledge and language of gender belong not to science but to politics (35-37).

the very notion of masculinity, and where masculinity (i.e., dominance) is shaken, the binary it consists also is destabilized. Since the binary is actually not about two counterparts but about one (e.g., gender binary is about man, white/black race binary is about white), to destabilize the defining one (e.g., male, white, etc.) means to destabilize the binary itself.¹⁸ It is a queer power since it does not work in the structure but creates an alternative space in which the power structure is different from outside. Subverting the power structure by subverting the binary that is constructed to be used for oppression may be achieved by queer power as long as “queer” is more about *what is possible* than about *what it is*.¹⁹

The cross of Christ, while presenting alternative powers and structures, also functions as an accuser against the Roman imperial system and its injustice. Through it, people gain a bird’s-eye view over the Roman ideology and become able to know that solidarity with one another is more significant than competing among themselves.

In Christ” in Galatians

Though I recognize the importance of “in Christ (ἐν χριστῷ)” in Pauline letters, there is not enough space in this paper to discuss its

meaning and use fully in Galatians. In this section, I briefly show how the uses of this phrase are relevant to our interpretation of “in Christ” as a space which is built not on Roman power structure but on inter-national solidarity. In Galatians, the prepositional phrase occurs six times (1:22; 2:4, 17; 3:14, 26, 28). Except in 2:17, its meaning seems clear: it is the condition/situation in which people have freedom (2:4) and are all one as children/heirs of the blessing and the promise given originally to Abraham and now to people who share the faith with Christ (especially in 3:14, 26, 28). This freedom, in my queer interpretation, is a freedom from the “upward mobility” for justification and/or self-affirmation since to require circumcision from gentiles is to force them to assimilate with Jews. Hence, it is a freedom from Roman ideology which compels people to compete with one another. In Christ, they are free from the oppression the competitive society brings. “In Christ” in 2:17 is less straightforward. Here, I want to simply point out that what is at stake in its context (2:16-21) is if circumcision is necessary for justification or not and Paul is suggesting the alternative way of “seeking justification” which is “in Christ.” It is a way of living totally opposite from what the empire promotes.

¹⁸ See Wilchins (43-44).

¹⁹ See Lopez (14).

Queerness and Liminality of the Space "In Christ"

People of the nations, who came to notice how harmful the empire's abuse of power is and where the true conflict lies, gather together and start to live with mutual support. This phenomenon did not immediately change or take over the world. Rather, it would have happened gradually in small groups of people, such as communities around synagogue where Christ-following Jews and Gentiles attracted by Jewish way of living gathered. It started as a queer and liminal space because of its own nature.

The space is queer in a sense not only that it is unique but also that there is no gender binary inside. As I clarified already, inside this space, people are to resist the oppressive power dynamics, which is symbolized in the gender binary; masculine conqueror dominate the feminine conquered. In this space, the maleness is deconstructed through the image of crucified Christ and the model Paul shows by his new way of living. It is where the harmful masculinity has no room, and therefore, its counterpart also does not exist.

The space is liminal because it does not fall into any category which existing structures offer. Rather, it is a totally new world and it does not have "citizenship" in the existing world yet.

It certainly exists but only between the boundaries of the existing categories of other spaces/communities, and in that sense, it does not *officially* exist. It is outside of *the* structure, and its alternative structure is not yet fully achieved to the degree that it can subvert the larger structure of the empire. In other words, it is a liminal space where the imagination of subversion and transformation is already started to take a shape in the real world, but not yet fully. Here, I am talking about its liminality not only in space but also in time.

This new alternative structure of mutual support could be *the* structure someday somehow. However, there is always a risk that once a structure, i.e., a way of activating power, becomes dominant in the world, it can start othering and marginalizing certain people who cannot fit in the structure or who feel repressed by the structure. Thus, this liminal, and therefore, eschatological space²⁰ is supposed to remain queer and liminal. It is a requirement for this trying-to-be-gender-neutral space to remain liminal as long as it seeks to be the resistance against the existing structures and categories, i.e., constant struggle to escape from the dominators' gaze which dominates people as others and dehumanizes them.

²⁰ For the ideas of spacial eschatology and liminality as eschatological, see Westhelle (2012).

It is obvious that constantly creating a space where the power dynamics is different from the outside world is difficult. Paul’s letter itself proves that he struggled to persuade the Galatians to create new way of relationships with one another, which does not allow anyone/any group of people to be dominant over (an)others. There was a certain conflict about circumcision, that is, a conflict concerning boundary of identities and who is superior to others. We actually do not know if he achieved his ambition to create a space/community of mutual support and solidarity in Galatia. It would be imaginable that there remained constant conflicts among one another in churches/assemblies, and therefore, also constant struggles for building solidarity. This may sound as if Paul failed. However, I consider such instability and continuing struggle as marks of living in liminal/eschatological space(s), in which Christ’s followers are called to live.

**Supplement from Queer Critique:
“No Male and Female” in Its Literal
Context**

In this supplemental section, I want to present two additional critiques from queer perspectives. In Gal 3:28, there are three sets of social status categories: Jews/Greeks, free/slaves, and male/female. Though they can be named as “race, class, and gender”

(the *troublesome* trinity) which we are almost obliged to mention in today’s discourses regarding power dynamics/structure, Paul may not have used them out of the social expectations/pressure not to miss any category out of the three. Concerning the dichotomies of Jews/Greeks and free/slaves, it is easier to understand why they matter since Paul argues about unnecessary of circumcision (2:3-4, 14, 16; 5:2-6), which had been the boundary marker between Jews and others, and about how those who share the faith of Christ are free men, not slaves, in his letter (4:30-5:1). However, it seems less obvious why “male and female” matters since there is no explicit argument about it. Even the simple fact that ἄρσεν and θήλυ only appears in 3:28 while Ἰουδαῖος (2:13), Ἕλληνας (2:3), δοῦλος (4:1,7), and ἐλεύθερος (4:22,26,30) appears more than once in the letter may indicate something about the unnaturalness of its use.

Male/Female and Inheritance

I argue there are two core issues embedded in this pair in the letter. One is (new) creation (cf. 6:15) and the other is inheritance. I start with inheritance. Inheritance is a key issue in the letter of Galatians. As the letter is often summarized as the argument about the dichotomy of circumcision (the work of the law)/faith, the circumcision is a central issue because,

for Paul, it defines who can inherit the blessing of God and receive the holy spirit. When it comes to who can be the heir, all three categories in 3:28 matters. In Jewish tradition, it is Jewish sons, not gentiles nor slaves nor females. Therefore, what Paul declares in 3:28 is that those social distinctions do not determine who can be the heirs, but only one criterion does: being baptized (and dressed) in Christ (3:26-27). Now the adoption is possible since the law functions in different way than defining who can be the heirs (4:5. Cf., 3:23-25). What is deconstructed here? Some scholars see, as I described above, it abolishes the social distinctions *per se*, while others see what is abolished is the privileges the distinctions generate. I consider it is the naturalness, the taken-for-granted, of the *essential* factors, which was defined by the law, to become heirs that is deconstructed here. What was supposed to be essential is revealed as merely a construct, as Paul argues, when the faith of Christ arrives.

Furthermore, once the conditions for becoming heirs are deconstructed, the *natural* way of forming group of people is also destabilized. As the issue of circumcision is the issue of boundary of certain group of people, what is at stake in the Galatian community is conflicts over boundaries. Before Christ, the boundary of Jews/others, i.e., who are the people of the God

of Israel and who are not, was maintained mainly according to their ethnicity. This ethnicity can be regarded as the extension of tribes and households/families. It is a group formed in patrilineal way, whose center is reproduction. Therefore, to destabilize the conditions of inheritance, i.e., the conditions for forming an ethnicity-centered group, is to destabilize the reproduction centered way of group formation (we can see the Christ centered new form of household here).

Male/Female and New Creation

The other issue embedded in the male/female pair is the (new) creation. As I mentioned above, the phrase ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ appears only once in Galatians and actually even in the entire Pauline letters, and it is difficult to know what underlies this pair since we cannot compare this phrase with other usages. In order to see it, the LXX helps.²¹ The phrase ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ occurs eight times in the LXX and all of them are in Genesis (1:27; 5:2; 6:19, 20; 7:2, 3, 9, 16); two of them refer to human being, other six usages refer to animals in the story of the ark of Noah. The first creation narrative describes that humankind was created in a pair

21 ἄρσεν and θῆλυς are used together in Rom 1:27, where Paul disputes about unnatural intercourse. Since they are not in the exact pair and the contexts of Romans and Galatians are totally different, I consider it not helpful to use Rom 1:27 in comparison with Gal 3:28.

of male and female (Gen 1:27, cf., 5:2) and Noah’s story also tells that animals were brought into the ark in pairs. It portrays the image that every species consists of one union of two sexes and there is no other way that any kind of creatures can exist or reproduce.

However, what is declared in Gal 3:28 seems to let us allow to imagine new way of existence: “no male and female.” It is the “new creation” (καινή κτίσις 6:15) in Christ that is contrasted to the (old) creation bound by the social distinctions (particularly circumcision or uncircumcision in 6:15). Though the term κτίσις or κτίζω is not used in the creation story in Genesis, Gospel traditions show there is a connection between κτίσις and ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ. The Gospel of Mark says “from the beginning of creation (κτίσεως), he made (ἐποίησεν) them male and female (ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ)” (Mk 10:6) and the parallel passage in Matthew says “from the beginning the one who create (ὁ κτίσας) made (ἐποίησεν) them male and female (ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ)” (Mt 19:4). Hence, the creation from the beginning (the old creation) was based on male/female set but in the new creation there is no male and female.

This new creation does not need male and female as a pair since the only element that consists, generates, and characterizes it is “being in Christ,” “wearing Christ,” i.e., “being

baptized in Christ.” Here, again, not only the reproduction centered way of being/existence is destabilized, but so also is the sex/gender as a foundation of living creature. It does not necessarily mean that the distinction of male and female disappears, but at least the male/female binary cannot be taken for granted any longer to be the basis of humankind as new creation.

Conclusion

Gender matters if its categories are classified to superior gender(s) and inferior one(s), and used to oppress, exclude, and dehumanize certain people. As Lopez’s Paul models a new way of relationship in which oppressive Roman masculinity has no room, and consequently, the gendered power structure, we also have to be aware of how gender can function in harmful way and how can we resist against the oppressive structure. At the same time, we are to recognize that the gender/power-neutral space, i.e., safe space, is almost merely an illusion of utopia, and that what is required is not to merely create and secure the “safe space” but to struggle constantly and never-endingly to make a space safe for struggling equally.

Once we understand our task in this way, it could overwhelm us. It seems almost implausible. Nevertheless, we should not be overwhelmed, for

we have Gal 3:28. It is a guide which shows us a preferable future, allows us to imagine something beyond this world, and helps our imagination take a specific shape. Moreover, this verse, or the interpretations of the verse, reveals to us we are not the only one who fight against oppression. When we read the verse with our deep desire for liberation, equality, and justice, we also hear the resonance of people's shouts demanding them in the verse itself and also in the history of its interpretation. Egalitarian readings of the verse presented by feminist scholars are the reflection of their painful fight against the male-supremacy. Critiques against those feminist interpretations from queer readers are also the reflection of desire to see and accept the complexity beyond male vs. female and to imagine a better world for queer people. With all those echoes from history of the resistance and struggle, we are invited to imagine what kind of a better world we need and want for the oppressed, for the marginalized, and for our beloved ones in suffering, through Gal 3:28.

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THE END OF ESCHATOLOGY: DERRIDA'S SPECTERS OF MARX AND THE FUTURES OF LUKE'S CHRIST

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Abstract

This paper argues that recent biblical scholarship focusing on eschatology, particularly Lukan eschatology, is part of the cultural milieu of Late Capitalism. Rather than being subsumed into the binary of imminent vs future hope, this paper rereads so-called “Lukan fulfillment” through the lens of Jacques Derrida’s *Specters of Marx*. Focusing primarily on the kingship of Jesus, this paper argues that despite certain eschatological proclamations, Jesus was never king of any people or place. Therefore, reading from a time where hopeful messianic narratives have been subsumed under Capitalist narrativity, now is the moment to consider, as Kotrosits has begun to show, Luke as a narrative layered with empathetic pessimism.

Palabras clave: Lucas, escatología, Derrida, capitalismo, pesimismo.

Resumen

Este artículo argumenta que la reciente investigación bíblica interesada en la escatología, en particular en la escatología del libro de Lucas, forma parte y refuerza el ambiente cultural del capitalismo tardío. En lugar de quedar subsumido en la distinción binaria entre inminencia y esperanza futura, el artículo realiza una relectura del así llamado “cumplimiento lucano” desde la perspectiva del libro *Espectros de Marx* de Jacques Derrida. A partir del enfoque en el parentesco de Jesús, se argumenta que, a pesar de ciertas proclamas escatológicas, Jesús nunca fue rey de ningún pueblo o lugar. Por lo tanto, al leer desde un contexto en el que las esperanzadoras narrativas mesiánicas han sido subsumidas por la narrativa capitalista es conveniente considerar, como lo ha hecho de manera introductoria Kotrosits, que el libro de Lucas es una narrativa cubierta de pesimismo empático.

Keywords: Luke, Eschatology, Derrida, Capitalism, Pessimism.

Capitalism and the Haunting of Lukan History

Just months before the Berlin Wall was torn down, John T. Carroll published his dissertation titled, *Response to the End of History: Eschatology and Situation in Luke-Acts* (1989). Interestingly, Fukuyama published his political work on the victory of Capitalism shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992). Much like the relationship between Luke and Acts, the (prophetic) response precedes the kerygmatic (un)fulfillment of the gospel. Situated in all these works, there is the underlying question: when does history end? Carroll explains: "Perhaps the greatest single source of confusion in recent study of Lukan eschatology is the lack of terminological precision. One scholar's "eschatology" is another's "history" (33).

This is on its own terms a theological debate meant for organizing faith communities' logo-centers, foundations of an absolute truth for a given (contextualized) community. Yet, why this dissertation then? And why is the title of Fukuyama's political analysis so similar to Carroll's?

The expansion of "end of the world" narratives during late(r) capitalism has been widely noted, prompting Mark Fisher to repeat "It is easier

to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of Capitalism" (2009)¹. Yet, Lukan eschatology is pronounced in between the failed expectations for the political sovereignty of Israel (Lk. 2:25; Acts 1:6) and the end of the world. In this paper I contend, that end of the world narratives are a feature of late capitalism. Likewise, biblical studies have seen a heightened interest eschatology and apocalypses during what has been named "crisis capitalism." Yet, while Luke narrates prophetic ends of the world or history, eschatologies are a structuralist impositions on the text itself. For, nowhere does Luke tell us that he is going to explain how the world ends (only one of his characters does that). Neither can we say that Lukan eschatological pericopes do more than perform a desire for change within a matrix of Jewish messianic narratives.

Interestingly, it is Derrida who takes up the call to answer Fukuyama's *The End of History*, which he calls a "Gospel" in *Specters of Marx* (70-71).² It is the theological *telos* with respect

1 This is in fact the title of Chapter 1.

2 Derrida says of Fukuyama's gospel, "Why a gospel? Why would the formula here be neotestamentary? This book claims to bring a 'positive response' to a question whose formation and formulation are never interrogated in themselves. It is the question of whether a 'coherent and directional History of mankind' will eventually lead 'the greater part of humanity,' as Fukuyama calmly, enigmatically, and in a fashion at once modest and impudent calls it, toward 'liberal democracy.'"

to a "Gospel" that Derrida aims to disjoin. As such, one might consider that the repeated attempts to superimpose an eschatology on top of the text of Luke-Acts, the fetish of capitalist *teloi* have had a role to play. In order to counter this fixation for *telos*, this paper will attempt to imagine and show the possibilities of spectrality (*das Gespenst*) in Luke's resurrected Christ (*revenant*) within a Derridean open eschatology whose only *telos* is the end of the narrative. We do this keeping in mind that the end of the narratives of Luke and Acts are admittedly open-ended.

What is a narrative for? Unlike popular biblical inquiries into the structures and histories of original meaning, the indeterminability of this question is crucial to thinking narrative and eschaton together. Clearly, I cannot answer this question once-and-for-all with respect to the third gospel, and I am sure there must be more than one reason for the text of Luke, and other non-reasons (irrationalities) for it as well. But the indeterminacy of this question must haunt all inquiry, and in such a colonial text, a text with a victim of hegemonic state violence, this haunting is equally paralleled by diasporic exclusion and the revenant of the crucified. Hegemonic purpose aims to be clear and precise, although rife with contradictions. But the necessity of diasporic texts is pregnant

with possibility, and with intended unknown possibilities and unintended.³ In short, part of the telling of Luke's Gospel is to see what happens in and *after* its telling.

Eschatology and Lukan Spectrality: Reading Carroll with Derrida

Carroll summarizes for us seven positions on Lukan eschatology, but the first two will suffice. First, he names one of the most popular positions, which he calls "Un-eschatological Luke: The Eschaton Recedes in Time and Significance in Luke-Acts." While Conzelmann's *Die Mitte der Zeit* completely synthesized this argument, Carroll argues it originates with Bultmann, quoting: "The fact that he [Luke] wrote Acts as a sequel to his Gospel completes the confirmation that he has surrendered the original

3 See for further discussion Kotrosits (2015). In her chapter on Acts (108), she writes:

The Way' in Acts manages, then, to be not only an imagination of an ideal route of diasporic togetherness, but also the passage to a kind of 'monstrous family of reluctant belonging,' to quote Jacqueline Rose. In monstrous belonging, togetherness is formed not out of volition or even fondness, but out of the tense, ongoing, and irrevocable entanglements brought into being through violence and its many potent afterlives—a kind of belonging that might knit conflicting groups, victims and perpetrators, and even their king in uncomfortable and unconscious binds. So too in Paul's travels, 'the Way' is defined not only by the unity and faithfulness of its followers, but also by coalitions that are brief and dubious, often formed under strained political, economic, and social circumstances.

kerygmatic sense of the Jesus-tradition...and has historicized it" (3)

In this perspective, Carroll argues "the Spirit, becomes a substitute for imminent eschatological faith, indeed a 'solution of the problem of the Parousia.' From my perspective, this argument is on the right track, however, I would want to crack open this understanding of Spirit as (merely) a metaphysical entity and remove the concept of progress in a move that might opt not to translate *pneuma* to the Hegelian *Geist*. For what is prominent in these interpreters is a negotiation of the meaning and structure of a *Heilsgeschichte* that, for me, is not completely constructed in the Gospel and Acts proper, nor does it claim it as its main purpose.

While we can see a certain presence of a developing *Heilsgeschichte* structure in early Jewish attempts at naming a Kingdom-of-God, what Luke invariably does is to show how this has changed in the presence and coming presence of Jesus, a Jesus who never becomes king in the narrative. This is evidence of what Derrida shows as dis-jointed time, moments out-of-joint in the so-called progress of history.⁴

4 See Ware (2004). Ware says:

It is interesting that Derrida's *Specters of Marx* is an entire essay on the importance of disjointed time, heterogeneity, singularity, and respect for the other, yet critics repeatedly try to conjoin Benjamin and Derrida, as if the former holds the

We could accept Luke in a vacuum and claim his narrative kerygma as dogma, as Luke's own truth claim, which we are not required to do. For in doing so, we would be claiming that Luke has no concept of history outside his own moment. Rather, if Luke understands himself as a continuation of a certain Jewish tradition, this history is out-of-joint, and Luke in a certain way understands this.⁵ Thus, this gives us a chance to consider Derrida's concept of messianic time by considering the openness of Luke's *Heilsgeschichte* to something similar to Derrida's "messianism-to-come" or "the promise of justice," a justice which we must not know what it looks like.

key to understanding the latter and by conjuring Benjamin's spirit, we may dispel the complexity of Derrida's work, or vice versa.... Since Benjamin's main critique in his "Theses" of the idea of "progress," we can understand why he distances himself from any notion of the future, directing his dialectical concern to the past instead. Derrida, likewise, is concerned with the past and with our present debt to the past. Like Benjamin, he deconstructs the notion of a future-present, for as the oxymoronic name suggests, this notion is an attempt to give self-presence to the unanticipated future-to-come. But instead of turning away from the future all together, Derrida wishes to affirm the very heterogeneity of the future-to-come, and he does so through the concept of the promise. The very structure of a promise is futurity (i.e., it is impossible to promise anything that does not relate to the future); so, by affirming the promise itself, we indirectly affirm the future, thereby approaching (without appropriating) the future as other (113-114).

5 For example, a crucified messiah is neither part of the Jewish tradition, nor does it "make sense" in any previous Jewish discourse.

The next major formation of eschatology within Lukan scholarship is what Carroll names as "Consistent Imminent Eschatology." The famous "the Kingdom of God is among/within you" is exemplary passage for this understanding of Lukan eschatology. It takes the Pentecost passage in Acts 2 as its major pericope and assumes a new history is begun with the ascension of Christ and the inauguration of the global spirit. That which is arriving has now arrived, a *revenant* or *arrivant* for Derrida.

But Derrida questions this messianic imminence in the form of Hamlet's father's ghost:

The one who says "I am thy Fathers Spirit can only be taken at his word. And essentially blind submission to his secret, to the secret of his origin: this is a first obedience to the injunction. It will condition all the others. It may always be a case of still someone else. Another can always lie, he can disguise himself as a ghost, another ghost may also be passing himself off for this one (6).

I do not doubt that Luke has intended to link Jesus of Nazareth to the resurrected Christ to the Spirit of Pentecost. Yet, if we are to take each of these at their word, as real phenomena in the early believers, Luke's work to connect these three betrays his own uncertainty in his attempt to "prove" continuity. While the Emmaus walkers do have

their eyes opened to the identity of the resurrected to Jesus, to the revenant, their inability to recognize him makes Luke's certainty suspect. I have no desire to question the ontological facticity of Luke's claims, but rather situate myself with Derrida and admit that Luke's work to connect Jesus, Christ, and Spirit looks like the work of mourning. After all, the Emmaus walkers admit to their own mourning (Lk 24:17).

First of all, mourning. We will be speaking of nothing else. It consists always in attempting to ontologize remains, to make them present, in the first place by identifying the bodily remains and by localizing the dead (*Specters of Marx*, 9)

But beyond this, and as I will discuss more below, what returns is changed. The resurrected Christ is something new, in spite of Lukan attempts at continuity. The spirit is in Jesus throughout the gospel, but never in the disciples. Its movement in and through the apostles is something new. The need for Luke to demonstrate its continuity is contingent precisely on the change, the transformation, that it resurrects.

Imminence, as Derrida points out, contains a "desire for resurrection" (44). Yet, if the continually returning imminence is a point of change, then what of this imminence? If it lacks continuity, it is evidence of time-out-of-joint, and Luke's attempts at continuity are

attempts to put history back into joint. Thus to consider imminence as a static form is on its own terms a fetish for origins and a structuralist (foreign) imposition on the text. The necessary change that occurs at each point of re-imminence (*revenance* for Derrida) is the promise of justice. It follows then that the resurrected Christ and the Spirit are the future. Or in Derrida's words: "At bottom, the specter is the future, it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back" (48).

The payoff then for Carroll is in fact the possibility of imminent hope for Luke: "When, from Luke's own vantage point, will the eschaton occur? Scholars who perceive Luke as a historicizer of eschatology tend to deny any imminent hope to Luke; those who see Luke as an eschatologizer of history tend to affirm it" (33).⁶

Eschatological Kingship: Fulfillment or Disruption

One way to see this play out in the Lukan text is in the eschatological

kingship of Jesus, which never reaches fulfillment in the Lukan narrative. There are in fact *possible* references to Jesus kingship, but as I have argued elsewhere, the meaning and function of these symbols are disrupted by Jesus actually never ruling over anything within the narrative. At best, one can say that Jesus is king of wherever he goes after the ascension and his earthly kingship is delayed beyond the eschaton. However, "king" is not the only title for Jesus in the Luke-Acts narrative, but this openness to the possibilities of Jesus aimed towards the future, is posing for the auditor, just what can a Jesus be? If a Christ for sure, then what can a Christ be?

The concluding sentences of Brawley's *Centering on God* contains this statement: "Nevertheless, there are lines of correspondence between Jesus and the Samaritan. Jesus is an unlikely messianic figure.... To see Jesus as Messiah is, therefore, to see messianism turned on its head" (228).

Jesus' identity in Luke may be stabilized as messiah/Christ, but the essence of messiah/Christ is never stable (and the meaning of messiah is most likely destabilized in its translation to *Christ*).

For the structuralist Brawley, the structured messianic expectation-fulfillment remains intact and hinges upon the God-character of the Jewish

6 See also, "To Conzelmann and Grässer, among others, this fact compels the judgment that Luke has transformed eschatology into history. Taking into account the period that followed the time of Jesus, Luke allowed the eschaton to retreat to the distant horizon. However, Borgen and Francis, among others, this phenomenon requires the conclusion that Luke has eschatologized history! In the light of the end-time bestowal of the Spirit (Acts 2:17), the entire period of the church's mission is eschatological in quality."

narrative. For me, however, the disruption of messianic expectation (Tannehill) is evidence of the absence of the God who is never a character in the narrative. Nevertheless, despite our structured starting points, we both may agree that in the posterior proclamation of fulfillment, the tradition is renegotiated. For this analysis, Brawley's narrative teleology will be useful in considering the text. First, however, Brawley gives a brief history of Lukan scholarship's engagement with eschatology and history in *Luke-Acts and the Jews*.

The *heilsgeschichtliche Schule* offered an alternative to the historical reconstruction of the history-of-religions school.... Against the comparative history of religions, the *heilsgeschichtliche Schule* opposed the alleged impact of Hellenism and paganism on the evolution of the church and traced strong continuity between Christianity and the history of Israel. Against the Bultmannians, the *heilsgeschichtliche Schule* controverted the dichotomy between faith and history and claimed an essential core of historical event as necessary for faith.... This theological reading of Luke-Acts resulted in a striking congruity with the *heilsgeschichtliche Schule*. Whereas the *heilsgeschichtliche Schule* had hotly debated the Bultmannian bifurcation of faith and history, Conzelmann's hypothesis of a Lucan *Heilsgeschichte* sidestepped the historical question, with

the exception of the one historical datum of the delay of the Parousia (*Luke-Acts and the Jews*, 2).

Thus, as Brawley summarizes and Conzelmann demonstrates, the problem of eschatology is a problem of history. History does not end, but the Lukan narrative does. Eschatology is narrated in an eschaton-less Gospel. Salvation history is forced to renegotiate the terms of salvation. What salvation comes to Zacchaeus' house (19:10)? How can history end when the messiah is crucified on the cross?

Carroll in *Responses to the End of History* takes up the burden of lack in Lukan eschatology. For Carroll, "the eschaton awaits not the repentance of all Israel but the completion of the 'restoration/fulfillment of all things spoken by God through the prophets'" (163). Yet, this does not include the (political) restoration of Israel.

Finally, the burden of Luke's entire narrative works against this understanding of the place of Israel at the eschaton. Luke has told the story of the coronation of Israel's King, of the consolidation of new leadership over the twelve tribes of Israel, of the fulfillment of the covenant-promise to Abraham, and of the realization of Israel's God-given task of bearing light to the Gentiles.... For Luke to add a supplement in which, at the end of time, the temple is rebuilt, Jerusalem and political Israel established, and

the nation brought to repentance and faith, would contradict the force of Luke's whole narrative (163).

What Carroll is arguing is that Israel's fate at the future eschaton is no different than it is within the text of the Gospel and Acts. Israel can choose to follow Christ or not. There is no "third chance." And some of Israel will be judged and severed from the people of God. While I cannot support Carroll's interpretation of Jesus' kingship, his argument for an openness to eschatological questions on the part of Luke is compelling.

Turning back to Brawley, let us consider the pattern of expectation and fulfillment. Brawley refers to the *telos* of the narrative. Still, it is important to recognize that every narrative has a physical *telos*. For example, any written story must end before the page does. Likewise, Luke, in spite of holding an open eschatology, must end his story in the midst of a history which includes the destruction of the Second Temple.

Brawley instructs on teleology and structure:

The coherent whole is a teleological pattern. That is, actions in narratives fit into causal networks out of which the reader constructs a thematic pattern moving toward a goal [...] The teleological goal is

not merely a matter of content but also a matter of structure. Structurally gratifying plots exhibit particular relationships between the beginning and the end (59).

After introducing us to the four types of teleological relationships of Victor Shklovsky, Brawley concludes:

To a significant degree, the retrospectively recovered story in Luke-Acts unfolds from (2) predictions and their fulfillment. A case in point is Luke 1:31-35 where Gabriel makes predictions about Mary's child that the narrative moves to fulfill. It also moves from (4) misunderstanding to rectification. It vindicates Jesus over against his rejection by the people of Nazareth and over against the scandal of his crucifixion, and it exonerates Paul from the accusations that he advocates apostasy from Judaism (59).

In other words, the teleological structure of Luke-Acts moves from a misunderstood prediction to a rectified fulfillment. So according to Brawley and Carroll, we have a Lukan narrative where the eschaton is unknown, but fulfillment of predictions is the Lukan *telos*. From a deconstructive (anti-structuralist) perspective, there is a latent contradiction here, where one's anxiety about the uncertainty of the future drives one to name the inheritance of the future. Of course, this is true for the New Testament

writers, but it is even more the case for post-Enlightenment biblical scholars.

Let us turn to Derrida's *Specters of Marx* for a moment to put some distance between *telos* and *eschaton*.

One does not know if the expectation prepares the coming of the future-to-come or if it recalls the repetition of the same, of the same thing as ghost....⁷ This not knowing is not a lacuna. No progress of knowledge could saturate an opening that must have nothing to do with knowing. Nor therefore with ignorance. The opening must preserve this heterogeneity as the only chance of an affirmed or rather reaffirmed future. It is the future itself, it comes from there. The future is its memory. In the experience of the end, in its instant, always imminently eschatological coming, at the extremity of the extreme today, there would thus be announce the future of what comes. More than ever, for the future-to-come can announce itself as such and in its purity only on the basis of a *past end*: beyond, if *that's possible*, the last extremity. If that's possible, if there is any future, but how can one suspend such a question or deprive oneself of such a reserve without *concluding in advance*, without reducing both the future and its chance? Without totalizing in advance? We must discern between eschatology and teleology, even if the stakes of such a difference

risk constantly being effaced in the most fragile and slight insubstantiality—and will be in a certain way always and necessarily deprived of any insurance against this risk. Is there not a messianic extremity, an *eskhaton* whose ultimate event (immediate rupture, unheard-of interruption, untimeliness of the infinite surprise, heterogeneity without accomplishment) can exceed, at each moment, the final term of a *physis*, such as work, the production, and the *telos* of any history? (44-45).

It can come as no surprise then that the revenant of Luke's Jesus concludes the Gospel with these words:

Then he said to them, These are my words that I spoke to you while I was still with you, that everything written about me in the Law of Moses and the Prophets and the Psalms must be fulfilled. Then he opened their minds (διήνοιξεν αὐτῶν τὸν νοῦν) to understand the Scriptures, and said to them, Thus it is written, that the Christ should suffer and on the third day rise from the dead, and that repentance and forgiveness of sins should be proclaimed in his name to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. You are witnesses of these things. And behold, I am sending the promise of my Father upon you. But stay in the city until you are clothed with power from on high. (Luke 24:44-49).

Clearly, Brawley is correct that there is an element of fulfillment in

⁷ Here we can think of the post-resurrection Jesus as a revenant.

the Lukan narrative *telos*. But what does this *telos* have to do with the eschaton? It is important to note that the interpretation of the scriptures says nothing of the kingship of Jesus. It does not specify which portions of the Law, Prophets, and Psalms are to be fulfilled. Instead, the revenant "opened their minds" so his audience could understand the scriptures, namely that the Christ would die and return as the very revenant that is speaking. The revenant works to correct messianic expectation. The revenant rectifies the prophetic, in order that the kerygmatic can be proclaimed "to all nations, beginning from Jerusalem."

In these final words, the narrative *telos* is revealed for the Gospel (the death of Jesus and the appearance of his revenant) and Acts (kerygmatic proclamation to all nations). Through Derrida's lens, Luke's cross is the messianic event which creates the eschatological space for the renegotiation of messianic expectation. The future need not be the fulfillments proclaimed, but the future will be influenced by the appearance and proclamations of the revenant, who gives us the narrative *teloi* of both volumes of the narrative.

In other words, the narratives (of Luke and Acts) must end, and therefore, they have *teloi*, death and resurrection of Christ and kerygmatic proclamation in space respectively. That

future eschaton remains open to surprise, just as Derrida and Carroll suggest. And Luke knows this, in spite of all his fulfillment discourse. Therefore, the (narrative's) present appearance of the revenant aims to express and perform the desires for the future. So often biblical scholarship attempts to interpret fulfillment in (Kristevan) symbolic terms, denoting how the predictions are fulfilled, betraying its bias for metaphysical presence. Rather, in the (Kristevan *semiotic*) space that Luke's cross creates, fulfillment proclamations ought to be interpreted affectively and performatively, unless the fulfillment is symbolized within the physical bounds of the narrative. The narrative space between death and ascension, the space of the revenant, is precisely the ruptured opening in which Luke memorializes the future, or where the past injustice of the crucifixion of Jesus insists upon possible futures.

Futures of a Christ

And that is exactly where we find ourselves, where the Bible and its Christ are loci for political negotiations and postures. For most Christs are opportunities for more *teloi*, removed from their respective narratives. And narrative-less *teloi* become fruitful ground for the fetish for the origins of a Christ (like the Jesus seminar and its responses). Luke's political uncertainty, however, means that the

meaning of its Christ is unsettled, and carries in it apophatic parabling that resists Christological *teloi*. This reading of Luke-Acts even destabilizes liberation hermeneutics' attempts to read liberation as *telos*. To put it short, multiple forms of liberation are easily subsumed into the narratives of capitalism, particularly those that reference teleological fulfillment. And Luke denies the reader a clear, comprehensible liberation, although it affirms those desires.

To name a Christ is to name the end (*telos*) of the world. As such, in theological discourse, it is easier to imagine why Christ died than it is to imagine the end of Capitalism. Therefore, the open eschatology of Derrida is important in our time, and perhaps, in all times—as a way of admitting the indeterminability of history and its futures, not as progress, but as life passed on. It is likely that the generic messianic structure has already been subsumed under capitalist narrativity (i.e. special individuals who save the world). In such a case, rereading the narratives to highlight the relational aspects (the necessity of the disciples or of women, etc.) or the critique of state violence (Roman crucifixion) will have to serve as new hermeneutical lenses. Each epoch of history is invited, and insists upon its readers, to interrogate the text anew. Yet, up until this point in Lukan scholarship, and in public Christian

discourse in general, the choice has been, as Carroll would have it, between an imminent hope and a future one. Nevertheless, the future of Luke's Christ is still undetermined, and in that indeterminability, perhaps a necessary empathetic pessimism lives.

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ESTUDIOS FILOSÓFICOS

THE PHENOMENAL-INTENTIONAL NATURE OF HAPPINESS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH TO EPICTETUS AND STOICISM

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Resumen

Este presente artículo ofrece una comparación entre las ideas filosóficas del estoicismo y las ideas contemporáneas en filosofía de la mente, para entender la naturaleza de la intencionalidad y experiencia como un elemento fundamental en una teoría de la "felicidad". De esta manera se evalúan aspectos relacionados con una teoría fisicalista a partir de una idea basada en una visión de la intencionalidad-fenoménica, esto es, la idea que la intencionalidad depende de las características fenoménicas, de esta forma, un análisis de la psicología popular y actitudes proposicionales como una base contemporánea para reinterpretar la metafísica y epistemología estoica, en particular desde las ideas expuestas por Epicteto, es posible. Se concluye que esta interpretación puede aportar una base más sólida que la propuesta en las teorías representacionales como las defendidas por Michael Tye para entender la naturaleza de la representación y el cambio en la narrativa interna que sugiere el estoicismo como vía a la felicidad.

Palabras clave: felicidad, intencionalidad, carácter fenoménico de la experiencia, estoicismo, Epicteto.

Abstract

The present paper offers a contrast between the philosophical ideas of Stoicism and contemporary ideas in philosophy of the mind, to understand the nature of intentionality and phenomenal experience as a fundamental element in a theory of "happiness". The metaphysical foundation that I follow is based on a physicalist approach in non-reductive terms, from a perspective derived from a phenomenal-intentionality program, that is, the idea that intentionality depends on its phenomenal characteristics, in this way, an analysis of popular psychology and propositional attitudes as a contemporary basis for reinterpreting metaphysics and stoic epistemology in particular from the ideas exposed by Epictetus is possible. It is concluded that an interpretation more in line with the phenomenal characteristics of intentionality can provide a solid base to understand the nature of

representation and the change in the narrative suggested by Epictetus rather than the representational theories such as those advocated by Michael Tye as the path to understand happiness.

Keywords: Happiness, Intentionality, Phenomenal Character of Experience, Stoicism, Epictetus.

Introduction

It is said that happiness is neither a warm puppy nor a warm gun, and yet, there is an attempt to put our hopes in pursuing happiness in external factors such as objects, persons, or things. The conception of happiness is very elusive. This is evident considering that through history, philosophers had suggested different standpoints on the meaning of happiness. I want however to propose a view in which happiness is understood as a mental state with phenomenological and intentional properties realized by the relevant brain states. The idea I contend could be sympathetic with the views held by the stoics, specifically Epictetus¹. On this account, I pretend to compare the stoic viewpoint on the mind, the idea of the representation, and the phenomenal properties, with the way they can be understood in the actual framework of the philosophy of mind. Thereby, I will suggest that the thesis of understanding today's complex metaphysics of the mind, and a theory of happiness whose roots are founded in the stoicism can be

defended. Incidentally, we should be clear on the fact that if we must dive deep into a theory of happiness, we must first establish its origin. That is, defining a starting point, developing the required discussion, and offering a plausible conclusion.

The position that I will explore lies on the fact that, if happiness is no the exclusive result of nurturing the character by our owns means (À la Aristotle)², then, it must be considered

¹ Epictetus (AD 55-135, Nicopolis), was a Greek philosopher associated with the early Stoicism.

² For instance, Plato argues in the Republic that living in justice may result in happiness. Plato states that, "We have proved that justice in itself is the best thing for the soul itself" (Plato 10.612b). Justice in the platonic point of view is to live in harmony, and this harmony rooted in a mathematical idea is quite restrictive, this is, if you leave your natural place, there is no harmony, thus not justice. Another philosopher who explored the idea of happiness is Aristotle, who claims that eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία) is to live according to virtue. Hence, by mean of this "human flourishing" (Rasmussen 1-2) via the exercise of habits, and then virtues, the life must lead us to focus on the contemplation of philosophical truths According to Aristotle, we must dedicate ourselves to practice virtue. By this mean, we shape our character to the main goal of human life which is this human flourishing. However, I may not totally agree with the Aristotelian viewpoint. The critique that Gregory Trianosky made about Aristotle may have some sense in the view that I explore:

...although one's attitudes, emotions, reactive capacities, and skills are or can to some

the external factors that may appear in our lives, and the way they affect us. Thus, as Trianosky asserts, it is not the exercise of the agent on its own; instead, what it may be important is, as David Lewis observes, the history and the evidence of the agent (Lewis, *Radical Interpretation* 337).

In order to have a history of evidence and cognition, we must require a brain to store all the elements that configure our history and our character³ (our memories, hopes, beliefs, fears and so on) On this account, I will discuss the idea that happiness has its foundation in the phenomenal and intentional nature of the mind⁴. This proposal

extent be developed by will, no effort of will, however sustained, is *sufficient* for their development. Character is the product not only of voluntary action but also of the activity of temperament, along with upbringing, childhood experiences, social environment, peer expectations, and pure happenstance. And not only temperament but all of these things are not themselves the product of some exercise of agency, whether voluntary or non-voluntary. Hence, no Aristotelian account of responsibility for character can succeed (104).

Moreover, Aristotle suggests that some external goods are required in addition to virtue for happiness, but my view is that this idea could be highly problematic. How an external object can give us a sense of security?

3 According to Kant "Virtue is the strength of a human being's maxims in fulfilling his duty." (Kant167). This idea of virtue will be explored in concordance with the position I defend.

4 Even Kant, who's ethical system does not rely upon a definition of happiness, he explored the topic, according to Kant:

Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world, to whom everything in all of

may attempt to provide a modern perspective on how our minds are the actual main highways to happiness.

Epictetus, stoicism and the early philosophy of mind

It can be conceived at the light of the modern philosophy of mind, that the ancient Greeks (and Romans) did not have a solid theory of the intentionality⁵, or a complex metaphysical

his existence goes according to wish and will. Hence this depends upon the agreement of nature with his entire purpose [which includes happiness], likewise to the essential determination basis of his will (Kant 161)

However, this definition of happiness is entangled with the moral system that he develops. In other words, it can be suggested that Kant holds the idea that happiness is what makes a balance with morality of rational beings. Thus, as Kant suggested "[happiness] amounts to the highest good of a world into which... we must definitely transfer ourselves" (Kant180). I may agree with Kant in some sense, as he emphasizes that happiness must be grounded in a more moral conception, and this moral conception must be rooted in the reason. Thus, happiness must be part of our mental faculties, rather to considered happiness as a result of external objects alone.

5 Intentionality in the "modern" conception can be traced back to Franz Brentano (1874), so intentionality will be defined in this line, that is to say, a representation or aboutness. Nowadays, we understand representation under a theory of intentionality, introduced in contemporary philosophy by Franz Brentano, who claims that:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity.

and epistemological theory on the mind as we currently have. Instead, the Stoics conceived different ideas to explain representation. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize the fact that the views that they had, can be

Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 68)

Brentano attempts to find what is the mark of the mental, this is, he developed a kind of dualism to determine what exhibit a what cannot exhibit mentality. Although I will not follow this line of research, it is important to mention to fully understand the idea behind Brentano's thesis. The idea of intentionality is attached to the idea of content, thus, for every intentional state, there is something that state is directed, hence, intentionality has been called "aboutness" or "directedness", in other words, if I represent an apple, the intentional state is related to the apple. Of course, I can represent a unicorn even if I have not see one. I can represent non-exist objects. But what are our attitudes toward the object, in other words, if we have a brain state that realize a given phenomenology, and this realize intentionality, how is our external reaction? What I am claiming, in line with the Stoic position, is that our mental states are physical as well, and yet the difference is that nowadays a full scientific explanation can be given. This is a matter of adjust the metaphysical framework that science may understand how the mind is and how it works. This is not something easy, but a very good approach to explain the metaphysical nature of mind is through a non-reductive physicalism, inspired in the words of Putnam (Putnam, 1967), Fodor (1974) and David Lewis (1966). What is important to mention about this, is that the mental states are physical, but not reducible to a physical property. Having this framework, and in line with an analytic functionalism, one can explore the idea of what plays the role of the functional states, this, what could be the content of mental states, and such role is playing by folk psychology.

understood from the perspective of the modern philosophical concepts. As suggested by Rubarth, from the Stoics and the theory of representation, it can be conceived a theory of phenomenal experience (Rubarth, para. 8). However, what it is important to emphasize is that the views on representation and phenomenology (according to the Stoicism) must be part of a physical process, determining the physicalism as the starting point.

The Stoicism emphasizes the idea that everything is physical⁶. In their conception, even the mind (soul) has a physical nature. This by no means suggests that the Stoics had an adequate physicalist explanation of the mind as it was determined by the "scientific" conceptions of their time. For instance, the Stoics suggest that the soul has its sit on the heart (Peters 78), and this "soul" (identified with the word *pneuma*⁷ (*πνεῦμα*)) is just oversees all the

6 This idea is supported by Quine for example, who claims that "the physical facts are all the facts" (Hookway63). However, there could be a problem with the view: the reduction, this was not considered by stoicism, and yet, Quine may endorse about the mind a view practically in line with the anomalous monism of Davidson.

7 Even if it is not the aim of this paper, the word *pneuma* belongs to a broad concept that may refer the mind –or the soul - for example. Some of the words are *pneuma*, *psyche*, *spirit*, *anima*, *ghost*. And as has been point out, the Stoics use the word *pneuma* as soul, and in the context of a materialist explanation of cognitive faculties.

cognitive process⁸. The Stoics used the word *hegemonikon* to explain the idea on how all the physical faculties are governed by a single entity. As Rubarth suggests, “as a highly sensitive substance, *pneuma* pervades the body establishing a mechanism able to detect sensory information and transmit the information to the central commanding portion of the soul in the chest. The information is then processed and experienced” (Rubarth, para. 17). As a result of this initial explanation, it can be concluded that the Stoics needed to find (1) a way to explain how the information is experienced, (2) a way to explain how and why the external events can affect us, and (3) to propose a way to deal with those external events. To put this in another way, a physical idea of “mind”, the idea of the perception, and the content of perception must play a fundamental role in the Stoicism, therefore to happiness, and all of this can be analyzed in terms of philosophy of mind.

A clear example of this is found when Epictetus declares, “Make it, therefore, your study at the very outset to say to every harsh external impression, “You are an external impression and not at all what you appear to be” (Epictetus 10). Epictetus suggests that it is the perception of the thing, and the narrative of such event what influence

us. If a physical object hits us, our perception may not be the result of a direct contact with the object (direct realism); instead, our perception is indirect (indirect realism). To put this in another way, this kind of perception needs an explanation on how the phenomenal properties are realized by the relevant states of the brain, and by the history of evidence and the cognition of the agent. This conceptualization explains the reason why the Stoics required a physical and a (more or less) refined explanation on how the object affect us based on the representation that we have (with a linguistic content). Without such explanation, the whole position of the Stoicism would be pointless. Therefore, the only way they had to explain the matter was by appealing to mere physical terms of the mind. Thus, the idea behind the Stoicism is to account a physical explanation of the mind allowing some relations with the physical objects in the world. By doing this, and with an epistemological and metaphysical inquiry about the nature or reality, they are prone to present their ethical consequences a theory of happiness, rooted in the way things appear to us. In other words, the stoics developed a very complex and interesting account of representation, in modern terms, intentionality.

According to the Stoic philosophy, the *hegemonikon* as was explained before, controls all the physical faculties. As

⁸ I will return to this point shortly, not all the Stoics may agree with this claim.

Julia Anas suggests, “Content is dominant in Stoic philosophy of mind...encourages them to focus on the content of experience rather on its phenomenal qualities” (63). On this account, as the soul responds to a physical explanation, the *hegemonikon* oversees all the representations, and in order to have a representation, it is essential the content. However, the main point of discussion lies in determining if in contemporary terms, the phenomenal qualities play a central role in any Stoic interpretation of happiness. Seddon has noted that, “the Stoic *sophos* (wise person) is to learn what is 'in one's power', and this is 'the correct use of impressions' (*phantasia*)” (para.18). This insight would lead the person to reach a tranquility of mind or *ataraxia*. This *phantasia* could be understood in phenomenal terms rather than in merely representational ones.

Let us look at the modern ideas of representation. Tim Crane claims that all the representations must have a content, but regarding the phenomenal experience, he observes that the “experience might be representational without being a propositional attitude” (Crane 469). Here it is evident that Crane’s position is a representationalism in which the phenomenal content is a kind of representational content (Tye 68). For this reason, if we could relate the Stoic position with a modern view, it could be conceived as a representationalist one.

However, I will not endorse this viewpoint yet. First, and as I explained in my doctoral thesis, according to Tye, the phenomenal character can be explained in terms of representation. In his words, “the phenomenal character is one and the same as a certain type of intentional content” (137). He suggests that, when a red apple is observed with good light and optimal conditions in the supermarket, the visual experience is directly related to the apple. The color of the apple constitutes the representational content (which is one of the physical properties of the object), the phenomenal character of the experience of the red apple (its redness) is present only by virtue of a characteristic such as external property, such as its redness (as suggested in the argument of transparency (Harman) Consequently, the property entails the phenomenal character of seeing red (Gonzalez 77). However, if according to the Stoicism the mind can be considered as physical, and the *hegemonikon* oversees all the representations, today’s representationalism may not suit as a theory to explain the central role of the phenomenal experience in a theory of happiness. I will elaborate this idea more in detail.

The role of the phenomena experience

In my opinion, the representationalist argument for the phenomenal experience and intentionality may not

be precise. It seems to me that the phenomenal experience is what determines what we represent⁹. Having said that, it is worth noting that according to Stoicism, “appearance”¹⁰ is what the information of our senses presents to us. As Annas admits, “what we receive is itself called appearance (*phantasia*)” (Annas 66), suggesting a kind of representationalist approach to understand Stoicism. However, this appearance must not be the result of a transparency (Harman, 1990), neither a direct realism account of perception as it has been pointed out. Let us explore this idea more in depth.

If we compare the modern ideas of representationalism with the Stoicism, we may notice that the role assigned to the phenomenal character of experience by the stoicism is unclear. My own view of this is that the perceptual process (“appearance”) is not enough

to determine the whole history of phenomenal experience and representation held by the Stoicism. Even if the representation to the stoicism is, in Annas words, “...experienced by the perceiver as something with content” (72), this is not enough to determine the whole representation of an object. Now, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that both (the Stoic view and in my view) are physical events. This permits to explore the representation as a property of the mental states realized by a given brain state if the appearance is the way something appears to someone, this needs to be performed by a physical substrate like the brain.

I should insist that this appearance must be based on phenomenological ways. Why? As I explored in my doctoral thesis what it is relevant of our phenomenology is the brain state (Gonzalez chapter 2), not the representational content, in other words, with a theory of perception base on an indirect realism, can be explored the idea that what we are aware are the phenomenal properties of the object, and indirectly the object itself, the phenomenology just put boundaries to our representation. With this view, the phenomenal experience must play a role in a theory of happiness rooted in the way our mental states are realized by the brain. This is what it is required with a stoic point of view, as philosopher Julia Annas admits that, “Even if the early stoics understood

9 For a reference about the phenomenal intentionality program can be consult: Kriegel (2013), Mendelovici (2018), Gonzalez (2018)

10 Contemporarily, Uriah Kriegel develops a framework to explain the phenomenal properties, and he suggests that “Corresponding to every perceptible property, then, is an appearance property, or phenomenal property. The appearance of an object is determined by the set of all its phenomenal properties.” (Kriegel, *Phenomenal content* 183) but later he adds that “...the phenomenal character of experience is given by the phenomenal properties represented by experience.” Kriegel still hold a kind of representationalist view, however, he is clearly enough to suggests some internal nature of the phenomenal properties, accordingly, this could be a path to follow de defend a stoic view of mind in representationalist terms without exhaust an internal view.

the perception as an “imprint”, like the “imprint of seals on wax” (73) clearly suggesting a direct realism, that let us also think in a transparency argument as (Harman did) as foundation of a theory of representation to stoicism, but this is not correct according to my view. However, Chrysipus will lead us to an absurd because an object could have different shapes simultaneously, this insight, however, reminds the one objected by Jackson in the adverbial theory of perception¹¹. To this extent, the perception for the Stoicism is a process. Even if Annas insists that for stoicism “whereby things are represented to the agent in various phenomenologically different modes” (73), this phenomenology does not play the role that I try to follow. Accordingly, representations alone (early stoicism, and contemporary representationalism) may not be enough to explain metaphysically the nature of happiness. In other words, if the phenomenology (as I suggest) plays

a fundamental role in the psychological explanation of stoicism, and this is conceived as a physical process, then an internal explanation of the phenomenology should be required¹². However, as appearances and assents involve content, it seems to be clear that the phenomenological interpretation of the Stoicism must be determined by a linguistic content, rather to a mere perception, and I may agree with this view.

This point worth to be discussed. According to Annas, “[to stoicism] perceiving is thinking, not the reception of raw data” (Annas 755). In this sense, if what we know about the Stoics is true, the language is required to think, and therefore, it cannot be a phenomenology without language¹³, thus, the perception of the object will require of the language to add color to our representation, otherwise representations would be simple shadows. Epictetus endorses this view by declaring:

Men are disturbed not by the things which happen, but by the opinions about the things; for example, death is nothing terrible, for if it were it would have seemed so

11 The adverbial theory of perception is a kind of direct realism theory. It suggests that we are in a direct contact with the object of perception, as Crane and Craig claim, “An important objection to the adverbial theory has been proposed by Frank Jackson (1975). Consider someone who senses a brown square and a green triangle simultaneously. The adverbial theory will characterize this state of mind as “sensing brownly and squarely and greenly and triangularly”. But how can it distinguish the state of mind it is describing in this way from that of sensing a brown triangle and a green square?” (Crane et. al, para. 17). This argument was followed by Chrysipus to use rather to imprint “alteration” and define that an appearance is an “alteration of the soul” (Annas 73).

12 This of course will lead to a problem in modern times, mostly the explanatory gap and the consciousness hard-problem.

13 To clarify this aspect, when I suggest that what is relevant to phenomenology is the brain state, is in part because, and the fact that we can apply phenomenal concepts to our introspection, in this way a conceptual view of phenomenology can be conciliate with the stoicism.

to Socrates; for the opinion about death that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. When then we are impeded, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame others, but ourselves--that is, our opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to blame others for his own bad condition; it is the act of one who has begun to be instructed, to lay the blame on himself; and of one whose instruction is completed, neither to blame another, nor himself (20).

What Epictetus may suggest is that rationality and thinking are tied with the use of the language. Let us remember that the *hegemonikon* is where all the perceptions happen. This means that in the case of pain, even if the source is in some part of the body (the foot for example), the "sensation" of pain will be located in the *hegemonikon*, this leads some Stoics to discuss the idea that perhaps the *hegemonikon* is in the head¹⁴. Having said this, it may be worth noting that Chrysippus had to follow a kind of folk psychology as Annas had suggested; with this view, I follow suit: the thoughts of Epictetus and the Stoicism could be analyzed in terms of a more propositional approach, this is, based on a theory of propositional attitudes and folk psychology. Hence some insights into the idea of phenomenal concepts and propositions

will determine the linguistic content to the phenomenology realized by the brain states when we experience the objects of perception¹⁵. Consequently, an emotional response may be expected, and this response may be visible in our behavior.

Happiness as a propositional attitude

Precisely, I will point out that the idea of the content of a mental state can be studied under the view of propositions. Furthermore, I agree with the idea that what makes the content an intentional mental state is the proposition, but this idea would be true only once a phenomenology is realized. Although the Stoics did not have a complex theory of proposition and the relation between a mental state and language, it has been suggested that the Stoics developed the concept of *lekton* to link their epistemological, metaphysical, and logical views with the "external objects of the world". As Julia Annas notes:

Lekta are conveyed in language; in our minds, they are conveyed in a language of thought. Perception in humans involves lekta, since it involves receiving an appearance

¹⁴ This may suggest by the fact that Diogenes of Babylon discusses the idea held by some Stoics that the *hegemonikon* was in the head (Annas 61).

¹⁵ Let us remember again, that via indirect realism of perception we have an awareness of the phenomenal properties realized by the brain states, this is, we have a direct contact with the object via its phenomenal properties, and indirectly with the object itself.

which is a rational appearance, one containing propositional content, and also involves assent to the lekton expressing the content of that appearance. Perception, in other words, may be an experience with a certain kind of phenomenological feel, but more importantly it is reception of and commitment to information about what is perceived. In perception, only one kind of lekton is involved, namely, statements or axiomata (35).

And if this language of thought can be associated with the modern conception held by Fodor, then our simple representations might form some more complex ones. Thus, simple representations can include symbols (lekta in stoicism) that allow a relation between the subject and the mental representation. Marina Rokova observes that, “the language of thought allows to assign properties to objects that characterize all kind of representations” (101), implying the language as the entity that not only shapes our mental states, but also, the way we introspectively make relations between the objects and the content. To put this in another term, let us explore the language of thought championship by Fodor; if the language of thought explored by Fodor is accurate, then we would not need necessarily a picture –in intentional terms -in our minds in order to have a representation, just a concept. For

instance, if I think there are some kids in the playground, I do not have the need to think in a specific number of kids. In the same way, if I see someone mourning a dead, I do not have the need to think about the body lying in the coffin. I just need the thought of a dead, which is according to Epictetus what would cause and effect on me, nonetheless, I emphasize that this though via language is intentional and phenomenologically-grounded.


Let us examine another an example. Some days ago, I was in the veterinary with my dog. A lady enters the reception and asks the veterinary about her dog. The veterinary tells her that the dog just died. It was a dog that live about 14 years! The lady starts crying. During that moment, my first thought was not about the dog lying in the veterinary. I just had the thought about the lady’s suffering and the good times she shared with her dog. In this manner, to represent the whole history in my mind, I need first to phenomenologically thing about the dog, apply phenomenal concepts, and to represent all the aspects associated to the dog. Once this process is done, I may be able to make a judgment about the suffering of the lady. In other words, in order to have a modern interpretation that fits Stoicism, it must be in line with a phenomenal-intentionality program. In this case, the phenomenology is

more primitive than the intentionality; the former is realized by the relevant brain state, the latter is realized by brain states as well, however, it obtains its linguistic content once the phenomenology is realized –via phenomenal concepts–.

For instance, when I saw the lady crying, I phenomenologically grant to this fact a content, but this happens only if I have a history of evidence and cognition that allows me to understand the symbols associated with it. In concrete, the pain that can produce the loss of a loved dog, and from there, to have any sort of desires, beliefs, and fears that may affect me can be only understood if I have an history with a dog. Yet, as I saw the lady crying, I started thinking about my own dog and the fact that he was fine but having into account that he could die at any moment. David Lewis’s scheme may allow to better illustrate the point:

I could fear of the dark, because I have the evidence that something terrible may happen if lights go out; however, some other person may not experience such a thing and may not be afraid of the dark. Therefore, what affect us will depend upon our history, and on the way our phenomenology determines our representation of the objects, facts, or persons in the world. Consequently, this whole evidence needs to be determined by a linguistic framework, this is the way we conceptually understand our phenomenology and representation.

Having said that, we may ask why is this possible? It is possible because we require to experience things to determine the boundaries of the representation; otherwise, the position would follow a representationalist account of mind, but such a theory may not work, because what is required is to understand how, by the chain of events that impact our senses, this information is driven by different neuronal



Taken from David Lewis Radical Interpretation, 1974

channels,¹⁶ until the phenomenology is ultimately realized¹⁷. In this manner, it may be suggested that the Epictetus ideas behind representation are by far more complex than the simple idea of representation that a initial reading may suggests. Bearing in mind the previous points, what it is certainly worth to explore is if the Stoic viewpoint of Epictetus can be supported. This could be achieved by demonstrating if the propositional attitudes play a fundamental role in our mental state; therefore, in our behavior.

Let us return to the propositional analysis. If in the Epictetus point of view, our concerns are about the representation itself, but not about the thing being represented, it can be suggested that what establishes a link between our worries and the object is

a proposition. For example, the proposition “Elisa fears that it will rain”, implies the attitudes; a psychological relation such as belief, desire, fear or hope that a subject carry with a proposition. Hence, what it is important to emphasize is that the attitudinal component of a propositional attitude is a matter of how a proposition is being taken. In this view Elisa can believe that it will rain, hope that it will rain, fear that it will rain, and so forth. In each case the proposition is the content of her attitude, the fear that it will rain, is the same. However, Sally, a friend of Elisa may think that the rain will ruin the whole day because she will not be able wear her new outfit. What differs in this case is how this proposition is taken by Sally (believed in, hoped for, or feared). And this is the interpretation in which the base of Epictetus must be translated. In addition to this, Epictetus claims that:

When you see a man shedding tears in sorrow for a child abroad or dead, or for loss of property, beware that you are not carried away by the impression that it is outward ills that make him miserable. Keep this thought by you: What distresses him is not the event, for that does not distress another, but his judgement on the event. Therefore, do not hesitate to sympathize with him so far as words go, and if it so chance, even to groan with him; but take heed that you do not also groan in your inner being. (Epictetus 20)

16 Recently a very promising research in neuroscience has determined that subjective happiness can be observed in the activation of a brain area called the precuneus. This area that has been associated with memory and consciousness, has a very fundamental role in happiness. Moreover, the study suggests that an amount of grey matter in this area may increase happiness (The structural neural substrate of subjective happiness (Wataru Sato, Takanori Kochiyama, Shota Uono, Yasutaka Kubota, Reiko Sawada, Sayaka Yoshimura & Motomi Toichi, 2015) Thus, the whole history of stoicism may be put in perspective: with a metaphysical framework to understand the mind, the findings could be used to determine the internal nature of happiness.

17 This metaphysical view is rather in a non-reductive physicalism, otherwise a reductionism may erase our phenomenology as Smart (1959) suggested, and Churchland or Dennett may defend via materialism eliminativist.

But how is it possible to have a judgement of the event? How can we judge that someone is in pain, distress, suffering, misery or agony? If we see somebody crying, we may assume that the person is in pain or suffering, if we see somebody laughing, we can infer that the person is happy. This is possible nor by a principle of humanity neither via an interpretivism. How can we explain the mental states in us and in others?

Firstly, according to the functionalism, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears (among others) are mental states because they play a given role in the cognitive system. Now, these roles can be grounded in the scientific theory as Smart suggests, however, this reductive explanation, is by no means satisfactory. Rather, the position of David Lewis as sympathetic with a physicalist account of mind. He suggests that what plays the role in our mental states is the folk psychology. Wolfgang Schwarz declares that:

Lewis held that psychological states are individuated by their causal-functional profile. Pain, for example, may be characterized as whatever state is typically caused by burns and injuries, causes such-and-such signs of distress, a desire for the state to go away, and so on. If it turns out that some biological state, say C-fibre firing, uniquely plays this role, then it has turned

out that C-fibre firing is pain. According to Lewis, the roles that characterize mental states can be extracted from folk psychology: our tacit but shared beliefs about how mental states interact with one another, what kind of behavior they tend to cause, and how they change under the impact of perceptual stimulation. Folk psychology implicitly defines our mental vocabulary: 'pain', 'hunger' etc. mean 'whatever state plays this and that role' (504).

It is worth remembering that Lewis has a view in which functionalism (analytic-functionalism) is based on material metaphysics. And as result of that, it can be suggested that if this modern view of physicalism can be equated with the views hold by the Stoics, then a contemporary account of philosophy of mind can explain successfully the view of happiness that Epictetus holds. In this use case, the relation by linguistic means that we have with the representations (phenomenal properties that injects intentionality into the world).

Hence, if the relation with the proposition by means of the attitude can be changed, our relationship with the object can be different. In other words, rather to say, if I fear that it will rain, a stoic way to handle the adverse weather may be by changing the attitude toward the proposition,

“I hope that it will rain”. As Epictetus acknowledges, we cannot change the fact that it will rain; however, what we can change is our representation and the attitude towards that event. Moreover, Spinoza claims that, “From what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate. Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else but pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (1980, 0. 163). Spinoza in the same way as the Stoics, suggests that our emotions are ideas –representations – of external causes. What we could do is to change our narrative, our linguistic tools to confront the situation, because there are not, according to the Stoicism, “perceptions which do not involve conceptualization and thinking...”¹⁸ (Annas 78). Yet, this only can occur once the phenomenology is realized. In this manner, the intentionality is injected into the world.

Once again, let us underline the fact that to the Stoicism the appearance is rational. This with a thought that realizes the content articulated

by language. Therefore, it can be suggested that what plays the role of this thought is folk psychology. In words of Schwartz, “a desire of happiness can be manifest in all kind of behavior, depending on what else the subject believes and desires” (504). A belief plays a fundamental role, and if this role is given by folk psychology, we react to external events in a way determined by the way we believe the things that we believe. In other words, most of our attitudes toward external objects can be determined by the justifications that we may have; however, it may be the case that most of our beliefs are not justified. And so, epistemologically, our happiness must depend not on the external objects themselves, rather than in the justification of the beliefs that we have. To have a desire of happiness, we must justify our beliefs, and consequently, a more accurate representation. In this situation, instead of believing that cancer is a direct ticket to paradise –or hell – we could justify our knowledge about death in a different way, and thinking about the cancer in a different way, with a different narrative.

Let us go back to the Stoic conception. According to Rubarth, “Assent occurs when the mind accepts a phantasia as true (or more accurately accepts the subsisting lekton as true). (párrafo 36), thus, the judgment referred to Epictetus consists on merely

18 Indeed, as Patricia Kitcher suggests, Kant may defend an idea of concept, as she claims that “Intuitions are singular representations that relate directly to objects; by contrast, concepts are general representations that relate to objects only through relating to intuitive representation” (Kitcher, 2017). In other words, concepts may be required to unify cognition, in this sense, concepts in Kant may play the role of the hegemonikon.

opinions. Therefore, the change in the narrative suggested by Epictetus must be in line with the acceptance that epistemologically we must prove our phantasies. As the ancient philosopher admits: “It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these things” (Epictetus 4). Again, according to stoicism, in order to have an epistemological access to our minds, we must have first a linguistic framework. Hence, a more contemporary approach to our beliefs, and how such beliefs play the role via folk psychology in our functional states (not linguistic brute facts as the Stoics hold), can clarify the way we can reinterpret reality in our favor.

Equally important, this viewpoint is not exempt of critics. Patricia Churchland argues that folk psychology and propositional attitudes are replaced by neuroscience. Daniel Dennett (1996) believes also that we confer intentional states to other people or animals based on the principle of humanity. In his view, we do not know their intentional states, because we do not have them. We just make an interpretation of our mental states. However, we cannot simply deny mental states. Both philosophers deny mental states to avoid the metaphysical and epistemological problems by recurring to a reductive account. Metaphysically speaking, this can avoid by exploring further a non-reductive physicalist

view and an indirect realism. This problem is mostly avoided because of old-fashioned metaphysics and problems related to skepticism. Nevertheless, if the metaphysical framework to explain our mentality is a reduction, we are in a dead end. Consequently, a metaphysical theory of happiness based on the nature of the mind could be hard to defend –unless a kind of representationalism can be granted. However, as I have explained, the representationalism is not a correct way to interpret the mind.

The ideas that the Stoicism and Epictetus defend can be further discussed on the light of a non-reductive physicalism and the view based on analytic functionalism. Sadly, there is no room to discuss the base of such theories in detail here; however, it is worth to say that our perceptions, our mental states rooted in the brain states play a crucial role in determining that happiness, is not limited to some just external objects that carry any given information. Instead, happiness must deal also with how such information is processed in our brains, and then how our phenomenology realized by such brain states recreates the objects.

Indeed, the history of cognition, social, economic, linguistic and other factors of an agent determine the way that the information is transformed. They impact our epistemological

relation with the world; therefore, our judgements or passions toward the world. For this reason, what Epictetus suggests is that what we can change is our narrative, the things that affect us product of the way that our senses provide us information (phantasia). This is possible because our phenomenological experience and representation is something that may depend upon us, rather to think that happiness is determined by external objects or that the objects themselves provide the content via transparency. Therefore, the idea to explore a metaphysical framework based on the contemporary ideas of analytic-functionalism, a non-reductive physicalism, and a theory of folk psychology, are the actual departure points to explore and understand one of the most elusive tasks of the human being: the nature and pursuit of happiness.

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NORMAS PARA PRESENTACIÓN DE ARTÍCULOS

La *Revista de Teología Siwô´* se publica dos veces al año. Tiene como objetivo principal promover el desarrollo de la investigación teológica y del campo desde las ciencias de la religión en los ámbitos nacional e internacional. Siwô´ publica artículos, comentarios y notas bibliográficas. Los trabajos solo se publicarán cuando reciban opiniones favorables de dos árbitros; si un manuscrito recibe dictámenes divergentes, se enviará a un tercer árbitro. El tipo de arbitraje es doble ciego, es decir, hay anonimato de ambas partes (autor y árbitros). Finalmente, el Consejo Editorial aprobará o rechazará la publicación del manuscrito y comunicará la decisión al autor o a la autora.

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El artículo debe presentarse en letra Times New Roman, 12 puntos, espacio y medio. Su extensión no debe ser menor de 12 páginas ni mayor de 25. La división de párrafos debe tener sangría.

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- Emplee una redacción fluida.
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- Utilice cursivas (itálicas) para dar énfasis o escribir palabras en otra lengua.
- Si el texto incluye fuentes del griego o hebreo, indíquelo.
- Las citas de cuatro líneas o menores van dentro del párrafo; las citas mayores de cuatro líneas van fuera de párrafo. Regule la inclusión de citas.
- Las fuentes bibliográficas deben seguir el siguiente orden del formato CHICAGO.

A. Libros

I. Libros con un autor

Nota al pie de página

Joseph Campbell, *El héroe de las mil caras* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999), 218-223.

Cita en el texto

(Campbell 1999, 218-223)

Bibliografía

Campbell, Joseph. 1999. *El héroe de las mil caras*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

II. Libros con dos o más autores

Nota al pie de página

Alberto Bernabé y Ana Isabel Jiménez San Cristóbal, *Instructions for the Netherworld: The Orphic Gold Tablets* (Leiden / Boston: Brill Academic Pub, 2008), 100.

Cita en el texto

(Bernabé y Jiménez San Cristóbal 2008, 100)

Bibliografía

Bernabé, Alberto y Ana Isabel Jiménez San Cristóbal. 2008. *Instructions for the Netherworld: The Orphic Gold Tablets*. Leiden / Boston: Brill Academic Pub.

Nota: Cuando es un libro con más de tres autores las notas al pie de página deben incluir el nombre del primer autor seguido por "et al." o "y otros". Las dos opciones son correctas. En la bibliografía, usualmente se ponen todos los autores, sin embargo, también se puede utilizar "et al." o "y otros".

III. Capítulo de un libro con un solo autor

Nota al pie de página

Antonio Piñero, "Las religiones de "misterios": la búsqueda de la salvación y de la inmortalidad," en *Año I. Israel y su mundo cuando nació Jesús* (España: Laberinto, 2008), 153-172.

Cita en el texto

(Piñero 2008, 156)

Bibliografía

Piñero, Antonio. 2008. Las religiones de “misterios”: la búsqueda de la salvación y de la inmortalidad. En *Año I. Israel y su mundo cuando nació Jesús*, 153-172. España: Laberinto.

B. Revistas

I. Artículos de revistas de difusión

Nota al pie de página

Gabriel Zaid, “La fe en el progreso,” *Letras Libres*, noviembre 2004, 21.

Cita en el texto

(Zaid 2004, 21)

Bibliografía

Zaid, Gabriel. 2004. La fe en el progreso. *Letras Libres*, noviembre.

II. Artículos de revistas académicas

Nota al pie de página

Francisco Díez de Velasco, “Comentarios iconográficos y mitológicos del poema épico Miníada,” *Revista Gerión* 8 (1990): 73-86.

Cita en el texto

(Díez de Velasco 2008)

Bibliografía

Díez de Velasco, Francisco. 2008. Comentarios iconográficos y mitológicos del poema épico Miníada,” *Revista Gerión* 8 (1990): 73-86.

C. Tesis

Nota al pie de página

Ana Isabel Jiménez San Cristóbal, “Rituales órficos” (tesis doctoral, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2002), 211-223.

Cita en el texto

(Jiménez San Cristóbal 2002, 211-223)

Bibliografía

Jiménez San Cristóbal, Ana Isabel. 2002. Rituales órficos. Tesis doctoral, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.

D. Conferencia, ensayo o artículo presentado en un evento académico

Nota al pie de página

Antonio Piñero, “La verdadera historia de la Pasión” (conferencia presentada en las “V Jornadas del Misterio de la Costa Tropical,” Granada, España, 18 de octubre al 21 de octubre, 2017).

Cita en el texto

(Piñero 2017)

Bibliografía

Piñero, Antonio. 2017. La verdadera historia de la Pasión. Conferencia presentada en las V Jornadas del Misterio de la Costa Tropical, 18 de octubre al 21 de octubre, en Granada, España.

Además de las referencias al pie de página, el artículo debe llevar un apartado final titulado “referencias bibliográficas”, donde aparezcan, en orden alfabético, todos los documentos citados.

El artículo debe ordenarse de la siguiente forma:

- Título del trabajo no debe exceder quince palabras.
- Nombre del autor o la autora.
- Fecha de entrega del material.
- Resumen en castellano, que no exceda las cien palabras y su respectivo *Abstract* en inglés.
- Palabras claves en español (un máximo de cinco) y sus respectivas *Keywords* en inglés.
- Introducción, desarrollo de secciones, conclusiones y fuentes consultadas.



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